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ARTICLES
The Legal Bounds of Physician Conduct
Hastening Death
NORMAN L. CANTORt AND GEORGE C. THOMAS Itt
For many, the thought of an ignoble end, steeped in decay, is
abhorrent. A quiet, proud death, bodily integrity intact, is a matter
of extreme consequence.'
The law prohibits, as murder, the intentional shortening of a
patient's life, regardless of the motive of the doctor or the age,
medical condition, or wishes of the patient... It remains as much
murder intentionally to shorten the life of an aged, terminally ill
cancer patient who pleads for death as it is to kill a young person
in the prime of life who strenuously objects to death.
Herman Michelle is a hypothetical 68 year-old male
afflicted with terminal lung cancer and experiencing severe
physical and emotional distress. Living with this
degenerative condition has become so dismal that he
prefers death. The pain in Herman's chest region is
sometimes excruciating. Lung weakness prompts an
t Professor of Law, Justice Nathan L. Jacobs Scholar, Rutgers University
School of Law, Newark. The research assistance of Robert Beckelman, a student
at Rutgers Law School, is gratefully acknowledged.
tt Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law, Newark.
1. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 310-11 (1990)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
2. John Keown, The Legal Revolution: From Sanctity of Life to Quality of
Life and Autonomy, 14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POLY 253, 264-65 (1998).
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uncomfortable shortness of breath often accompanied by a
choking sensation. Nausea is frequent. Moreover, Herman
previously witnessed the protracted dying process of two
loved ones afflicted with lung cancer. He therefore has
enormous anxiety about his prospective deterioration-fear
of increased pain, helplessness, and indignity. A psychiatric
consult has determined that while Herman is sad and
distressed, he is mentally competent to make his own
medical decisions.
Herman is suffering grievously and faces a two to three
month process of further deterioration ending in death.
While Herman has received first-rate palliative care,
including an array of pharmacological interventions, and
while he has been informed about available support
services, his fatigue, discomfort, and anxiety remain acute.
In such a situation, a dying medical patient like Herman
might contemplate diverse ways of accelerating death.
Consider the following lethal courses of action that
might tempt Herman. As Herman has little appetite and
ingesting food prompts pain and nausea, Herman might
refuse further mouth feeding and also decline artificial
nutrition and hydration. Death would follow within 10 to 14
days. (We call this voluntary stopping of eating and
drinking-VSED). Alternatively, Herman might seek
administration of increased dosages of opioids or other pain
relievers. He might do so with the hope and expectation
that the increased dosages would not only relieve pain, but
might also depress his respiratory function and prompt his
death earlier than would otherwise be the case. (This course
we call use of risky analgesics). Or Herman might
determine that his suffering is so acute and unbearable
that analgesic relief is inadequate; he might then seek
administration of sedatives that would render him
somnolent or unconscious all of the time. If he
simultaneously instructed his care providers not to initiate
artificial nutrition or hydration during his unconsciousness,
his death within days would be assured. Alternatively,
Herman might ask for a supply of barbiturates or opioid
analgesics so large that their ingestion would prompt his
immediate death-i.e., physician-assisted suicide. If
disinclined to ingest such poisonous substances, he might
ask a physician to administer a fatal injection of sodium
chloride or barbiturates-i.e., active euthanasia. Finally,
once Herman becomes ventilator dependent because of his
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thoracic deficiencies, he might refuse the ventilator or order
its discontinuance in order to precipitate his death. Perhaps
at that stage medical personnel would offer Herman
sedatives that would ease the panic and discomfort
accompanying ventilator withdrawal, but might also pose
some risk of further accelerating death.
Which of these modes of hastening death are lawful so
that medical personnel may cooperate with Herman's
efforts to die? The answers in some instances are easy.
Herman's rejection of life-sustaining medical intervention
(the ventilator) is clearly his prerogative.! Conversely,
except in Oregon, American medical personnel are
forbidden to supply a substance that they know the patient
will use for suicide. In all jurisdictions, health care
providers are also banned from themselves injecting a
lethal poisonous substance, even with the patient's consent.
The legality of other means that Herman might seek to
employ-cessation of eating and drinking, risky analgesics,
and terminal sedation-is more puzzling and complex. This
article will focus primarily on those means of hastening
death.
The main objective here is to delineate which measures
physicians may take to facilitate the death of a dying
patient. Medical management of the dying process has been
a reality at least since the 1950s when medical science
developed the tools to extend life beyond a point that some
patients would wish to live.' Since the Quinlan5 case in
1976, courts and legislatures have struggled to fix the
precise legal bounds of such medical management.
Controversy over the appropriate bounds of medical
management of the dying process has flared within the last
several years. Proponents of assisted suicide and of active
euthanasia have contended that given the scope of
permissible practices (withdrawal of life support and some
uses of risky analgesics), refusal to permit assisted suicide
is arbitrary. A typical comment:
3. See infra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
4. See generally ROBERT VEATCH, DEATH, DYING AND THE BIOLOGICAL
REVOLUTION (2d ed. 1989); ROBERT F. WEIR, ABATING TREATMENT WITH
CRITICALLY ILL PATIENTS (1989); NORMAN L. CANTOR, LEGAL FRONTIERS OF
DEATH AND DYING (1987).
5. See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
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We have created ethical and legal distinctions that allow some
suffering patients this choice [death rather than continued
suffering], but arbitrarily exclude others whose suffering may be
even more extreme and intractable. From the perspective of many
suffering patients and their families, some of these distinctions
have little meaning and are often not helpful.6
The Supreme Court in the recent assisted suicide cases
heard claims that punishment of assistance to suicide is so
arbitrary (in light of licit means of assisting dying) as to be
unconstitutional! While the Supreme Court ruled that
continued punishment of assistance to suicide withstands
federal constitutional challenge, the Court by no means
ended debate about the precise legal bounds of diverse
techniques for facilitating death or about the soundness of
current legal distinctions.
This article examines remaining questions about the
legal bounds of practices such as VSED, use of risky
analgesics, and terminal sedation. Clinicians deserve
clarification of the scope of currently permissible practices
so that they can conform their behavior to law.8 Defining
the scope of permissible practices is also important to the
ongoing debate, now shifting from the Supreme Court to
state legislatures and courts9 about possible tensions
between forbidden and permitted practices surrounding the
dying process. For even if the existing distinctions
6. Timothy E. Quill, Risk Taking by Physicians in Legally Gray Areas, 57
ALB. L. REV. 693, 694 (1994) [hereinafter Quill et al., Risk Taking]; see also J.
Andrew Billings & Susan D. Block, Slow Euthanasia, 12 J. PALLIATIVE CARE 21,
26 (1996) (noting "little practical significance" in distinctions between
withdrawal of treatment, use of risky analgesics, euthanasia, and physician-
assisted suicide); Timothy E. Quill et al., Palliative Options of Last Resort, 278
JAMA 2099 (1997) [hereinafter Quill et al., Palliative Options]; John A.
Robertson, Respect for Life in Bioethical Dilemmas-The Case of Physician-
Assisted Suicide, 45 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 329 (1997); LANCE K. STELL, PHYSICIAN
ASSISTED SuiCIDE 225, 242 (Margaret P. Battin et al., eds., 1998).
7. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 775-77 (1997) (Souter, J.,
concurring); id. at 748-49 (Stevens, J., concurring and noting a "significant
tension" between traditional prohibitions on physicians and emerging
practices).
8. See Howard Brody, Physician Assisted Suicide in the Courts: Moral
Equivalence, Double Effect, and Clinical Practice, 82 MINN. L. REV. 939, 962
(1998) (explaining that gray areas of end-of-life practice remain).
9. See, e.g., Ezekiel J. Emanuel, The Future of Euthanasia and Physician-
Assisted Suicide: Beyond Rights Talk to Informed Public Policy, 82 MINN. L.
REV. 983 (1998).
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withstand federal constitutional scrutiny, questions remain
whether, as a matter of public policy, current boundaries
are sensible and sufficiently accommodate the social drive
for death with dignity.
Our conclusion is not that the ineluctable logic of
accepted practices dictates legalization of suicide assistance
and active euthanasia. As we will show, the differential
legal treatment of various modes of hastening death is
logically tenable and defensible. Nonetheless, we suspect
that some distinctions in legal treatment of modes of
hastening death, to be examined below, are so fragile as to
be ultimately swept aside by the momentum of people's
yearning for death with a modicum of dignity," a death void
of a protracted period of severe debilitation, indignity, or
suffering. In our view, some of the theoretical distinctions
within the current legal framework are so subtle or so
debatable that they cannot ultimately prevail in the face of
public pressures to secure death with dignity. Moreover, the
theoretical consistency of the framework governing current
end-of-life practices (to the extent consistency exists) is not
the only issue. Other grounds to support current
distinctions in legal treatment of modes of hastening death
include supposed differences in the risk of abuse of patients
and adverse impact on medical mores from certain modes of
hastening death." Those apprehensions must also be
analyzed in order to finalize public policy.
I. WITHDRAWAL OF LIFE SUPPORT
Among Herman's contemplated modes of hastening his
death, withdrawal of a ventilator sustaining his existence
would be the most certainly protected. Once Herman's lung
function deteriorates to the point where he is ventilator
dependent, he would unquestionably be entitled to direct
discontinuance of such life support (and medical personnel
would be entitled to implement his wishes) even though the
10. Some commentators would vigorously disagree. Yale Kamisar, for
example, argues that current distinctions among means of hastening death
represent "an historical and pragmatic compromise" worth preserving in the
interests of protecting the vulnerable and promoting sanctity of life principles.
Against Assisted Suicide-Even a Very Limited Form, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REV.
735, 757-58 (1995). For reasons to be explained in the text, our assessment is
that current distinctions are too ephemeral to prevail.
11. See infra Part V.
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disconnection would result in his prompt demise. Since
1976, when Quinlan was decided, the courts have uniformly
upheld the prerogative of a competent person facing a
potentially fatal disease to decide whether to initiate and to
maintain life-sustaining medical intervention. 2  That
prerogative has sometimes been grounded in the common
law, especially the tort law notion of informed consent as a
prerequisite to medical treatment, and sometimes in
constitutional liberty. In 1991, in dictum in Cruzan," the
United States Supreme Court "strongly suggested" that
liberty under the 14th Amendment to the federal
constitution encompasses a right to refuse unwanted
medical intervention. 4  Thus, Herman's decision to
withdraw a ventilator would not only be recognized in every
state but would also likely be anchored in the federal
Constitution.
A physician's disconnection of the ventilator apparatus
would be an action that hastens Herman's death in the
sense that he would die significantly sooner than if he
remained on the ventilator. Indeed, if the disconnection
took place counter to Herman's instructions it would be a
criminal homicide. 5 And if, as posited at the outset,
Herman really wanted to die when he sought removal of the
ventilator, there is a temptation to characterize the
physician's conduct in disconnecting the ventilator as
euthanasia or assistance to suicide.
Some commentators have asserted that a patient
rejecting life support while intending to die is really
committing suicide. 6 According to one definition: "A suicide
12. See WEIR, supra note 4, at 73-87; see also CANTOR, supra note 4, at 2-16.
13. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-79
(1990).
14. Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged in 1997 that his Cruzan opinion
had "strongly suggested" the existence of this federal constitutional right.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997). In Cruzan itself, Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion had declared that forced medical intervention
would offend a person's constitutional "freedom to determine the course of her
own treatment." 497 U.S. at 288-89.
15. See STELL, supra note 6, at 245; Alan Meisel, Physician-Assisted Suicide:
A Common Law Roadmap for State Courts, 24 FORDHAM. URB. L.J. 817, 846-48
(1997); David Orentlicher, The Legalization of Physician-Assisted Suicide: A
Very Modest Revolution, 38 B.C. L. REV. 443, 447-48 (1997).
16. This was Justice Scalia's argument in his concurring opinion in Cruzan.
See 497 U.S. at 296-97; see also STELL, supra note 6, at 6; ROBERT N.
WENNBERG, TERMINAL CHOICES: EUTHANASIA, SUICIDE, AND THE RIGHT TO DIE 19-
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is a death one brings on oneself by doing or omitting
something with the specific intent that one will die as a
result, and where there is reason for one to believe that
what one does.., is substantially certain to produce that
result."7 Such a sweeping definition of suicide would
encompass Herman whose intention in discontinuing the
ventilator is to die. 8 A physician disconnecting the
ventilator would then ostensibly be implicated in Herman's
suicidal course of conduct. 9 If one accepts this broad
definition of suicide as including rejection of life support,
and if rejection of life support is constitutionally protected,
the argument follows that at least one form of physician-
assisted suicide (rejection of life support) had already been
recognized as a patient's prerogative well before 1997.20 A
position that essentially equates rejection of treatment with
suicide would have enormous implications for the recent
claim that physician-assisted suicide is a constitutionally
protected liberty. For example, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals in 1996 contended that medical withdrawal of life
support at the request of a competent patient is "nothing
more nor less than assisted suicide."2' That conclusion led to
the Second Circuit's determination (overturned by the
Supreme Court) that New York's ban on assistance to
suicide was an arbitrary denial of equal protection of the
laws. New York had previously acknowledged a patient's
23 (1989).
17. STELL, supra note 6, at 231.
18. Not every patient who seeks discontinuance of life support intends to
die. A particular patient might find a form of life support (e.g., a respirator) to
be intolerable and might hope for survival without the hated device. But some
patients, like Herman, prefer death over their gravely debilitated condition.
19. Technically, as the physician and not the patient is performing the
ultimate death-causing act (withdrawal of the ventilator), the physician's
conduct would constitute active euthanasia rather than assistance to suicide.
See Yale Kamisar, "The Right to Die': On Drawing (and Erasing) Lines, 35 DUQ.
L. REV. 481, 486 n.27 (1996). Another perspective is that the physician's role
constitutes an intentional killing, but is justified. See ALLEN BUCHANAN,
INTENDING DEATH: THE STRUCTURE OF THE PROBLEM AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS,
IN INTENDING DEATH 30 (Beauchamp ed. 1996). Alan Meisel has commented:
"Doctors have been permitted... to kill terminally ill patients for at least two
decades." Meisel, supra note 15, at 857.
20. "Physicians already have the tacitly recognized liberty to provide suicide
assistance by ordering stopped life-sustaining medical treatment." STELL, supra
note 6, at 245.
21. Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 729 (2d Cir. 1996), quoted in Vacco v. Quill,
521 U.S. 793, 798 (1997).
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right to reject life-sustaining medical intervention.22
Is the physician's affirmative conduct hastening
Herman's death (disconnecting the ventilator) basically a
form of physician assistance to suicide? Certainly, the many
courts that between 1976 and 1997 upheld a patient's right
to reject life-sustaining medical intervention believed that
rejection of treatment was legally distinguishable from
suicide. The New Jersey Supreme Court's 1976 Quinlan
opinion commented: 'We would see.., a real distinction
between the self-infliction of deadly harm [suicide] and a
self-determination against artificial life support.., in the
face of irreversible, painful and certain imminent death."
State legislatures between 1976 and 1997 concurred in this
assessment. The "natural death" and "living will" statutes
enacted in that period uniformly provided that the
withdrawal of life support pursuant to a patient's
instructions was not to be equated with suicide or
assistance to suicide. 3 Courts subsequent to Quinlan
elaborated on the instinctive line drawn initially by the
New Jersey Supreme Court. These courts did not focus on
the presence of immediate and certain death as suggested
by the above Quinlan quote. Rather, subsequent cases
suggested two possible distinctions between suicide and
rejection of life-sustaining medical intervention-that
rejection of treatment, in contrast to suicide, does not
involve either a self-initiated lethal action or a specific
intent by the patient to bring about death.24
The absence of a self-initiated cause of death, wholly
apart from the specific intent (which we discuss below),"
provides a foundation for the distinction sought to be drawn
by the courts and legislatures. Powerful sympathy with a
medical patient's plight (afflicted by a fatal disease) helps
explain the tendency to differentiate rejection of life support
from more typical modes of self-destruction, such as
22. See Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 551 N.E.2d 77, 80-81 (N.Y. 1990).
23. For a list of such statutes, see Choice in Dying, Refusal of Treatment
Legislation: A State by State Compilation of Enacted and Model Statutes
(1996).
24. See, e.g., Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 22-26 (Cal.
1984); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); In re
Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1224 (N.J. 1986).
25. See infra note 41 (explaining why the specific intent element does not
adequately differentiate rejection of life support from suicide).
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shooting oneself.26 When a person has a fatal natural
affliction and medicine proposes to intervene via bodily
invasions, the patient's interest in determining how and if
to combat the affliction is self-evident. Sympathy with the
stricken patient's delicate decision regarding how much to
suffer from the affliction, how much to struggle in response,
how much bodily invasion to undergo, how much
debilitation and indignity to tolerate, accounts for the
universal willingness to give competent patients a choice to
decline life-sustaining medical intervention. Because bodily
integrity is involved, and because nature, not the patient,
has initiated the fatal course, there is reluctance to taint
rejection of treatment with the moral disapproval usually
surrounding suicide. This is true even if the patient's
debilitation and distress are so extreme that the patient
specifically intends to die at the moment of withholding or
withdrawal of life support.27 The legal structure prefers to
regard the afflicted patient as acquiescing in a natural
dying process, letting nature take its course (as opposed to
self-initiated fatal acts such as shooting oneself or ingesting
a poison).
Common sense also dictates recognition of a patient's
prerogative to resist life-sustaining medical intervention
without attribution of suicide or other negative labels.
Otherwise, a debilitated cancer patient rejecting
chemotherapy, or a kidney disease patient declining further
dialysis, would be branded a suicide. The impetus would
then exist for medical personnel to extend life support until
the patient's last possible breath in order to prevent such a
suicide.28 The specter of forced treatment of a resisting
dying patient is indeed gruesome. Law takes a sensible
course in regarding a patient's shaping of medical response
to a fatal affliction as a basic patient prerogative.
26. N. ANN DAVIS, THE RIGHT TO REFUSE TREATMENT, in INTENDING DEATH
119 (T. Beauchamp ed., 1996).
27. A number of cases sustain a patient's prerogative to decline medical
intervention even if the patient finds further debilitated existence intolerable
and therefore intends to die. See infra note 75.
28. "If life-sustaining treatment could not be rejected, vast numbers of
patients would be 'at the mercy of every technological advance.'" Kamisar, The
Right to Die, supra note 19, at 493 (quoting NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE AND
THE LAW, WHEN DEATH IS SOUGHT: ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE
MEDICAL CoNTExT 75 (1994)).
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The notion of acquiescing in a natural dying process is
clearest when the patient simply declines treatment at the
onset of a fatal disease. But even if Herman's order is to
disconnect a previously instituted therapy (a ventilator),
and even if the detachment precipitates his immediate
death, the underlying lung cancer can still be regarded as
the proximate cause of death. Withdrawal of the ventilator
allows nature (the lung cancer) to take its fatal course by
restoring the circumstances prevailing prior to the artificial
intervention (the ventilator). "
In theory, it would have been possible to differentiate
between withholding of life support (omission) and
withdrawal of life support (action). Courts have uniformly
rejected such a distinction, preferring to recognize a
patient's prerogative to forgo medical intervention (whether
by withholding or withdrawing care) based on interests in
self-determination and bodily integrity. As the New Jersey
Supreme Court commented: "[A]ctive steps to terminate life
sustaining interventions may be permitted, indeed
required, by the patient's authority to forgo therapy even
when such steps lead to death.""° Withdrawal of life support
is then regarded as removing a medically placed artificial
obstacle to a natural death and treated as the moral and
practical equivalent of medical non-intervention.
Nor would it make sense to differentiate between non-
initiation and withdrawal of life support for purposes of
defining the permissible scope of physician conduct. That is,
it would be foolish policy to allow a physician to refrain
from starting a life-sustaining procedure (omission), but
forbid the withdrawal of the procedure once started. Such a
policy would create an unfortunate disincentive to trying
treatments that might have some chance of success for fear
that, if the treatment failed, the debilitated patient would
have to remain tethered indefinitely to a medical
apparatus.3
29. But see Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 729 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that there
is "nothing natural" in causing death by withdrawal of a ventilator or by
withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration).
30. In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1234 (N.J. 1986) (quoting PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL
AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT
72 (1983)).
31. See Karnisar, Against Assisted Suicide-Even a Very Limited Form, supra
note 10, at 755-56.
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As Alan Meisel observes, deciding whether to attribute
liability to a physician for withdrawing life support is not a
simple matter of omission versus commission or of "but for"
causation.2 Rather, attribution of blame is shaped in part
by policy considerations such as patient autonomy and
health care providers' duty to respect that autonomy.33
Meisel offers as an illustration a physician who withdraws
a respirator without patient authorization because the
physician wishes to save electricity.34 The physician's action
is homicide and the withdrawal is the proximate cause of
death. By contrast, if the physician withdraws the
respirator in response to the patient's request, the
physician is fulflling a legal duty to respect autonomy35 and
the underlying disease (a natural dying process) is legally
regarded as the proximate cause of death.36 Again, the
patient's prerogative to control medical intervention is the
determinative factor.
All this helps to explain how the Supreme Court in
1997 could conclude that New York's distinction between
withdrawal of life support (permitted) and physician
assistance to suicide (forbidden) was rational enough to
withstand an equal protection challenge. In reaching that
conclusion in Vacco v. Quill,7 Chief Justice Rehnquist's
majority opinion? alluded to the causative element-that a
stricken patient rejecting life support dies from the
underlying disease rather than a self-initiated action 39 -and
to the element of bodily integrity implicated when a patient
32. See Meisel, supra note 15, at 840-42, 847-48.
33. See id. at 845-48.
34. See id. at 846-47.
35. See GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 609 (1978) (noting
that treating removal of life support as equivalent to withholding of treatment
is confined to a "limited set of cases" where unavoidable death is imminent). We
regard the patient's prerogative to control medical intervention as the key
element, whether death is imminent or not.
36. The roles of patient prerogative and physician duty are prominent
whether the physician's conduct is omission or commission. A physician would
be criminally culpable for omission of treatment (withholding the respirator) if
the patient had wanted the life-extending treatment and could benefit from it.
37. 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
38. Although the Rehnquist opinion is labeled a majority opinion, the fifth
vote was provided by Justice O'Connor, who expressed distinctive views in her
concurring opinion. See infra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
39. See Vacco, 521 U.S. at 801.
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resists unwanted treatment." These elements were deemed
sufficiently rational to support the customary legal and
medical differentiation between withdrawal of life support
and assistance to suicide.41
That such a differentiation is sufficiently rational to
withstand constitutional challenge does not, of course,
mean that it is necessarily sound or sensible as a matter of
public policy. We will discuss later Herman's request for a
prescription of a lethal dose of barbiturates, i.e., his possible
resort to physician-assisted suicide. That later discussion
will address whether continued prohibition of physician
assistance to suicide reflects sound public policy. For the
40. See id. at 807. Bodily integrity is more respected when it involves
resistance to invasions (including medical treatment) than introduction of
substances into the body (such as addictive substances, poisons, or bullets). See
id.
41. Chief Justice Rehnquist also tried to use specific intent of the actors
(patient and physician) as a factor differentiating treatment withdrawal from
assistance to suicide. His basic contention was that a physician withdrawing
treatment may only intend to respect a patient's choice while a physician
providing a lethal poison must necessarily intend that the patient die. See id. at
801-02. Reliance on specific intent as a major distinguishing factor in this
context is shaky. As many commentators have noted, a dying patient rejecting
life support may well intend to bring about death as a form of relief. See STELL,
supra note 6, at 234-35; Meisel, supra note 15, at 837; Quill et al., Palliative
Options, supra note 6, at 2102. Even if a patient does not exactly wish to die, if
the patient's main object is relief from suffering and that object can be attained
only by death, then the mindset accompanying rejection of further treatment (in
order to hasten death) is quite close to the specific intent of any suicide who
finds existence unbearably painful or meaningless. Justice Stevens in Vacco
noted that there is often "little distinction... [in] intent" among people
performing various end-of-life practices. 521 U.S. at 750 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) On the irrelevance of a physician's specific intent in this context,
see Ann Alpers, Criminal Act or Palliative Care? Prosecutions Involving the
Care of the Dying, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHIcs 308, 316 (1998); Elizabeth J. Latimer,
Ethical Decision-Making in the Care of the Dying, 6 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT.
329, 334 (1991); David Orentlicher, The Supreme Court and Terminal Sedation,
24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 947, 957-59 (1997). In theory, law might have
demanded that a patient rejecting life support not have a specific intent to die.
Under such a regime, a patient could reject treatment because of its
burdensome side effects, but could not reject treatment because life had become
so dismal that death was preferable. See Keown, supra note 2, at 266-67; see
also Daniel Sulmasy, Killing and Allowing to Die: Another Look, 26 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 55, 60 (1998) (drawing a moral distinction between removal of life
support because of the burdens of machinery and removal with an intent to
bring about death). However, law has never drawn such a line. A patient
rejecting life support may be motivated by a conviction that current or
prospective existence is so dismal that death is preferable. See McKay v.
Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990).
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moment, one mode of hastening death-withdrawal of life-
sustaining medical intervention-has been established as a
legitimate form of self-determination available to Herman
Michelle.
II. CESSATION OF EATING AND DRINKING
In one scenario, Herman decides to stop eating and
drinking and to reject all forms of artificial nutrition and
hydration proffered. His hope is to die within 14 days as
opposed to the two to three month period projected with
continued nutrition. He does not expect any pain and
suffering associated with this process of death by
dehydration, as he expects his health care providers to
furnish palliative care. This means mouth care to avoid
dryness and cracking of lips and perhaps benzodiazepine
sedatives to ease any pain or emotional upset (possibly
suffering connected with his underlying cancer condition)
until the point when he will slip into a coma from which he
will never emerge.42 Herman sees this dehydration course
as offering a gentle passage at a significantly earlier
juncture than if he were to continue to accept nutrition and
hydration.
Notice that no natural pathology or disease process
obstructs Herman's normal processes of ingestion and
digestion. This is not an instance when illness necessitates
artificial means of nutrition and hydration (ANH). Were
that the case, Herman would clearly be entitled to reject
ANH. For ANH has uniformly been treated by the courts as
a form of medical intervention which competent patients
42. See JOANNE LYNN & JACQUELINE GLOVER, ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING, in
ENTERAL NUTRITION, IN ENTERAL AND TUBE FEEDING 580 (Rombeau & Caldwell
eds., 2d ed. 1990); James Bernat, et al., Patient Refusal of Hydration and
Nutrition, 153 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2723, 2727 (1993) (describing the
palliative measures that will eliminate suffering during the process of dying
from dehydration); Robert M. McCann, et al., Comfort Care for Terminally Ill
Patients: The Appropriate Use of Nutrition, 272 JAMA 1263, 1265-66 (1994);
Candace Jans Meares, Terminal Dehydration: A Review, 11 AM. J. HOSPICE &
PALLIATIVE CARE 10, 11 (1994). Death by dehydration is not always a tranquil
process. Some patients manifest symptoms of discomfort. See Robin Fainsinger
& Eduardo Bruera, The Management of Dehydration in Terminally Ill Patients,
J. PALLIATIVE CARE 55, 55 (1994). This means that the impact of dehydration
has to be monitored and assessed on a case by case basis. See KILLIAN DUNPLY
ET AL., REHYDRATION IN PALLIATIVE AND TERMINAL CARE, PALLIATIVE MEDICINE
221, 225 (1995).
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are entitled to refuse.43 Nor is Herman simply following the
common tendency of patients imminently dying to lose
interest in eating and drinking. With an unavoidable death
approaching within days, patients often decline food
without experiencing hunger awareness or suffering beyond
that prompted by the underlying disease process. At that
stage, physicians frequently acquiesce in this patient
predilection and refrain from parenteral nutrition.4
Herman, by contrast, is making a deliberate decision to
hasten his demise in order to shorten what has become for
him an anguishing dying process.
Herman's VSED constitutes what some commentators
herald as a simple and effective way for terminally ill or
chronically suffering patients to control the timing of their
own death.45 One advocate of this technique for managing
death argues:
We learn about how to avoid eating and drinking things we don't
want by the time we are two years old. Yet, somehow as adults we
have a tendency to forget that we have this power. Simply by
clenching our teeth and turning our heads, we can sabotage the
best efforts of any 'feeder.'... [H]umans who have lived out their
lives should be allowed to 'withdraw' when they feel that their
time has come.
Even Ann Landers endorses VSED as a means of
timing one's death.47 For most people, VSED and death by
dehydration may seem like a cumbersome way to die. But
43. See Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1141 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1986); In re Requena, 213 N.J. Super. 475, 485-86 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div.) affd, 213 N.J. Super. 443 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) (per curiam); In
re Rodas, No. 86PR139 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Mesa Co. Jan 22, 1997, as modified,
April 3, 1997) (Buss, J.); Thor v. Superior Court, 855 P.2d 375, 384 (Cal. 1993);
see also Alan Meisel, Barriers to Forgoing Nutrition and Hydration in Nursing
Homes, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 335, 352-55, 367 (1995).
44. See Paul Rousseau, Hospice and Palliative Care, DISEASE A MONTH 788,
829-30 (1995) [hereinafter Rousseau, Hospice]; Louise Printz, Terminal
Dehydration, a Compassionate Treatment, 152 ARcHIVES INTERNAL MED. 697,
700 (1992); McCann, supra note 42, at 1266; Meares, supra note 42, at 10.
45. See Bernat, supra note 42, at 2723, 2725; Quill et al., Palliative Options,
supra note 6, at 2100; Lori Montgomery, Starving is Legal Suicide Method,
DETROIT FREE PREss, Nov. 20, 1996, at 1A.
46. William Bartholome, posting to the MCW Bioethics Forum, Oct. 1, 1996
(on file with author).
47. See Ann Landers, Death With Dignity Hard to Find in Hospital Bed,
STAR-LEDGERARCHIVE, July 10, 1998, at 42.
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for a person like Herman, otherwise locked into a prolonged
and dismal dying process, VSED may seem like an
expeditious path to relief.
What is the legal status of Herman's conduct and of the
medical personnel who are asked to cooperate with his
effort to hasten death? Is Herman committing suicide? If so,
are physicians under a legal and moral obligation to try and
frustrate his effort by forced administration of artificial
nutrition and hydration? Would personnel cooperating with
Herman be guilty of aiding and abetting suicide if they
furnish palliative measures such as mouth care or
sedatives? Or is Herman invoking a right to self-
determination and/or bodily integrity when he stops eating
and drinking and insists that no intravenous or other
artificial nutrition be instituted?
Herman's conduct has many earmarks of suicide. His
determination to stop eating (and his accompanying
resistance to ANH) is an unnatural self-destructive course
prompted by despair over dismal conditions of existence.
Most philosophers concede that suicide can be accomplished
by passive means, such as a refusal to eat, as well as by
active means such as shooting or stabbing.8 The conduct at
issue is different in one important sense from rejection of
life-sustaining medical intervention by a dying patient even
where that rejection is undertaken with the specific intent
to bring about death. When a fatally stricken patient rejects
medical treatment, the natural affliction can be regarded as
the cause of death-a cause not initiated by the patient.49
When VSED brings about death, the patient has introduced
the fatal cause, dehydration, so the conduct has an element
of suicide absent when the patient merely rejects
treatment.0
48. See WENNBERG, supra note 16, at 33-34 (branding as a suicide anyone
who "intentionally creates a pre-emptive fatal condition .... "); Terence M.
O'Keefe, Suicide and Self-Starvation, in SUICIDE: RIGHT OR WRONG? 117, 123
(John Donnelly, ed. 1990).
49. We previously described how a patient acquiesces in a natural dying
process even when physicians remove a previously installed block to death such
as a respirator or artificial nutrition and hydration.
50. See K. Danner Clouser, Allowing or Causing: Another Look, 87 ANNALS
INTERNAL IED. 622, 624 (1977) (noting a difference "in principle" between
refusal of treatment and rejection of normal support for life, such as food). But
see Bernat, supra note 42, at 2725 (asserting that it is "irrelevant" whether a
competent patient invoking VSED is causing a "natural" death).
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This intuition that VSED is a form of suicide draws
support from a few judicial sources. Justice Scalia took that
position in his concurring opinion in Cruzan.5 ' In several
cases involving hunger striking prisoners whose object was
to fast until death, the courts indicated that the prisoners'
conduct constituted suicide.52 Suicide was deemed to be
implicated because the prisoner "set the death-producing
agent [dehydration] in motion [by resisting food] with the
specific intent of causing his own death."53 The saga of
Elizabeth Bouvia also supports this notion that a person
capable of eating who rejects nutrition may be committing
suicide. Ms. Bouvia was a 28 year-old quadriplegic,
suffering from severe cerebral palsy, who sought to reject
both hand feeding and ANH. When the California court
understood her to be rejecting food even though she was
capable of normal eating, her conduct was regarded as
attempted suicide and the court refused to insulate her
conduct from medical intervention. When her condition
deteriorated so that her physical affliction prevented
normal eating, the court upheld her right to reject ANH.54
Denominating VSED as a form of suicide does not
resolve its legal status. Attempting suicide, while once a
felony, is no longer a criminal act.55 This leaves room for the
law to tolerate at least some forms of suicide, including
VSED. Some medical commentators assert that VSED is
both widely accepted by palliative care physicians and
"probably legal."56 The legality assertion is made with little
or no reference to legal authority. These commentators
simply regard VSED as an extension of the acknowledged
51. "Starving oneself to death is no different from putting a gun to one's
temple as far as the common-law definition of suicide is concerned." Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Dep't Health, 497 U.S. 261, 296-97 (1990).
52. See Laurie v. Senecal, 666 A.2d 806, 809 (R.I. 1995); In re Caulk, 480
A.2d 93, 97 (N.H. 1984); Von Holden v. Chapman, 450 N.Y.S. 2d 623, 627 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1982).
53. Caulk, 480 A.2d at 97.
54. See Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 299 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1986). For a more detailed discussion of the Bouvia episode, see CANTOR, supra
note 4, at 28-30.
55. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 712-14 (1997) (sketching of
the history of legal treatment of suicide and explanation, by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, that, while suicide is no longer punished by criminal law, public
policy disfavors suicide).
56. Quill et al., Palliative Options, supra note 6, at 2103; see also Bernat,
supra note 42, at 2726; Montgomery, supra note 45, at 1A.
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right to reject life-sustaining medical intervention, invoking
the same self-determination and bodily integrity interests
recognized in that context.57 That analysis is too simplistic.
VSED indeed involves self-determination and resistance to
bodily invasion. But the commentators ignore the element
of self-initiated cause of death accompanying VSED that is
absent when a fatally stricken patient rejects ANH or other
life support. The conclusion that Herman's conduct is lawful
might be correct, but it needs further explication.
The cases concerning hunger-striking prisoners offer
mixed signals. Two American cases uphold the prerogative
of a competent prisoner to refuse to eat or accept ANH even
if that course of conduct will bring about the prisoner's
death. In Zant v. Prevatte,"8 the Georgia Supreme Court in
1982, without mentioning suicide, simply declared that a
prisoner has a constitutional right to "refuse to allow
intrusions on his person, even though [the intrusions are]
calculated to preserve his life."59 A Florida intermediate
appellate court in 1996 relied on the Florida constitution to
protect a prisoner's hunger strike."0 However, that court
circumvented the suicide issue in a manner not available to
Herman Michelle and other terminally ill patients. The
Florida case ruled that because the hunger striker was
protesting government conduct and sought changes in
government behavior, he did not intend to die. According to
the court, "the purpose of the hunger strike was to bring
about change, not death."6' It is a nice question whether a
hunger striker seeking to pressure government to make
57. See Howard Brody, Physician Assisted Suicide in the Courts: Moral
Equivalence, Double Effect, and Clinical Practice, 82 MINN. L. REV. 939, 960
(1998); see also Quill, et al., Palliative Options, supra note 6, at 2100.
58. 286 S.E.2d 715 (Ga. 1982).
59. Id. at 717. A British case also upholds the prerogative of a hunger
striker to resist "any form of physical molestation" including forced feeding. See
Secretary of State for the Home Dep't v. Robb, 1 All E.R. 677, 680 (Fam. 1995)
(declaring without analysis that resisting nutrition is not a form of suicide).
60. See Singletary v. Costello, 665 So.2d at 1109 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996);
see also Thor v. Superior Court, 855 P.2d 375 (Cal. 1993).
61. Ironically, the fact that the prisoner was seeking to extract a concession
should have been a reason for the court to intervene. For a person cannot be
allowed to coerce administrative officials by means of a threat to self-destruct.
See In re Sanchez, 577 F. Supp. 7, 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). But see Zant v. Prevatte,
286 S.E.2d 715, 717 (Ga. 1982) (holding that a hunger strike even though the
prisoner was seeking to extract concessions from prison officials).
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concessions has a suicidal intent.62 However that issue is
resolved it cannot help Herman Michelle because he has
made clear his explicit intent to die.
The bulk of the cases involving hunger strikers
acknowledge the relevance of suicide and hold that a
prisoner has no constitutional right to resist life-preserving
nutrition.63 A New York intermediate appellate court's
comment is typical:
[I]t is self-evident that the right to privacy does not include the
right to commit suicide.... To characterize a person's self-
destructive acts [hunger striking] as entitled to Constitutional
protection would be ludicrous. On the contrary, the State has a
duty to protect the health and welfare of those persons in its
custody.
Yet these cases allowing forced feeding of hunger
strikers are not really determinative of the matter of dying
medical patients. For one thing, the cases often rely on a
government interest in maintaining internal order and
discipline within a correctional institution6--an interest
that has no application to people like Herman Michelle.
Moreover, the cases sometimes involve prisoners seeking to
extract concessions via the coercive impact of a threat to
hunger strike until death.6 That coercive element alone
could warrant overriding the prisoner's effort and, again,
62. For an interesting discussion of this issue, see O'Keefe, supra note 48, at
125-31. OKeefe argues that a political hunger striker is engaged in
"instrumental self-killing," intending to put pressure on government and hoping
that government will yield and that the striker will not have to die. Id. at 127.
O'Keefe is willing to treat such instrumental self-killing as lacking an
overriding intent to die and therefore outside the bounds of suicide. See id. at
131. An alternative perspective, though, is that the prisoner knows that no
concession will be forthcoming and that he will have to die; then, his protest is
just a motive for his self-destructive act and does not alter his intent to die.
63. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena John Doe, 150 F.3d 170, 172 (2d Cir.
1998); Martinez v. Turner, 977 F.2d 421, 423 (8th Cir. 1992); Sanchez, 577 F.
Supp. at 8-9; In re Caulk, 480 A.2d 93, 97 (N.H. 1984); Commonwealth v.
Kallinger, 580 A.2d 887, 893 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990); Laurie v. Senecal, 666
A.2d 806, 808 (R.I. 1995).
64. Von Holden v. Chapman, 450 N.Y.S.2d 623, 625 (App. Div. 1982); see
also Laurie, 666 A.2d at 808-09 (holding that the state has a right and a duty to
intervene and protect patients).
65. See In re Caulk, 480 A.2d at 96; Laurie, 666 A.2d at 809.
66. See Sanchez, 577 F. Supp. at 9. But see Zant, 286 S.E.2d at 717
(upholding a hunger striker's prerogative despite the striker's attempt to exact
concessions).
2000] PHYSICIAN CONDUCT HASTENING DEATH 101
that element is absent in the case of a dying medical
patient invoking VSED.
Authority on point, cases specifically addressing a
competent, terminally ill person invoking VSED despite
being physically capable of eating, is sparse. We are aware
of only a few cases, all of them in lower courts. Two such
opinions, both in New York and both unpublished, relate to
requests from nursing homes for authorization to give ANH
to elderly, debilitated patients resisting all forms of
nutrition. Both cases involved chronically ill women in
their mid-eighties who decided to die via VSED. In both
cases, a judge refused to intervene despite the nursing
home's invocation of a New York statute authorizing
prevention of suicide. In one instance, the opinion declared
a right of an adult to determine what can be done to his or
her own body and cited cases involving refusal of life-
sustaining medical intervention.68 The court did not attach
significance to the patient's self-destructive course and did
not mention New York precedent allowing forced feeding of
a hunger-striking prisoner. In the Bouvia case, mentioned
earlier, a lower court judge ordered medical intervention for
a 28 year-old quadriplegic when it was thought that the
patient was seeking to die by refusing to eat.69
The dearth of judicial authority concerning VSED
prevents easy resort to precedent to establish the legal
status of the practice. Nonetheless, we project that judicial
non-intervention is likely to continue in instances of
suicidal VSED by competent, dying medical patients." A
major factor impelling non-intervention is revulsion at the
prospect of restraining for extended periods people who are
competent and determined to resist nutrition. Long term
feeding of a resisting patient requires physical or chemical
67. See In re Brooks (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987) (unpublished decision, on file with
the Buffalo Law Review); see also Rebecca Dresser, When Patients Resist
Feeding, 33 J. AM. GERIAT. SOCY 790, 793 (1985); A.B. v. C., 477 N.Y.S.2d 281,
284 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (describing in dictum the petition of a severely
incapacitated person whose petition was dismissed as being prematurely filed).
68. See Brooks (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987) (unpublished decision on file with the
Buffalo Law Review).
69. See Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 299 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986).
70. See Dresser, supra note 67, at 793 (predicting that courts will allow
patients to reject nutrition where an "underlying physical condition will soon
produce death").
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restraints71 -restraints so demeaning and inhumane that
courts will likely be unwilling to order them, especially
where the patient is enmeshed in an inexorable dying
process.7' Several judicial sources have noted the distasteful
specter of forcible restraint of a competent patient. 3 The
likelihood is that solicitude for the competent patient's
dignity will impel courts to refrain from interfering when
nutrition is declined by fatigued, dying patients.
While judicial reluctance to order forced feeding has
been overcome in some instances of hunger-striking
prisoners, the approach to dying patients has been, and will
likely continue to be, different. The explanation probably
lies in judicial intuition about the moral status of suicide in
the context of a fatally stricken patient. Moral
condemnation of suicide is grounded in part on disapproval
of the hopelessness reflected in a suicide choice.' The
spurned lover or ruined businessperson who chooses suicide
is repudiating the possibility of improved circumstances
over time. Especially where a young person opts for suicide,
that denial of the possibility of change is seen as imprudent
and immoral. By contrast, where a person has been stricken
by a fatal condition, the potential for improved
circumstances is limited. In such an instance, people (and
judges are, after all, people) sympathize with the pessimism
and resignation reflected by the patient who chooses to
acquiesce in the fatal course that the affliction brings. That
sympathy is certainly visible in the cases involving rejection
of life support by competent patients whose condition is so
71. See Bernard Lo & Laurie Dornbrand, Guiding the Hand that Feeds, 311
N. ENG. J. MED. 402, 403 (1984).
72.
Consider the force and violence entailed in compelling a resistant
patient to ingest food or fluids. Restraint is necessary first to emplace a
feeding tube or catheter; four-quadrant physical restraints must then
be employed to prevent the resistant patient from dislodging the tubes.
The patient is thus immobilized and forced to use a bed pan (or is
accompanied to the toilet by a monitor). The physical and psychosocial
consequences are so repulsive and inhumane as to preclude physical
intervention in the face of a competent patient's self-starvation.
Norman L. Cantor, Two Opinions in Search of a Justice: The Constitution and
Physician-Assisted Suicide, 28 RuTGERS L.J. 435, 447-48 (1997).
73. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't Health, 497 U.S. 261, 287-92
(1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring); In re Hier, 464 N.E.2d 959, 964 (Mass. App.
Ct. 1984).
74. See C.G. PRADO, THE LAST CHOICE: PREEMPTIVE SUICIDE IN ADVANCED
AGE 53-55 (1990).
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dismal that they prefer death, rather than life-sustaining
medical intervention. 5 That sympathy probably extends to
the suffering, dying patient who chooses to hasten death by
VSED. Customary moral condemnation toward suicide
should dissipate in such a circumstance just as it did in the
few lower court cases regarding nursing home patients.76
As noted, sympathy for the plight of the terminally ill
patient is reflected in the cases recognizing a patient's
prerogative to decline life-sustaining medical intervention
even where the patient's intention is to bring about death."
Some courts have even suggested that the government
interest in the preservation of human life weakens as a
person's life trajectory nears its unavoidable end. That
notion surfaced as early as Quinlan's comment that the
state interest weakens as "the prognosis dims."" Some later
opinions subscribe to the idea that the state's interest
lessens when "the issue is not whether, but when, for how
long and at what cost to the individual... life may be
briefly extended."79 Indeed, when the Ninth Circuit ruled in
1996 that Washington's ban on assisted suicide was
unconstitutional as applied to terminally ill patients, Judge
Reinhardt's opinion asserted that the state interest in
preserving life is diminished in the context of a terminally
ill patient
8 0
This notion that the state interest in preservation of life
weakens as death nears seems wrong. Criminal law
protects the fatally afflicted person just as vigorously as the
healthy person. People have been convicted of homicide for
murdering patients who would have died within days
75. See Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297; In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 406-07 (N.J.
1987); In Re McAfee, 385 S.E.2d 651, 651 (Ga. 1989); McKay v. Bergstedt, 801
P.2d 617, 620 (Nev. 1990); Thor v. Superior Court, 855 P.2d 375, 379 (Cal.
1993).
76. Not everyone is willing to relax moral antipathy toward suicide via
VSED just because the patient is nearing unavoidable death. See Keown, supra
note 2, at 263 (branding suicidal refusal to accept nutrition as "patently
immoral"). Some people regard suicide as intrinsically immoral because it
interferes with God's dominion over life and death. See O'Keefe, supra note 48,
at 120-23.
77. See generally supra note 75 and accompanying text.
78. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (N.J. 1976).
79. Browning v. Herbert, 568 So.2d 4, 14 (Fla. 1990) (quoting Satz v.
Perlmutter, 362 So.2d 160, 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)).
80. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 79 F.3d 790, 817 (9th Cir. 1996).
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anyway.8' The above judicial expressions about a
diminished state interest in the lives of inexorably dying
patients really reflect sympathy for the plight of the fatally
afflicted patient who must determine how to respond to
impending death. Those judges were striving to maximize
the self-determination of the stricken patient and they
erroneously deemed the state's interest to be diminished in
that context. It is not that the state interest in preservation
of life is weak, but that the individual interest in shaping
the dying process in the face of unavoidable death is so
strong." The same kind of sympathy with the dying
patient's plight is likely to impel courts to protect people
like Herman Michelle in their decision to stop eating and
drinking.
There is another distinction between VSED and typical
modes of suicide. The VSED patient is ceasing the natural
flow of nutritive substances into her body. Although
stopping this flow is unnatural, the decision to eat and
drink is normally within the complete control of humans.
Deciding to cease an act that is within our control seems
dissimilar from suicide which, at least in its paradigmatic
form, requires the person to perform an affirmative act
ending life. To be sure, the distinction between act and
omission is usually a thin one. Bringing about a
consequence by failing to act usually creates moral
responsibility for the consequence; allowing a child to
drown when the actor could easily and safely save the child
makes the actor morally responsible for the child's death
just as if the actor had drowned the child.83 Yet there is a
lingering intuition that failing to act is somehow not quite
as culpable. The actor who lets the child drown somehow
seems less culpable (even if only slightly so) than the actor
81. See, e.g., Edinburgh v. State, 896 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Okla. Crim. App.
1995).
82. "[T]he state's indirect and abstract interest in preserving the life of the
competent patient generally gives way to the patient's much stronger personal
interest in directing the course of his own life." In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209,
1223 (N.J. 1985). Even when the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the
constitutional challenge to state laws banning assistance to suicide, several
Justices expressed strong sympathy with a competent patient's prerogative to
avoid suffering. Those expressions are discussed infra notes 139-41 and
accompanying text.
83. The point in the text is to compare the morality of VSED with that of
suicide. But omissions can be criminal as well as immoral. The example of a
parent failing to save a child is an example of a criminal omission.
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who drowns the child. The act-omission distinction might,
therefore, distinguish VSED from typical modes of suicide
by reinforcing the inclination to call VSED part of the
patient's self-determination.
Even if the cessation of eating is regarded as a suicidal
act, there may be room to exculpate the medical cooperation
that Herman Michelle is seeking. Attempting suicide is not
a crime but some states have a statutory crime of aiding
and abetting suicide. The issue then becomes whether the
medical role in VSED-providing a clean bed, wetting the
lips, offering skin care (turning the patient to avoid bed
sores), and providing light sedation in the face of agitation
or anxiety-constitutes aiding and abetting suicide.
Our legal analysis of palliative assistance to VSED
starts with the common law approach to aiding and
abetting. Aiding and abetting was not a separate crime at
common law. Rather, the aider and abettor derived liability
from the principal and was deemed as culpable as the
principal. Someone who facilitated the principal's crime
would be held responsible for that crime-so the getaway
driver would be guilty of the crime of robbery committed by
his partners who robbed the bank. Notice, as this example
makes clear, that aiding and abetting need not be an
indispensable or even a "but for" cause of the principal
crime; presumably, if the getaway driver had refused to
participate in the crime, the robbers would have found
another driver. Nor need aid actually be given. "It is
sufficient encouragement that the accomplice [the one who
aids and abets] is standing by at the scene of the crime
ready to give some aid if needed .... ." To avoid dispersing
criminal liability too broadly to peripheral players,
however, the common law required a uniquely high
threshold of mens rea to hold an aider and abettor liable for
the crime of the principal: "the accomplice must intend that
his acts have the effect of assisting or encouraging another
[to perpetrate a crime]."85
This stringent mens rea requirement for accomplice
liability would apply to a charge of aiding and abetting the
common law felony of suicide. The typical example of
assisting suicide-providing the means of suicide by
84. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AusTiN W. ScoT, JR., CRvMmAL LAw 577 (2d ed.
1986).
85. Id. at 580.
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supplying a poison to be ingested-is illustrative of these
common law principles. Writing a prescription for the
poison could be aiding and abetting even if the suicide
would have been able to procure the poison from another
source or would have found another means to commit
suicide. But it would not be aiding and abetting under
common law unless the physician intended his act to
encourage the patient to take his own life. Presumably,
most physicians do not intend the patient to kill himself but
merely intend to allow that option. For example, a
prescribing physician may well hope to reassure a terminal
patient that relief is available if suffering ultimately
becomes extreme-with the interim hope and expectation
that the reassured patient will persevere longer, rather
than use a poison.8 In such a scenario, the physician
intends to facilitate the patient's choice but does not intend
to encourage suicide. 7
Today, committing suicide is typically not a crime in the
United States. Thus, the classic common law analysis could
not produce liability for the aider and abettor of suicide
because there is no criminal liability to derive from the
principal. It is not, for example, a crime to aid and abet an
adult to purchase liquor in a state that permits the sale of
liquor. The principal way aiding and abetting suicide can be
a crime today, therefore, is if a state legislature explicitly
makes that particular conduct a crime.88
Many modern statutes do indeed create an independent
crime of aiding or soliciting suicide.89 For example, the
Model Penal Code provides: "A person who purposely aids
or solicits another to commit suicide is guilty of a felony of
the second degree if his conduct causes such suicide or
attempted suicide, and otherwise of a misdemeanor."" This
model statute incorporates a very high mens rea
86. See generally MARILYN WEBB, THE GOOD DEATH (1997).
87. George Annas relies on this point in urging that physicians are not
criminally responsible for providing prescriptions for potentially lethal drugs
that have an immediate palliative justification. See GEORGE J. ANNAS, SOME
CHOICE 213-14, 220, 232 (1998).
88. The Michigan Supreme Court, however, did rule that assisting suicide
could be prosecuted in Michigan as a common-law crime. See People v.
Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 716 (Mich. 1994).
89. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-2.5 (West 1998); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 752.1027 (West 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.215(3) (West 1998).
90. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5 (1) (1962).
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requirement of "intent"-here called "purpose"-in a
fashion similar to the common law prerequisite for
accomplice liability. Under the Model Penal Code, one acts
purposely with respect to a result of his conduct if his
conscious object is that the result occurs.9 In the assisting
suicide context, the aider would have to have as a conscious
object that the patient commits suicide. The Commentary
notes: "It seems clear that no lesser culpability should
suffice .... [A] requirement of less than purposeful conduct
would run the serious risk of overinclusiveness, perhaps
applying, for example, to one who sells readily available
goods to another who states that he intends to kill
himself."" The Model Penal Code thus draws a distinction
between one who assists knowing that the principal will
commit the assisted act and one who assists because it is
his purpose for the principal to commit the assisted act.
Application of this framework exculpates most, if not
all, medical personnel who help Herman Michelle
implement VSED. Medical personnel furnishing palliative
care (primarily mouth and skin care) to the patient
invoking VSED are unlikely to have the patient's death as a
conscious object. They are simply meeting basic
humanitarian needs. They likely intend to be helpful and to
care for the patient. They may want the patient to have
VSED as an option. But none of this entails that their
conscious object is the patient's death. Indeed, if the patient
decided to stop VSED at any time, the medical personnel
would assist in that reversal of VSED just as they are
assisting in VSED. Thus, even though VSED may be a
suicidal act, provision of palliative assistance should not
trigger criminal liability.
There are also policy reasons that support this
construction of the law of aiding and abetting. If medical
personnel were foreclosed by criminal law from providing a
clean bed and elementary mouth care, the patient would be
relegated to a home environment where lay people might or
might not be available to perform the simple palliative
steps sought. Institutions might thus be deterred from
91. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a)(i) (1962). See generally Kevin Breer
& Cherie Durst, Note, Recent Developments in Kansas Bioethics Law: The
Kansas Prevention of Assisted Suicide Act, 38 WASHBuRN L.J. 557, 567 (1999)
(explaining that state statutes often adopt similar mens rea requirement).
92. MODEL PENAL CODE, Commentary to § 210.5 (1962).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
providing palliative facilitation of VSED, but patients
would not likely be deterred from their fatal course. They
would persist either with lay assistance or on their own. In
sum, because the palliative measures in issue are so clearly
humane, because criminal law doctrine strictly limits the
reach of accomplice liability, and because criminalization of
the palliative conduct would not foreclose VSED, judicial
policy is almost certain to exclude such steps from the
bounds of aiding and abetting suicide.93
Our reliance on absence of specific intent to aid suicide
in our exculpation of medical personnel facilitating VSED
does not contradict our later point that murder ordinarily
encompasses both knowing and purposeful conduct. We will
later argue that there is no difference of substance between
a physician who administers a lethal analgesic dose
knowing that it is lethal and a physician who administers a
lethal dose with the purpose of killing the patient. The
distinction between knowledge and purpose when an actor
is the one who causes the harm is of no legal significance. "4
But the distinction between knowledge and purpose is
crucial when the state of mind is not of the principal actor
herself but of one who is aiding the principal actor. When
someone else causes the harm, the liability of the aider is
necessarily derivative and the criminal law requires a
purposeful mens rea to limit this derivative liability to
those who are without doubt culpable.
Several states have statutes that encourage the
prevention of suicide by justifying the use of force to
prevent a suicide attempt. Alabama's statute, adopted from
the Proposed Federal Criminal Code and similar to several
other state statutes,95 can serve as an example:
A person acting under a reasonable belief that another person is
about to commit suicide or to inflict serious physical injury upon
himself may use reasonable physical force upon that person to the
extent that he reasonably believes it necessary to thwart the
result.
96
93. The administration of sedatives that render the self-starving patient
unconscious or semi-conscious presents a harder question regarding the aiding
and abetting of suicide. That issue is addressed in the context of terminal
sedation. See generally infra notes 231-35 and accompanying text.
94. See generally infra notes 122, 149-53 and accompanying text.
95. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.10 (McKinney 1997); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.34,
9.61-9.63 (1994); MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07, 3.08 (1962).
96. ALA. CODE § 13A-3-24(4) (1975).
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Does this statute conflict with our conclusion that
physicians and nurses can assist Herman Michelle in his
VSED? At least in states like Alabama, can a care provider
ignore the policy in favor of preventing suicides so clearly
expressed in the above statute? The answer is that we
defend VSED only in the limited circumstance where the
patient is terminally ill, has no personally acceptable
chance for improved circumstances, and has voluntarily
chosen VSED. In this circumstance, the statutory policy in
favor of intervening in a suicide attempt seems
inapplicable. We doubt that the Alabama legislature's
intent was to frustrate a considered choice of VSED
motivated by a stricken patient's determination that death
is preferable to further existence and further medical
intervention. The legislative commentary notes: "The
purpose of this section is to delineate certain circumstances
where an actor... may apply reasonable physical force
against a person in order to protect or promote the welfare of
that person... .' Given the policy statement's focus on
promoting the welfare of the person attempting suicide, and
given the permissive nature of the statute (a person "may
use reasonable force"), it seems unlikely that the state
legislature intended by the general statutory language to
foreclose a fatally afflicted patient's VSED option.
To summarize, some courts would view VSED not as a
suicide but as an exercise of bodily integrity, in effect giving
the patient the right to VSED." In those jurisdictions, a
court would not only refuse to authorize medical
interventions but would order removal of ANH initiated by
health care providers over a patient's objections. Other
courts, while not explicitly recognizing VSED as a right,
would recognize pragmatic reasons not to intervene-
primarily, distaste toward putting a patient in restraints to
keep her from pulling out the I.V. that is keeping her
alive-when a patient seeks VSED and the care-providing
institution either does not oppose the request or seeks court
authorization to initiate ANH against the patient's will.
The hardest case in such a jurisdiction, we believe, would
be if a health care provider forces nutrition and hydration
97. Commentary to ALA. CODE § 13A-3-24 (emphasis added) (justifing
statute that contains the justification of the use of force in preventing suicide).
98. That would certainly be the case where courts have already endorsed a
prisoner's prerogative to hunger strike. See generally supra notes 58-60, 67-69.
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on a competent patient who has initiated VSED. Though
there are no cases of which we are aware, we project that if
a health care provider initiates ANH over a competent
patient's objections, at least some courts would likely view
this unconsented bodily invasion as a common law battery
and would uphold the patient's autonomy.
III. USING RISKY ANALGESICS 99
In one scenario, Herman Michelle, finding himself in
the throes of unbearable physical and emotional suffering,
asks that his health care providers administer opioid
analgesics, probably in the form of an intravenous
morphine drip. Such provision of pain relief is an integral
part of medical responsibility to furnish palliative care to a
dying patient.'0  Many sources contend that opioid
analgesics are safe-that patients build considerable
tolerance to the substances and that any hazard of
hastening death is exaggerated.'0 ' However, depending on
dosage, there may well be a risk of causing some
respiratory depression and hastening death in some
measure.' 2 Herman, given the depth of his emotional
suffering, is hoping that the analgesics will indeed do more
than mitigate pain and that they will accelerate his dying
process.
In this section, we discuss the criminal law principles
that sometimes justify administration of risky analgesics.
Our analysis rejects the conventional wisdom that the
99. The term "analgesics" is employed here as a shorthand for the variety of
substances, including opioids and barbiturates, that may be used to ease
patients' pain and suffering during a dying process.
100. See, e.g., AMA OPINIONS OF THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL
AFFAIRS, OPINIONS 2.18 AND 2.20 (1998-1999); Nathan I. Cherny et al., The
Treatment of Suffering When Patients Request Elective Death, 10 J. PALLIATIVE
CARE 71, 72 (1994); State v. Naramore, 965 P.2d 211, 213 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998).
101. See Deborah C. Hinnant, Do Opioids Hasten Death? 95 AM. J. NURSING
61, 61 (1995); NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, WHEN DEATH
IS SOUGHT: ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT 39, 162
(1994) [hereinafter NYSTF REPORT]; Howard Brody, CID v. Washington,
Promoting Dangerous Myths in Terminal Care, II BIo LAW S154, S156 (1996);
Marcia Angell, The Quality of Mercy, 306 N. ENG. J. MED. 98, 99 (1982).
102. See Cherny et al., supra note 100, at 337; Frank J. Brescia, Killing The
Known Dying: Notes of a Death Watcher, 65 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 337, 338
(1991); Thomas A. Cavanaugh, The Ethics of Death-Hastening or Death-Causing
Palliative Analgesic Administration to the Terminally Ill, 12 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM
MGMT. 248 (1996).
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physician's specific intent to relieve pain always serves as
an exculpation from any responsibility for death. In its
place, we develop a more nuanced framework for
responsibility based on the potential risk and reward of
particular analgesic uses in the context of the individual
patient's situation. This framework is grounded in
principles of recklessness that allow justification for some
risk taking. Our risk/reward framework not only rejects the
simplistic specific intention solution to physician liability
but also provides the criminal law answer to any situation
in which risky analgesics are contemplated. The framework
confirms the legality of using risky analgesics as commonly
done within a palliative regimen. However, a risk/reward
framework makes it highly unlikely that a physician could
justify a dose of analgesics that is known to be lethal,
despite comments by a few Supreme Court justices and
hints in a few professional standards suggesting that such
conduct might be licit.
When a terminal patient is given risky analgesics,
causation is always an issue. It is very difficult to establish
that analgesics hastened a dying process when critical
natural pathologies were already afflicting the debilitated,
terminally ill patient.'° In the rare instances when health
care providers have been accused of criminal behavior in
using analgesics, the prosecutions or attempted
prosecutions have usually foundered on the difficulty of
showing that the substances in fact hastened death.' Even
103. Brief of Choice in Dying, amicus curiae, at 11, Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S.
793 (1997) (No. 95-1858). See generally Phebe Saunders Haugen, Pain Relief for
the Dying: The Unwelcome Intervention of the Criminal Law, 23 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 325, 354-56 (1997) (discussing cases wherein defendants were acquitted
because the prosecution was unable to prove causation).
104. See Brian Bergman, The Final Hours: Does a Doctor Have a Right to
End a Patient's Life?, MACLEAW'S, Mar. 9, 1998, at 46 (discussing case wherein
Judge ruled there was insufficient evidence to try a respirologist for the murder
of one of her patients); Donald G. Casswell, Rejecting Criminal Liability for
Life-Shortening Palliative Care, 6 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & PoL'Y 127, 128 n.4
(1990); Maureen Cushing, Causes of Death: Drug or Disease?, 83 AM. J.
NuRSING 943, 944 (1983); see also Regina v. Cox, 12 BMLR 38 (1992), LEXIS
(discussing a British doctor who administered potassium chloride to a dying
patient and was prosecuted for attempted murder, not murder, because of the
difficulty of showing causation). But see State v. Naramore, 965 P. 2d 211 (Kan.
Ct. App. 1998) (reversing conviction of physician on grounds that evidence did
not support jury's finding that defendant had requisite mens rea); Haugen,
supra note 103, at 354-56 (describing instances wherein defendants have been
acquitted injury trials although they admit to having administered what might
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if the chances of prosecution are negligible, however, health
care providers should understand the legal bounds of risky
pain relief. Understanding those bounds will help
determine whether the law is sensibly and consistently
treating end-of-life medical practices.
Assume that in response to Herman's request, a
physician sets up a morphine drip dispensing 2 milligrams
per hour into Herman's body. Assume also that Herman
dies 3 days later (rather than the projected 2 to 3 months
later) and that the morphine can be established as either a
sole or contributing cause of death. Has Herman's physician
acted in the finest tradition of palliative medicine or should
she be facing a criminal homicide charge?
Notice that this scenario is significantly different from
the previous scenario involving withdrawal of a ventilator.
In the present scenario, lung cancer has not simply been
allowed to follow its natural lethal course. The physician
has introduced a lethal agent (morphine) that hastened
death, and it has been black-letter criminal law for
centuries that the acceleration of death is homicide. Notice
also a difference from the scenario involving VSED. There,
Herman merely invoked bodily integrity and refused all
forms of nutrition. He asked that medical personnel then
take modest steps to ease his self-initiated dying process.
Here, Herman enlisted active medical participation in the
death-hastening conduct (the morphine drip).
Many sources would assert that Herman's physician,
acting with the object of easing Herman's unbearable pain,
engaged in sound medical practice by setting up the
morphine drip. Yet that conduct significantly hastened
Herman's death. Usually, killing a patient, even a
grievously suffering patient who requests death as a form of
relief, is criminal homicide. Glanville Williams, an eminent
authority on criminal law, comments on euthanasia (mercy
killing) as a form of criminal homicide: "Neither the consent
of the patient, nor the extremity of his suffering, nor the
imminence of death by natural causes... is a defense."
10 5
otherwise be lethal doses of analgesics); Francis A. Molenda, Active Euthanasia:
Can It Be Justified?, 24 TULSA L.J. 165, 187 (1988); Richard H. Nicholson, A
Quick and Painless Death, 23 HASTINGS CENT. REP. 5 (1993) (reporting the
conviction of a rheumatologist for criminal homicide based on administration of
chemical substances to dying patients). See generally Alpers, supra note 41, at
311-15 (summarizing outcomes of criminal investigations during the 1990's).
105. GLANvLLE WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 319
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American jurisprudence generally subscribes to this
principle; neither relief of suffering nor the victim's request
justifies a killing.0 6 If relief of a patient's suffering is not a
sufficient justification for a killing, how can Herman's
physician be exonerated for the fatal morphine drip?
Some sources contend that there is no significant
difference between euthanasia and the physician's use of
risky analgesics prompting death. Indeed, a common
argument of proponents of legalizing active euthanasia is
that euthanasia has already been tacitly accepted in the
guise of risky pain relief. °7 For reasons to be explained, we
do not equate euthanasia with risky pain relief, and we find
a plausible basis for distinguishing the two. Before that
explanation, however, we address and repudiate the
common rationale used to distinguish the legality of risky
pain relief from the illegality of euthanasia-the asserted
distinction between intent to relieve suffering and intent to
kill.
The popular wisdom is that analgesics that risk
accelerating death are lawful so long as the physician's
primary intent is to reduce suffering rather than to cause
death.'8 In Vacco v. Quill, Chief Justice Rehnquist's
majority opinion noted: "It is widely recognized that the
provision of pain medication is ethically and professionally
acceptable even when the treatment may hasten the
patient's death if the medication is intended to alleviate
pain and severe discomfort, not to cause death."' 9 The
premise behind this assertion is that, for criminal law
purposes, causing death as an unintended side effect (of
providing pain relief) is different from intentionally causing
death. This rationale attempts to transfer the double effect
(1957).
106. See Turner v. State, 108 S.W. 1139, 1141 (Tenn. 1908); Edinburgh v.
State, 896 P.2d 1176, 1180 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995); Griffith v. State, 548 So.2d
244, 247 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
107. See Stephen A. Newman, Euthanasia: Orchestrating the Last Syllable
of Time, 53 U. PriT. L. REV. 153, 175 (1991).
108. See Haugen, supra note 103, at 351; Keown, supra note 2, at 258;
Miriam K. Feldman, Pain Control in Dying Patients, How Much is Too Much?,
73 MINN. MED. 19, 21 (1990); Casswell, supra note 104, at 129; Cornelius J. van
der Poel, Ethical Aspects in Palliative Care, AM. J. HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE CARE
49, 54-55 (1996).
109. 521 U.S. 793, 808 n.11 (1997) (quoting the NEW YORK STATE TASK
FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, WHEN DEATH IS SOUGHT: ASSISTED SUICIME IN THE
MEDICAL CONTEXT 108, 163 (1994)).
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principle of moral philosophy to the criminal law context."0
The effort is neither logically convincing nor consistent with
prevailing criminal law doctrine.
Using the palliative care provider's specific intent as
the main determinant of culpability is highly problematic in
the context of end-of-life palliative care. For starters,
specific intent is largely indeterminable in this context.
Patients like Herman Michelle are gravely debilitated and
suffering grievously to the point where they may well be
desirous of death. In this situation, even the provider who
administers an only slightly risky analgesic dosage"' may
harbor an intent to put the patient out of his misery by
accelerating death."2 On the other hand, even a physician
who knows that an analgesic dosage necessary to relieve
suffering will precipitate death might still have a primary
object of relieving suffering. Also, as Alan Meisel points out,
a provider might possess more than one intent, including
both relief of suffering and causation of death."' The
elusiveness of specific intent in this context is thus patent.
The 1983 President's Commission for the Study of Ethical
Problems in Medicine noted that the spectrum of possible
purposes behind administration of risky analgesics entails"substantial potential for unclear or contested
determinations.""4 Accordingly, the Commission concluded
that the theoretical distinction between intending death
110. See generally Cavanaugh, supra note 102, at 248; Stephen R. Latham,
Acquinas and Morphine: Notes on Double Effect at the End of Life, 1 DEPAUL J.
HEALTH CARE LAW 625 (1997); Patrick F. Norris, Palliative Care and Killing:
Understanding Ethical Distinctions, 13 BIOETHICS FoRUM 25 (1997) (discussing
the moral philosophy underlying the double effect principle).
111. A physician might intend to cause death but use an only slightly risky
dosage in order to avoid detection.
112. See Timothy Quill, The Ambiguity of Clinical Intentions, 329 N. ENG. J.
MED. 1039 (1993). Even staunch defenders of the double effect principle in the
palliative care context concede the possibility that the palliative care provider
might intend to cause death. See Robert Truog et al., Barbiturates in the Care of
the Terminally Ill, 327 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 1678, 1680 (1992); Cavanaugh, supra
note 102, at 252; Norris, supra note 110, at 27. One such defender observes:
"he pain-medicating physician would then be a euthanist in disguise."
Latham, supra note 110, at 643. See Paul J. van der Mass, et al., Euthanasia
and Other Medical Decisions Concerning the End of Life, 338 THE LANCET 669,
672 (1991).
113. See Meisel, supra note 15, at 835.
114. Deciding to Forego Lift-Sustaining Treatment, in PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. AND BIOMED. AND
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH 78 (1983) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION].
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and merely foreseeing death as a consequence "does not
help.")A
15
Given the indeterminability of specific intent in this
context, hinging culpability on such intent (where the
impetus is strong to hasten a patient's torturous dying
process) encourages a hypocritical practice. The palliative
care provider either strains to keep his or her mind off what
may be the real objective of hastening death or later simply
asserts that his or her mind was so tuned. Some
commentators contend that providers commonly give large,
dangerous dosages of analgesics with the intent not just to
mitigate suffering but to bring about a quicker death." 6 If
challenged, the provider will assert that the primary
intention was to relieve suffering. The provider's
protestation that he or she is only intending to ease
suffering is then seen as a "fig leaf' for euthanasia" or, as
one physician puts it, euthanasia "hidden by the cosmetics
of professional tradition and language.""8 The temptation of
self-deception and deception of others is indeed powerful
where a physician strongly desires to relieve a patient's
extreme and persistent suffering and that result is
attainable by hastening death (via analgesics) while
claiming an inherently unknowable mental state (viz.,
stating an intention merely to relieve suffering)."' In
115. Id. at 81-82, (exposing an alternative approach to risky analgesics
based on the justifiability of pain relief practices as determined in part by
professional norms). That approach parallels the approach presented in this
article.
116. See Marcia Angel, No One Trusts the Dying, THE WASHINGTON POST,
July 7,1997, at A19; Thomas A. Preston, Killing Pain, Ending Life, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 1, 1994, at A27. The actual incidence of such physician conduct is
unknown, but, anecdotal reports of such conduct are readily available. See, e.g.,
Ronald E. Cranford, Going Out in Style, the American Way, 17 L. IED. &
HEALTH CARE 208 (1989); Mark Austen, Doctor Admits Killing 50 People,
SUNDAY TIMES (LONDON), July 20, 1997 (discussing doctor's admission of having
helped at least 50 people to hasten their death); Sebastien Berger, We Helped
200 People to Die, Say Doctors, DAILY TELEGRAPH (U.K), July 21, 1997, at 1
(discussing physicians' admission to having administered overdoses of
diamorphine to help 200 patients die).
117. Truog et al., supra note 112, at 1680; Brief for Coalition of Hospice
Professionals, amicus curiae, at 14, Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702
(1997) (No. 96-110).
118. Preston, supra note 116.
119. See DAVIS, supra note 26, at 118 (describing a similar impetus for
physicians to shape their descriptions of their own state of mind in the context
of withdrawal of life support).
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addition, specific intent does not trigger criminal liability in
end-of-life practices. 2 ' For example, in the context of
withdrawal of life support, a provider's specific intent to
bring about the patient's death would not make criminal
the act of fulfilling a competent patient's wishes. 2'
Our position is that the legality of using risky
analgesics is determined not so much by the specific intent
of the provider, but by standard criminal law principles of
recklessness and justification. In a previous article, we
explained:
The question of criminal liability for risky pain relief normally
cannot be resolved by reference to the physician's purpose-i.e.,
the conscious object or result sought by his or her action. Purpose
does not map the criminal law boundary between crimes and non-
crimes because a good purpose (a conscious object to achieve a
good result) does not necessarily exculpate, and an evil purpose (a
conscious object to cause death) is not required to prove criminal
homicide. First, as a matter of exculpation, the purpose to relieve
pain does not justify euthanasia.... The uniform judicial position
in the United States that euthanasia is always unjustified
homicide reflects a view that pain relief can never outweigh the
harm of purposely causing a premature death. Second, as a matter
of inculpation, a purpose to kill is not required for homicide. A
reckless state of mind is sufficiently culpable to prove murder or
manslaughter under the MPC .... Thus, actions taken with a
conscious disregard of the risk of death can, in some
120. The specific intent element is even more problematic for people who
maintain that pain relief must be the only object of the actor, not just the
primary intention. In effect, the physician cannot harbor even a secondary
intention to bring about the patient's death. See Emanuel, supra note 9, at 495-
97. Such purity of thought is a difficult concept both in theory and practice. See
Haugen, supra note 103, at 351 n. 182.
121. But see Daniel Sulmasy, Killing and Allowing to Die: Another Look, 26
J.L., MED. & ETmcs 55, 59-60 (1998) (arguing that a physician is acting
unethically or improperly if the physician's specific intent at the moment of
withdrawing life support is to end the patient's life). However, as a legal matter,
the physician is implementing the patient's right to have treatment withdrawn.
Indeed, to refuse the competent patient's request for withdrawal would entail a
legal battery. Because continued medical intervention against a competent
patient's will would constitute a battery, an attending physician has a duty to
remove the unwanted intervention. The physician's intent in discharging that
legal duty is irrelevant. See Latimer, supra note 41, at 334. Not surprisingly,
cases addressing the legality of withdrawal of life support tend not to discuss
the physician's state of mind. See Thor v. Superior Court, 855 P.2d 375 (Cal.
1993); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1986);
State v. McAfee, 385 S.E.2d 651 (Ga. 1989); In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404 (N.J.
1987); McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990).
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circumstances, result in liability for homicide .... [I]f recklessness
is otherwise established, proof that the actor's primary object was
to relieve pain would not justify the reckless conduct in issue.122
Under a recklessness framework, the issue shifts from
the physician's specific intent to whether the risk created
by the analgesics is justified. To justify the risk, several
conditions must be met.123 The patient must be grievously
suffering because relief from unendurable pain furnishes
the benefit that justifies risking death.124 The patient must
make an informed request and the analgesic dosage used
must be the safest means of relieving the patient's
suffering. This effectively means that dosage must start
with a level thought to be safe and must be escalated only
as necessary. The requirement of using only the dosage
necessary for effective pain relief stems from the notion
that conduct risking human life must be 2genuinely
necessary in order to be justified in law.2 5 Medical
professional norms also help shape the legal determination
of justifiable conduct, and good palliative care practice
demands careful analgesic administration. Most medical
authorities indicate that as a prerequisite to risky
analgesics there should be no less harmful pain relief
method available and the dosage should be titrated upward
on an as needed basis. Study commission reports and a
122. Norman L. Cantor & George C. Thomas III, Pain Relief, Acceleration of
Death, and Criminal Law, 6 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 107, 110-11 (1996).
123. For a detailed analysis of the concept of recklessness under Section
202(2)(c) of the Model Penal Code, see id. at 111-13.
124. See Nathan I. Cherny & Russell K. Portenoy, Sedation in the
Management of Refractory Symptoms, Guidelines for Evaluation and
Treatment, 10 J. PALLIATIVE CARE 31, 36 (1994).
125. See Margaret A. Somerville, Pain and Suffering at Interfaces of
Medicine and Law, 36 U. TORONTO L.J. 286, 309 (1986) (arguing that when
risky pain relief treatment is "the only reasonably effective means available to
relieve the pain," it may be characterized as necessary and defensible).
126. See, e.g., Nathan I. Cherny & Kathleen Foley, Nonopioid and Opioid
Pharmacotherapy of Cancer Pain, 10 HEMATOLOGY/ONCOLOGY CLINICS OF NORTH
AMERICA 79, 82, 92, 94 (1996); Russell K. Portenoy & Nessa Coyle, Controversies
in the Long-Term Management of Analgesic Therapy in Patients with Advanced
Cancer, 5 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 307, 311 (1990); Brody, supra note 8, at
947; William R. Greene & William H. Davis, Titrated Intravenous Barbiturates
in the Control of Symptoms in Patients with Terminal Cancer, 84 SO. MED. J.
332 (1991); see also Robyn S. Shapiro, Liability Issues in the Management of
Pain, 9 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 146, 149-50 (1994) (discussing pain control
versus euthanasia).
127. See House of Lords Select Committee para. 242 reprinted in JOHN
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few state statutes128 reinforce the contention that conformity
to such sound medical practice is a prerequisite to lawful
use of risky analgesics.
Statutes in some states might, at first blush, seem to
undercut our insistence that specific intent does not
determine the legal limits of pain relief administration.
States that have adopted explicit bans on assistance to
suicide in the last ten years commonly include a provision
clarifying that when a physician supplies pain relief
medication that may hasten death, she is not assisting
suicide unless the medication is intended to cause death.
Indiana law is typical and specifies that its criminal
prohibition on assisted suicide does not apply to:
A licensed health care provider who administers, prescribes, or
dispenses medication or procedures to relieve a person's pain or
discomfort, even if the medication or procedure may hasten or
increase the risk of death, unless such medications or procedures
are intended to cause death.
129
In large measure, such a statutory provision merely
confirms our earlier point-that aiding and abetting
culpability is generally confined to people acting with
specific intent. Thus, it is unsurprising and unexceptionable
that statutes punishing assisting suicide require specific
intent. However, the same statutes mention a physician
who "administers" pain relief medication that may hasten
death. The claim might then arise that these provisions
signal a legal immunity, including protection against
homicide charges, for any physician who administers lethal
KEOWN, EUTHANASIA EXAMINED: ETHICAL, CLINICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES
103 (1995); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION STUDY, supra note 114, at 79-81; NYSTF
REPORT, supra note 101, at 150, 164.
128. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3412.01 (West 1997) (requiring a
prescribing physician to meet "professional medical standards"); FLA. STAT. ch.
458.326(3) (1995) (demanding conformity to a level of care of "a reasonably
prudent physician").
129. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-2.5(a)(1) (Michie 1998); see also IOWA CODE
ANN. § 707A.3(1) (West Supp. 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-4403(a) (Supp. 1998);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 216.304 (Banks-Baldwin 1995); LA. REV. STAT., § 14:32.12
(West 1997); MD. CODE ANN. § 416 (April 1999); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
752.1027 (West 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.215(3) (West Supp. 1994); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-06 (1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3141.4 (West 1998);
R.I. GEN. LAwS §11-60-4 (1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-37.1 (Michie 1997);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-216 (Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 801-622.1 (Michie
1998).
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analgesics without the primary intent to cause death.
We strongly doubt that these statutory provisions in
fact make primary intent the key to criminal culpability for
administration of risky analgesics. The provisions on their
face relate to assisting suicide and not homicide. However,
it is homicide that is potentially implicated where a
substance administered by a health care provider
accelerates a patient's death. Moreover, these provisions
make no mention of other highly relevant medical practice
factors such as the nature of the suffering necessitating
pain relief, maximum tolerable risk of death, and graduated
dosages. In other words, these statutes do not track the
elements of good medical practice that would shape
allowable pain relief practice."0 Finally, these recent
provisions exist in only twelve states and have never been
judicially interpreted. We suspect that even in these
jurisdictions principles of recklessness shape the bounds of
criminal homicide responsibility for analgesics hastening
death.
Our suggested recklessness framework conforms to
common understandings about the justifiability of risk
taking in medical practice. A risky surgery, such as a heart
by-pass operation, is justified if it offers a substantial gain
in the patient's longevity or quality of life, but reckless if
the prospective gain to the patient is modest compared to
the accompanying risk of death. 3' Similarly, use of an
analgesic carrying some risk of hastening death can be
justified if this is the only means of relieving a patient's
grievous suffering. As noted, good palliative care practice
appears to conform to the principle that a risky analgesic is
justifiable only where it is the least dangerous means of
accomplishing the pain relief objective.
How is it that euthanasia is unlawful if it is permissible
to use risky analgesics in order to relieve grievous
130. See generally ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3412.01 (West 1997); FLA.
STAT. ch. 458.326 (1997) (speaking more generally to permissible pain relief
practices without special reference to assisted suicide); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-
2907.01 (Michie 1998); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-3408.1 (Michie 1998). These
provisions seem to stress physician good faith and conformity to professional
standards of practice.
131. "It is one thing for a doctor to perform neurosurgery to remove a
malignant tumor, even though the operation may prove fatal; quite another to
perform it merely because the patient has a headache." Keown, supra note 2, at
259.
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suffering? Frances Kamm asks: if pain relief is a greater
good (than preserving life) when analgesics are used, "why
may we not intentionally deprive someone of life when...
that death is the lesser evil?"'32 Our response is grounded in
the recklessness framework that tolerates risk taking while
precluding conduct that the actor knows will cause death.
In other words, awareness of the certainty of death helps
explain the current legal line between euthanasia and use
of risky analgesics. As in other areas of medical practice, it
is justifiable to take risk in using analgesics in order to
mitigate a patient's grievous suffering. However, if a
physician knows that a dosage of analgesics will certainly
or almost certainly cause death, the act is done knowingly
and fits within the prohibition of criminal homicide. 3' As an
analogy, consider an organ transplant operation from a
living donor with the objective of saving an ill patient's life.
A surgeon may be authorized to transplant a kidney with
the attendant minor risk to the donor, but would be
forbidden to transplant a heart because that operation
would certainly kill the donor. In short, euthanasia involves
conduct that will certainly or almost certainly cause death.
Permissible use of risky analgesics involves conduct that
carries a risk of death that is less than "practically
certain."
134
132. Frances M. Kamm, The Doctrine of Double Effect: Reflections on
Theoretical and Practice Issues, 16 J. MED. & PHIL. 571, 579 (1991).
133. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (stating that an actor's conduct will be
"knowing" if the result [death] is "practically certain"); see also Donald
Casswell, Rejecting Criminal Liability for Life-Shortening Palliative Care, 6 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POLICY 127 (1990). For purposes of the Model Penal
Code, as well as the common law, there is no distinction in culpability between
acting with the knowledge that one will cause death and acting with the
conscious object to cause death. There is little difference between these states of
mind. Criminal homicide can also be committed recklessly when the actor
consciously disregards a substantial risk of death and that conscious disregard
is not justifiable. Of course, in the context of risky pain relief, as we have
argued, a substantial risk of death will often be justified as the best way to
relieve grievous suffering and thus not be criminally reckless. See generally
Cantor & Thomas, supra note 122.
134. The Model Penal Code concludes that an actor acts "knowingly" with
respect to a result of his conduct when "he is aware that it is practically certain
that his conduct will cause such a result." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b)(ii).
Sometimes, to avoid an awkward sentence construction, we use "almost
certainly" or "certainly" but in every case we mean to reference the Model Penal
Code standard of awareness that death "is practically certain" to occur.
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We contend that this distinction between use of risky
analgesics and euthanasia-based on risk taking as
opposed to awareness of certainty of consequences-is
logically tenable.'35 Within this framework, a physician may
legally use an analgesic carrying a substantial risk of death
as long as the use of the analgesic is justified-i.e., as long
as the pain is unrelenting and unbearable, the dosage is the
least dangerous medical treatment that can achieve pain
relief, and the risk of death is not too great.
What do we mean by a risk of death that is not "too
great"? Fixing a maximum percentage chance of death
beyond which the use of risky analgesics cannot be justified
is a difficult legal and philosophical problem. Use of a
dosage that would be certain or practically certain to cause
death constitutes a knowing killing and cannot, we contend
be justified under the prevailing criminal law framework.
139
On the other hand, use of a dosage that poses only a
substantial risk could be justified.
To see the difference between disregard of a substantial
risk and awareness that death is practically certain,
consider a dosage that creates an 80% probability of death
and one that creates a 99% risk of death. Is it possible to
distinguish the administration of these dosages, both of
135. Some people might insist that if relief of suffering is a legally sufficient
justification for risky pain relief it ought to be a justification for euthanasia as
well. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 105, at 322-23; Kamm, supra note 132, at
577-81. That is a plausible position as a matter of public policy. See footnotes
250-64, 269-88, and 304-17 and accompanying text for further discussion of
public policy vis & vis euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. But that
position is not logically compelled. A rational legislator could think that
knowing or intentional killing, even for a worthy reason such as pain relief, is
more heinous than behavior merely risking death. Phrased differently, a worthy
object such as relief of suffering might warrant risk taking even though it would
not warrant an intentional or knowing killing (recall the example of a kidney
donation as opposed to a heart donation).
Yale Kamisar, a distinguished opponent of active euthanasia, found our
analysis of how use of risky analgesics contrasts to euthanasia to be "quite
persuasiv[e]." Kamisar, The Right to Die, supra note 19, at 499-500; see also
Howard Brody, Commentary on Billings & Block's "Slow Euthanasia," 12 J.
PALLIATIVE CARE 38, 39 (1996) (endorsing risky analgesics that carry only a
"finite risk" of hastening death); Fr. Robert Barry & James E. Maher, Indirectly
Intended Life-Shortening Analgesia: Clarifying the Principles, 6 IssuEs IN L. &
MED. 117, 140 (1990) (differentiating between risking death and causing death).
136. The Model Penal Code permits only narrow and special justifications
when the act of killing is knowing or purposeful. Examples include, self-defense,
defense of others, or reacting to a natural disaster in a way that saves more
lives than are lost.
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which create a high probability of death? We believe that a
difference in kind exists here. The physician who is not
aware that the dosage is practically certain to cause
death-the one who gives the 80% dosage-can at least
hold out a realistic hope that the analgesic will not kill. Any
doctor who is practically certain could not have this
realistic hope. As long as a doctor has a realistic hope that
the treatment is both life affirming and the best means of
providing pain relief, the conduct does not pose the same
threat to the sanctity of life principle that underlies much
American jurisprudence. We believe that the doctor who
says "I created a high probability of death but realistically
hoped that the dose would not kill" is less culpable than the
doctor who says, "I knew the dose would kill."
Isolated language from concurring opinions in the
recent Supreme Court cases on assisted suicide casts doubt
on our risk-based analysis of the legality of hastening death
via analgesics. That language suggests that use of
analgesics is lawful even if the administering health care
provider knows that the analgesic will hasten death. By
contrast, we argue that analgesic administration is not
legally justifiable where death is a certain or practically
certain consequence-i.e., where the actor's conduct is
either purposeful or knowing."7  In Washington v.
Glucksberg, Justice Souter states that Washington State"ggenerally permits physicians to administer medication to
patients in terminal conditions when the primary intent is
to alleviate pain, even when the medication is so powerful as
to hasten death and the patient chooses to receive it with
that understanding.""8  Justice O'Connor's concurring
opinion in Vacco v. Quill represents that the parties before
the Court agreed as follows:
137. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
138. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 780 (1997) (emphasis added).
Justice Souter relies primarily on a Washington statute. See WASH. REV. CODE §
70.122.010 (1997). This statute does not explicitly authorize the result that
Justice Souter proclaims. The measure is part of the introductory "findings" to
Washington's Natural Death Act. It expresses a legislative "belief" that
providers should not withhold pain medication for terminal patients "where the
primary intent... is to alleviate pain .... " Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 780. This
language does not necessarily authorize an analgesic dosage certain or
practically certain to cause death, though Justice Souter may have been reading
it so.
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[A] patient who is suffering from terminal illness and who is
experiencing great pain has no legal barriers to obtaining
medication from qualified physicians to alleviate that suffering,
even to the point of causing unconsciousness and hastening
death.... There is no dispute that dying patients in Washington
and New York can obtain palliative care even when doing so would
hasten their deaths.
139
Justice O'Connor's use of "would" rather than "might"
implies the legality of analgesics that would be practically
certain to bring about death.
Justice Breyer gives mixed signals about his
understanding of the legal status of risky pain relief. At one
point in both Glucksberg and Quill, he observes that state
law authorizes analgesic drugs despite "the risk that those
drugs themselves will kill."" That language is consistent
with our risk-based analysis of analgesic usage. However,
Justice Breyer later comments that he would reconsider his
attitude (accepting the constitutionality of bans on assisted
suicide) if a state barred pain relief "as needed" in end-of-
life palliative care.' That language could be read
consistently with Justices Souter and O'Connor as
endorsing a practice of using analgesics even when death is
a certain or practically certain result, so long as such
analgesics are necessary to achieve pain relief.
To the extent that these excerpts from concurring
opinions by Justices Souter, O'Connor, and Breyer suggest
that analgesics can be licitly used even when death is a
certain or practically certain result, they probably reflect a
misconception of the state of the law derived from a too
ready acceptance of what some parties and amici curiae
before the Court declared in the litigation.' Carefully
139. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 702, 736-38 (1997) (emphasis added). Justice
O'Connor relies on the Washington Revised Code statute cited by Justice Souter
(see supra note 138) and also on New York's brief. Neither of those sources fully
supports the contention that risky analgesics are lawful even when death is a
certain consequence of their administration.
140. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 791 (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
Justice Breyer relies on the New York State Task Force on Life and the Law's
1995 report. There, the Task Force says "pain medication is ethically and
professionally acceptable even when the treatment may hasten the patient's
death...." NYSTF REPORT, supra note 101, at 163.
141. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 792 (Breyer, J., concurring).
142. Among the dozens of briefs submitted to the Court by parties or amici
curiae, a few did suggest that use of analgesics would be licit even if death were
a certain or practically certain consequence. None of them, however, made a
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analyzed, neither presentations before the Supreme Court
nor dicta in the concurring opinions in the assisted suicide
cases establish that the law tolerates analgesics in dosages
known to be lethal.
As to the actual state of the law when a doctor knows
an analgesic dosage to be practically certain to cause death,
precedent is scarce but several factors support our risk-
based analysis (under which use of an analgesic certain to
convincing case for that proposition. Respondents asserted that petitioner (New
York State Attorney General Dennis Vacco) had "conceded" that physicians may
administer analgesics intended to relieve suffering "even with the foreseeable
effect, indeed, the overwhelming likelihood, of causing death." Respondent's
Brief at 15, Vacco (No. 95-1858). Yet the cited portion of Vacco's brief made no
such concession, merely describing, as legal, palliative treatment intended to
relieve suffering where "death may be a possible side effect." Petitioner's Brief
at 15 n.9, Vacco (No. 95-1858). Similarly confused interchanges occurred at oral
argument. Laurence Tribe, arguing on behalf of Respondent Quill, asserted that
palliative medication is licit "even when you [a physician] are pretty sure-or
even when you know... that it will hasten.., death." Oral argument at 44,
Vacco (No. 95-1858). When Justice O'Connor questioned Attorney General
Vacco about the legality of palliative care certain to hasten death, he made a
cryptic reply indicating that the conduct would be lawful in New York "even
though there is a risk of death." Oral argument at 21, Vacco (No. 95-1858).
Among the amici curiae briefs, a few-all without substantial reference to
authority--contended that palliative care would be permitted even if such care
would almost certainly hasten death. The Solicitor General's brief for the
United States as amicus curiae represented that "ethical standards" of medical
practice allow pain relief medication "even when the necessary dose will hasten
death." (emphasis added). Brief of the United States, amicus curiae, at 17,
Glucksberg (No. 96-110). Solicitor General Walter Dellinger made a similar
representation at oral argument. See oral argument at 25, Glucksberg, (No. 96-
110). The Solicitor General's brief cited as authority only the AMA Code of
Medical Ethics. Yet the AMA's own amicus brief, joined by numerous medical
professional organizations, appears to take a different position-indicating that
pain relief medication can be used only where such medication "might hasten
death" or "may foreseeably hasten death." Brief for the American Medical
Association, et al. at 19, Glucksberg (No. 96-110). Three other amicus briefs
suggest that palliative care is permissible even in doses that are almost
certainly lethal, but again without convincing authority. Brief of ACLU, amicus
curiae, at 2, Vacco (No. 95-1858); Brief of Gay Men's Health Crisis, amicus
curiae, at 28, Glucksberg (No. 96-110); Brief of Dr. Julian Whitaker, amicus
curiae, at 4, Glucksberg (No. 96-110). One of them erroneously cites as authority
our 1996 article on the subject of risky pain relief-an article that in no way
suggests the legality of dosages that are certain or practically certain to cause
death. Other amicus briefs that speak to the issue of hastening death via
analgesics appear to endorse only medication that risks death or "may cause
death." Brief of the Catholic Health Assoc. of the United States, amicus curiae,
at 17-18, Vacco (No. 95-1858); Brief of Bioethics Professors, amicus curiae, at
18, Vacco (No. 95-1858).
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be lethal is impermissible). A number of commentators on
the legal status of analgesics concur that use of a dosage
known to be lethal must be impermissible. 43 Part of this
commentary is based on the artificiality of saying that an
actor does not intend to cause death when death is foreseen
as a practically certain consequence of an act.'" We do not
rely on this assertion that an actor who knows a
consequence is certain must intend to produce that
consequence. We noted earlier the problematic nature of
determining a physician's specific intent when a dying,
grievously suffering patient is seeking final relief from
pain.'45 Also, as a person is generally presumed to intend
the natural consequences of his or her actions, there is some
impetus to say that a physician intends to cause death
when he or she knows that the analgesic dosage used will
be practically certain to cause death.'46 However, it is at
least possible for a physician to have a primary intention of
relieving suffering even when the physician knows that
death is a certain or practically certain consequence of an
analgesic dosage. " 7 In a 1992 British prosecution of a doctor
for administering a lethal dosage of potassium chloride to a
143. See Somerville, supra note 125, at 309; Barry & Maher, supra note 137,
at 135, 139, 148; Donald B. Marquis, Four Versions of Double Effect, 16 J. MED.
& PHIL. 515, 523, 529 (1991).
144. See Barry & Maher, supra note 135, at 148. "Can one withhold
intending that which one knows in fact will occur?" RAYMOND G. FREY,
INTENTION, FORESIGHT, AND KILLING, IN INTENDING DEATH 69 (T. Beauchamp ed.,
1996). But see John Finnis, Euthanasia, Morality, and Law, 31 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1123, 1129 (1998) (maintaining that even results known to be certain are
not necessarily intended).
145. See supra notes 113-23 and accompanying text. In one prosecution of a
physician for administering a lethal substance to a dying patient, the
defendant's counsel commented on the problematic nature of specific intent:
"[T]he line... between a primary purpose to alleviate pain which may, or even
will, incidentally cause death and, on the other hand, a purpose to kill which
may-for however short a time-incidentally alleviate suffering, is so finely and
subtly drawn as to be incapable of sensible application [by practitioners]."
Regina v. Cox, 12 BMLR 38 (1992), LEXIS at *10. Justice Stevens also noted
"the illusory character" of intention in this context. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 751
(Stevens, J., concurring).
146. See Marquis, supra note 143, at 523 (arguing that when a consequence
is certain or almost certain it must be deemed to have been intended in some
sense).
147. By analogy, a person can expect death from a course of conduct yet not
intend that death occur. Lance Stell gives the example of a Jehovah's Witness
declining a critical blood transfusion. Stell, supra note 6, at 11; see also Finnis,
supra note 144.
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dying, suffering patient, the judge's instruction allowed for
the possibility that the doctor's primary intention was to
relieve suffering, "[g]iven that the injection had the effect of
alleviating suffering as [the patient] died ... .""' Thus,
specific intent to kill is not inevitably present even when a
lethal dose of painkillers is knowingly used.
While we do not argue that specific intent to kill
necessarily accompanies use of a lethal or almost certainly
lethal analgesic dosage, we still contend that any legal
distinction between intentional and knowing use of a lethal
dose of painkillers is untenable. Either mental state will
sustain a criminal homicide conviction under the Model
Penal Code. Glanville Williams described how criminal law
encompasses both intentional and knowing conduct: 9
There is no legal difference between desiring or intending a
consequence as following from your conduct, and persisting in your
conduct with a knowledge that the consequence will inevitably
follow from it, though not desiring that consequence. When a
result is foreseen as certain, it is the same as if it were desired or
intended. 5 '
If a physician uses a massive analgesic dosage intending to
kill the patient or knowing that the dosage will certainly or
almost certainly be fatal, she has the requisite state of
mind-intentional or knowing-for criminal
responsibility.'
In essence, criminal law treats an intentional or
knowing killing as intrinsically bad conduct even where
there is a worthy reason, such as relieving suffering or even
saving another person's life. As noted earlier, euthanasia is
148. Regina, LEXIS at *9. The jury's verdict of guilty indicated that it
viewed the physician's conduct as primarily intended to cause death.
149. To collapse knowledge and purpose into a single culpability category
when the actor is the one who has caused the harm is not inconsistent with our
earlier argument that accomplice liability should fall only on those with a
purposeful mens rea. See supra text accompanying notes 84-85.
150. See WILLIAMS, supra note 105, at 322. See supra notes 133-34 for our
explanation of the Model Penal Code position that agrees with Williams.
Glanville Williams believed that relief of pain ought to be deemed a sufficient
justification for administration of even a clearly lethal dosage of analgesics, at
least where such dosage is necessary for pain relief, but he did not believe that
current law authorized such a result. Id. at 322-24.
151. See Somerville, supra note 125, at 307-08, (conceding that
administration of a pain relief dosage certain to cause death could be prosecuted
as criminal homicide, i.e., either murder or manslaughter).
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unlawful even where a competent patient has asked to be
put out of her misery. As another example, it would be
criminal homicide for a surgeon to remove a vital organ
from a patient even if the patient so requested and even if
the object was to save another person's life via a
transplant.52  Even some commentators who see the
philosophical doctrine of double effect, with its focus on the
physician's primary intent, as informing the bounds of
permissible medical behavior agree that it is illegal to
administer pain relief in a dosage known to be lethal. They
reach this conclusion by finding that the good effect (pain
relief) is impermissibly tainted by the bad means (knowing
killing of the patient)."'
Not all commentary agrees with our position. A British
philosopher, John Keown, asserts that use of even a
certainly lethal dosage of analgesics is defensible,' relying
on the charge to the jury in the 1992 prosecution of a
British doctor for injecting potassium chloride into a dying,
suffering patient. There, the court instructed the jury:
It was plainly Dr. Cox's duty to do all that was medically possible
to alleviate [the patient's] pain and suffering, even if the course
adopted carried with it an obvious risk that, as a side effect of that
treatment, her death would be rendered likely or even certain.
There can be no doubt that the use of drugs to reduce pain and
suffering will often be fully justified notwithstanding that it will,
in fact, hasten the moment of death. What can never be lawful is
the use of drugs with the primary purpose of hastening the
moment of death.
155
152. See In re T.A.C.P., 609 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1992); Kathleen L. Paliokas,
Note, Anencephalic Newborns as Organ Donors: An Assessment of Death and
Legislative Policy, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 207-08 (1989).
153. See Latham, supra note 110, at 630-31; Marquis, supra note 143, at
516, 534, 538.
154. "A doctor treating a terminally ill cancer patient suffering pain clearly
has a sufficient justification for administering palliative drugs with the intent
to ease the pain, even though a foreseeable side effect may, or will, be the
shortening of life." Keown, supra note 2, at 258. (emphasis added). If a
"foreseeable side effect" is that the dose will shorten life, Keown apparently
means that the one who gives the dose is acting with the knowledge that death
is a certain or practically certain consequence.
155. Regina v. Cox, 12 BMLR 38 (1992), LEXIS at *4. Judge Ognall's charge
is grounded on a similar charge given in a 1957 British prosecution of a
physician accused of killing a dying patient via analgesics. That case, Regina v.
Adams, is described in PATRICK DEvLIN, EASING THE PASSING: THE TRIAL OF DR.
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A few other commentators share the contention that
analgesics necessary for pain relief are licit even when the
dosage will certainly cause death, so long as the doctor's
primary intent is to relieve suffering."'
On the American scene, the principal ostensible
endorsement of analgesics that would certainly or almost
certainly be lethal comes from the President's Commission
for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine. The
Commission's 1983 report declares that there is "no moral
or legal objection to using the kinds and amounts of drugs
necessary to relieve the patient's pain"'-whatever risk of
death is entailed."5 ' Nonetheless, the President's
Commission (as do we) bases its analysis of permissible
bounds of pain relief on justifiability grounded in
professional norms of behavior that have gained social
approval.'59 It is noteworthy, therefore, that professional
norms of palliative care were not well developed as of 1983
and that the President's Commission cites no medical
authority for the proposition that analgesics are permissible
even in dosages practically certain to cause death.
To identify the legal bounds of risky medical behavior,
it is critical to consult evolving professional standards.
Unfortunately, that inquiry does not yield definitive results
on the issue of whether a dosage certain or practically
certain to cause death is tolerable. No professional standard
aimed at end-of-life medical practice states unequivocally
that risky analgesics may be used in dosages that are
JOHN BODKIN ADAs (1985). Lord Devlin's 1957 charge indicated that a doctor
may do "all that is proper and necessary to relieve pain and suffering, even if
the measures... may incidentally shorten life. Id. at 171. Judge Ognall
expanded Lord Devlin's 1957 description of defensible conduct by including
physician action that is certain to cause death in addition to action that "may"
shorten life.
156. See Casswell, supra note 104, at 129; Thomas A. Cavanaugh, The
Ethics of Death-Hastening or Death-Causing Palliative Analgesic
Administration to the Terminally Ill, 12 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 248, 253
(1996); Bernard M. Dickens, Commentary on 'Slow Euthanasia,' 12 J.
PALLIATIVE CARE 42, 43 (1996).
157. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 114, at 81.
158. Id. at 82.
159. Id. at 79, 81. Another study commission recently concurred in the
notion that professional norms of palliative care have a significant role in
shaping the legal bounds of analgesic administration. NYSTF REPORT, supra
note 101, at 164 (asserting that "judgments about potentially risky and life-
threatening interventions undertaken to cure the patient or relieve pain fall
squarely within the scope of the physician's professional role.").
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practically certain to cause death. To be sure, some medical
sources do seem to endorse even lethal dosages where
necessary for pain relief. A 1989 article by several eminent
physicians comments: "Narcotics or other pain medication
should be given in whatever dose and by whatever route is
necessary for relief."60 A few professional organizations
appear to endorse that position. 61 Other sources indicate,
without documentation, that it is common practice to
administer pain medication despite an awareness that the
dosage will almost certainly hasten death.'62 Yet even these
sources do not claim that this conduct reflects a prevailing
professional standard.
By contrast, most medical standards seem to speak in
terms of risky analgesics that "may" hasten death or carry a
"possibility" of hastening death. 63  For example, the
American Academy of Neurology's position notes a
"possibility" of hastening death and comments that it is
"ethically permissible to risk producing this side effect" of
pain medication."M The AMA appears to mirror that
position.'65 A recent New York State Task Force report
notes that "provision of pain medication is ethically and
160. Sidney Wanzer, et al., The Physician's Responsibility Toward
Hopelessly Ill Patients, 320 N. ENG. J. MED. 844, 847 (1989).
161. The Kansas Association of Osteopathic Medicine quoted the Wanzer
article in its brief in State v. Naramore, 965 P.2d 211, 215 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998);
see also Melissa L. Buchan & Susan W. Tolle, Pain Relief for Dying Persons:
Dealing with Physicians' Fears & Concerns, 6 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 53, 55 (1995)
(claiming that some professional associations believe that pain relief
administration is permissible even in dosages likely to hasten death). For other
clinical guidelines that are ambiguous as to whether dosages "necessary" for
pain relief can include dosages practically certain to hasten death, see generally
infra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
162. See Brief of Gay Men's Health Crisis, amicus curiae, at 28, Vacco (No.
95-1858); Angell, supra note 116; Preston, supra note 116, at A27.
163. Howard Brody observes that the current ethical roadmap permits
analgesic administration for terminally ill patients even if the dosages required
approach levels that might hasten death. See Brody, supra note 8, at 949;
Cherny & Portenoy, supra note 124, at 34, 36.
164. See American Academy of Neurology Position Statement, Certain
Aspects of the Care and Management of Profoundly and Irreversibly Paralysed
Patients with Retained Cognition, 43 NEUROLOGY 222 (1993); James L. Bernat
et al., Competent Patients with Advanced States of Permanent Paralysis Have
the Right to Forgo Life-Sustaining Therapy, 43 NEUROLOGY 224, 225 (1993).
165. See John Glasson, Report of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs
of the AMA Physician-Assisted Suicide, 10 IssuEs IN L. & MED. 91, 92 (1994);
Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the AMA, Euthanasia Report,
Proceedings of the AMA House of Delegates 259 (1988).
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professionally acceptable even when such treatment may
hasten the patient's death."'66 In Vacco v. Quill, Chief
Justice Rehnquist relied on the Task Force Report when he
indicated that pain medication is recognized as permissible
even when it "may" hasten the patient's death.'67 Finally,
some professional standards as to permissibility of certainly
lethal dosages are ambiguous in calling for use of effective
doses of pain medication without specifying any boundaries.
For example, the American Nurses Association endorses as
ethically justified "the increasing titration of medication to
achieve adequate symptom control, even at the expense of
life, thus hastening death ... .,16 Similarly, the American
College of Physicians calls relief of suffering a "highest
priority" and suggests increasing analgesics to levels that
successfully relieve pain "even if a side effect is to shorten
life."'69 These latter formulations do not speak explicitly
about the maximum tolerable level of risk of death, though
they might be read as permitting any dosage level, even one
certain to cause death.
What difference would it make if the medical
armamentarium against suffering included a prerogative to
administer a dosage of analgesics that is certain or
practically certain to cause death? Yale Kamisar suggests
166. NYSTF REPORT, supra note 101, at 108, 162-63 (1994). That report
allowed for "a significant risk" of hastening death. Id. The Kansas Medical
Society took a similar position when it filed an amicus curiae brief in a recent
case. See State v. Naramore, 965 P.2d 211, 214 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998) ("[Tjhere is
an ethical distinction between providing palliative care which may have fatal
side effects and providing euthanasia.")
167. 521 U.S. 793, 806-09 (1997).
168. American Nurses Association, Position Statement on Promotion of
Comfort and Relief of Pain in Dying Patients, as quoted in Appendix to Brief of
the AMA, amicus curiae, at 19a, Vacco (No. 95-1858). For other ambiguous
statements about nursing practice, see Nessa Coyle, Pain Management and
Sedation in the Terminally Ill, AACN, 5 CLINICAL ISSUES IN CRITICAL CARE
NURSING 360, 362 (1994); Cindy Hilton Rushton & Peter B. Terry,
Neuromuscular Blockade and Ventilator Withdrawal: Ethical Controversies, 4
AM. J. CRITICAL CARE 112, 114-15 (1995). For similar ambiguous policies
authorizing incremental doses, without any "cap," as necessary to relieve
suffering, see documents from the Hennepin County Medical Society and UCLA
Medical Center presented in Haugen, supra note 103, at 369-70. For another
ambiguous expression suggesting that physicians may do "all that is necessary"
for pain relief consistent with "responsible medical practice," see House of Lords
Select Committee on Medical Ethics S 242, in JOHN KEOWN, EUTHANASIA
EXAMINED: ETHICAL, CLINICAL, AND LEGAL PERSPECTIvES 103 (1995).
169. American College of Physicians Ethics Manual, 117 ANNALS INT. MED.
947, 955 (1992).
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that such a medical prerogative would strengthen
opposition to physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia by
making this ultimate form of pain relief available without
resort to assisted suicide." This might be so and it might be
good public policy to embrace the option of a certainly lethal
analgesic dosage. But let us candidly recognize that use of a
dosage that is almost certainly lethal is a form of
euthanasia. According to the AMA: "Euthanasia is the
administration of a lethal agent by another person to a
patient for the purpose of relieving the patient's intolerable
and incurable suffering." 7' That definition can be stretched
to fit use of a dosage of an analgesic that is certain or
practically certain to cause death.
A likely response is that euthanasia is characterized by
a specific intent to kill, while analgesic administration
involves an intent to relieve suffering. However, any
pretense that the physician's primary specific intent in
administering a dosage that is certain or practically certain
to cause death is to relieve suffering ignores the real-world
wisdom of Glanville Williams previously quoted: "When a
result is foreseen as certain, it is the same as if it were
desired or intended."72 To ignore Williams on this point is
to engage in a charade that masks what is often, if not
always, an actual object to cause death. Moreover, under
the Model Penal Code (MPC), which reflects prevalent state
law on this point, both purposeful and knowing conduct can
prove murder. Using specific intent to determine the actor's
culpability therefore fails to reflect modern American
criminal law doctrine regarding homicide. Administration
of an agent that is certain or practically certain to hasten
death meets the MPC and state law definitions of murder,
even if the actor's intent is to relieve suffering. Thus,
euthanasia does not require specific intent to kill.
Of course, a prerogative to use certainly lethal
analgesics would not be a full-blown legalization of
euthanasia. This limited form of euthanasia would be
confined to medical professionals, persons trained in
170. See Yale Kamisar, On the Meaning and Impact of the Physician-
Assisted Suicide Cases, 82 MIN. L. REV. 895, 910 (1998).
171. AMA Council on Scientific Affairs, Opinion 2.21; see also Rushton &
Terry, supra note 168, at 112.
172. WILLIAMS, supra note 105, at 322. For one group's assertion that any
distinction in this context based on a provider's specific intent is "sophistry," see
House of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics at 1 76 (1994).
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assessing the unavoidability of death and the unavailability
of alternative ways to relieve suffering. Professional
standards would also constrain usage of certainly lethal
analgesics. Careful assessment of the patient's competence
would be required and only graduated escalation of dosage
as necessary to control suffering would be permitted.73 By
insisting on careful assessment of "necessity" as a
prerequisite to use of certainly lethal dosages, professional
standards would be exhibiting concern for the sanctity of
human life. Again, perhaps all this is good public policy. As
further explained below, our point is that use of risky
analgesics (even in dosages that will probably cause death)
can be justified under a recklessness structure while the
use of a dosage that is practically certain to cause death is a
form of euthanasia and ought to be acknowledged as such if
accepted into the medical armamentarium. Alternatively, if
a categorical ban on euthanasia is to remain in place, then
medical standards should clarify that relief of suffering can
justify analgesics carrying a substantial risk of death, but
not when the actor is practically certain that death will
result.
Beyond the issue of dosages that will certainly or
almost certainly hasten death, a hard question remains
about the maximum degree of risk tolerable in palliative
treatment. How should the law treat a physician who
disregards a probability of death as long as that probability
is less than awareness that death will be an almost certain
consequence of the analgesic? Any conduct that creates a
substantial risk of death is potentially reckless and
therefore criminal, unless justified.74 The Model Penal Code
has no culpable mental state between acting recklessly and
acting knowingly-between actors who unjustifiably
disregard a substantial risk of death and those who act with
awareness that death is a certain or practically certain
outcome. Obviously, there is a wide range of probability
outcomes within this range of risky behaviors-that is,
between death as a substantial risk and as a practically
certain consequence. Even a risk of a few percentage points
that death will result seems like a substantial risk for
173. See NYSTF REPORT, supra note 101, at 150 (noting that provision of
risky analgesics must conform to "accepted medical standards") and the medical
standards described at supra notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
174. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(b).
132 [Vol. 48
2000] PHYSICIAN CONDUCT HASTENING DEATH 133
purposes of assessing recklessness. At the other end of the
spectrum, for a result to be "practically certain" it would
have to approach 100%. Thus, the recklessness standard in
criminal homicide cases potentially encompasses all
perceived risks from a few percentage points above zero to
almost 100%. A doctor who gives a dose of analgesics with a
5% risk of killing the patient and a doctor who gives a dose
with a 80% or 85% risk of killing the patient are, under the
Model Penal Code, potentially within the same mental state
(recklessness) in terms of culpability. The question becomes
how great a risk of death is justifiable and therefore non-
reckless.
It seems intuitively obvious that a doctor who
disregards a 5% risk of death is less culpable than a doctor
who is practically certain that the dose will cause death.
But what about the doctor at the upper end of the
recklessness range-for example a doctor who disregards
an 85% risk of death? Should the law regulating end-of-life
medical practices draw a culpability line between a doctor
who disregards an 85% risk of death and one who
disregards a 5% risk that death will result? Under the MPC
framework, both doctors can seek to defend the substantial
risk (85% or 5%) by showing that it was the only way to
achieve pain relief and that the pain was unbearable and
persistent.
We previously explained that there is "no precise line
for maximum tolerable risk that will work for all cases"
because the "line will be affected by at least two elements-
prevailing medical practices and jury attitudes toward the
acceptability of... risk taking in individual cases.""'5 While
professional standards are imprecise, they leave open the
possibility that a probably lethal dosage (i.e., carrying a
greater than 50% chance of death) can be justified.
Professional standards that endorse palliative medications
that "may" hasten death or that carry a "possibility" of
hastening death can be read to uphold use of analgesics
that will probably cause death. Thus, in our view, the 1983
Report of the President's Commission was correct when it
suggested that analgesic doses are permissible even when
they "probably lead to death" in a grievously suffering
terminal patient when less risky means have proved
175. Cantor & Thomas, supra note 122, at 120.
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futile.'76 Those sources that seem to uphold use of probably
lethal pain relief are in accord with our recklessness
structure so long as the probability does not reach
"practically certain."
All of this is not to suggest, however, that the doctor
who disregards an 85% probability of death will have an
easy time justifying her conduct. As we argued in an earlier
paper, "[W]hen the risk of death exceeds 50 percent, the
chance of achieving pain relief without causing prompt
death necessarily becomes less than 50 percent and,
accordingly, pain relief becomes a less likely outcome than
death." 7 We believe, then, that it is much harder (but
possible) to show a justification when the risk of death
exceeds the chance of pain relief without prompt death.
A further question arises as to whether highly risky
analgesic dosages are ever "necessary," "' given that
sedation to unconsciousness looms as a less drastic means
of providing relief from suffering. Another way to phrase
the issue-pursuant to our framework of justification for
risk taking-is whether there is a safer means (deep
sedation) to relieve suffering than use of probably lethal
analgesics. The AMA Council on Scientific Affairs contends
that "profound sedation" can "always relieve pain."'79 Other
clinicians observe that sedation to unconsciousness is
available as a response to conditions such as extreme
agitation, delirium, dyspnea, or pain that sometimes plague
a person's dying process.' Such sedation is a not infrequent
adjunct to end-stage care of cancer patients. 8 ' While
176. PRESiDENTS COMMISSION, supra note 114, at 80. One study of physician
conduct in the Netherlands shows that Dutch physicians administering risky
analgesics expect in approximately 70% of instances that their action will
"probably shorten life." See Paul J. van der Mass et al., Euthanasia and Other
Medical Decisions Concerning the End of Life, 338 LANCET 669, 672 (1991); see
LANCET, infra note 315.
177. Cantor & Thomas, supra note 122, at 120.
178. PRESmENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 114, at 81.
179. AMA Council on Scientific Affairs, Good Care of the Dying Patient, 275
JAMA 474,475 (1996).
180. See Beth McIver et al., The Use of Chlorpromazine for Symptom
Control in Dying Cancer Patients, 9 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 341, 342 (1994);
Cherny & Portenoy, supra note 124, at 34; Balfour Mount, Morphine Drips,
Terminal Sedation, and Slow Euthanasia: Definitions and Facts, Not Anecdotes,
12 J. PALLIATIVE CARE 31, 35 (1996); GREGG A. KASTING, THE NON-NECESSITY OF
EUTHANASIA, IN PHYSICIAN ASSISTED DEATH 25, 40-41 (Humber et al., eds., 1993);
Wanzer, supra note 160, at 847.
181. See Greene & Davis, supra note 126, at 333, 336; McIver, supra note
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sedation to unconsciousness can carry risks of respiratory
depression and acceleration of death,12 careful use of the
technique can avoid hastening death.' 8 Thus, at least in
some instances, profound sedation offers a less dangerous
form of relieving suffering than a dosage of analgesics that
probably will hasten death.
The catch is that the prospect of lingering for days or
weeks in an unconscious or semi-conscious state may be
repugnant to some patients. As some commentators have
noted, "[c]ontinuous sedation, while awaiting 'natural
death' is a possible option, but may be contrary to the
preferences of patients who see no point in prolonging their
existence in a state of unconsciousness."'84 A helpless,
insensate limbo is seen by some dying patients as
undignified or as an unwanted imposition on surrounding
family conducting a deathwatch.
5
As to those patients deeming profound sedation to be
intolerably undignified, the question-for purposes of legal
justification of risky conduct-becomes whether such
personal opposition disqualifies sedation as a less
dangerous pain relief option than riskier analgesics. In the
context of a competent patient's rejection of life-sustaining
medical intervention, the patient's distaste for a proposed
treatment, including distaste for loss of cognitive function,
would indeed be a legitimate basis on which to disqualify
that life-sustaining treatment. However, a competent
patient has an almost unlimited prerogative to determine
what bodily invasions to tolerate in the face of a fatal
affliction. A patient's rejection of life support can be
180, at 344.
182. See Greene & Davis, supra note 126, at 333, 336; Cherny & Portenoy,
supra note 124, at 34.
183. See McIver, supra note 180, at 345; Mount, supra note 180, at 35;
Rushton & Terry, supra note 168, at 115. Of course, profound sedation
accompanied by withholding of nutrition and hydration can be particularly
dangerous. We speak to that more hazardous mode of sedation infra Part IV.
184. See Franklin G. Miller & John C. Fletcher, Criticism or Caricature, 25
HASTINGS CENT. REP. 3 (1995); AMA Council on Scientific Affairs, supra note
171, at 45.
185. See Brief of Coalition of Hospice Professionals, amicus curiae, at 11-12,
Glucksberg (No. 96-110); see also Respondent's Brief at 17, Vacco (No. 95-1858)
(calling profound sedation a "monstrous" fate-the "very essence of
degradation"); WEBB, supra note 86, at 388 (describing the strong aversion of
some patients to a comatose or semi-comatose state-for them an indignity
worse than death).
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grounded on distaste for a proposed treatment, concern
about being a burden on surrounding family or care
providers, or distaste for the deteriorated status that the
patient has reached. A patient presumably has a similar
prerogative to reject profound sedation-as an unwanted
bodily invasion. The prerogative to choose a highly risky
analgesic, however, may be narrower.
In our prior analysis of this topic, we suggested that
distaste for prolonged unconsciousness would justify
selection of a more dangerous form of pain relief in
preference to profound sedation.'86 This position can be
defended by a common sense analogy to risky surgery. A
patient can choose a more risky surgical intervention than
an available alternative intervention if the more risky
operation would yield a very significant quality of life gain.
By analogy, a patient should be able to choose a somewhat
riskier form of pain relief if that riskier form would yield a
very significant quality of life gain such as alertness in
place of prolonged unconsciousness.
Does the justification analysis change where the risk of
hastened death from the analgesics is highly probable, but
less than "practically certain"? Consider by analogy a
patient mired in a very debilitated state who faces a 60%
risk of death from surgery that, if successful, would restore
him to normal functioning. We tentatively conclude that
this choice should be left with the patient and that the
surgeon would be legally justified-i.e., not criminally
reckless-in performing the surgery. Would the same result
obtain if the choice were between probably lethal pain relief
and less risky profound sedation? Can a suffering patient
choose an analgesic with a 60% chance of causing death
(but which preserves alertness) rather than deep sedation
with a 10% risk of provoking death?
Our response hinges on principles of recklessness and
justification. For an act to be justified when the actor
disregards a substantial risk, the potential benefit that is
sought must outweigh the risk of harm. In the surgery
hypothetical, the risk of harm is a 60% chance of death; the
potential benefit is that survival will produce a fully
functioning rather than very debilitated individual-i.e., a
considerable gain in quality of life. In the pain relief case,
the potential benefit of relief from unbearable pain even for
186. See Cantor & Thomas, supra note 122, at 117.
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a few days might weigh as heavily in the justification
balance as the surgery patient's much improved quality of
life, but the cases are different in that the patient seeking
pain relief can get relief through the less dangerous
profound sedation. Unlike the surgery patient who can
obtain the benefit of recovering normal function only by
taking a 60% risk of death, the pain relief patient can get
pain relief either through the highly risky analgesic or the
less risky profound sedation. Thus, the balance for the pain
relief patient is whether avoidance of prolonged
unconsciousness is worth the greatly increased risk of death
compared to the modest risk of hastened death from
profound sedation.
For illustration purposes, assume a 60% risk of death
from the analgesics and only a 10% risk from the profound
sedation, thus creating a 50% greater risk of death from the
analgesics. It is difficult to know whether alertness is a
benefit that is "worth" more than an added 50% risk of
hastened death. One argument in favor of tipping the
balance toward alertness and justifying a 60% risk of death
is that the insentient stupor alternative is little different
from death itself. Many sources conclude that
consciousness-capacity to experience an environment and
to interact with people-is the essence of life."'7 If this is
right, then permitting a patient and her doctor to risk a
high probability of death in order to achieve pain relief with
continued alertness may be akin to permitting the surgery
patient to elect surgery that risks a high probability of
death. In both instances, there is an important quality of
life gain that can justify choosing the riskier alternative.
This does not mean, however, that a quality of life gain
justifies use of an analgesic dosage that is practically
certain to cause death. In an early musing on the legal
bounds of pain relief administration, Glanville Williams
speculated that avoidance of existence in a "drugged torpor"
would not furnish a legal justification for administration of
a lethal drug.'88 Although there are no judicial precedents
187. Indeed some commentators assert that a permanently unconscious
being is not a person and should be deemed dead. See Ronald E. Cranford &
David Randolph Smith, Consciousness: The Most Critical Moral (Constitutional)
Standard for Human Personhood, 13 AM. J.L. & MED. 233, 233-34 (1987);
Steven Goldberg, The Changing Face of Death: Computers, Consciousness, and
Nancy Cruzan, 43 STANFORD L. REV. 659, 669 (1991).
188. See WILLIAMS, supra note 105, at 325.
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on point, the justification risk/benefit balance suggests that
Williams was correct. The patient who rejects profound
sedation in favor of analgesics that are practically certain to
cause death has traded a death-like state for a near
certainty of death. However, for the purpose of legally
justifying a mortal risk, the balance must clearly favor the
benefit sought before disregard of the risk can be justified,
and a "death for death" potential exchange is a net wash.
Thus, we conclude that a physician can be justified in
disregarding a substantial, even a probable, risk of death in
administering analgesics, but can never be justified under
current law when aware that the dosage is practically
certain to cause death.
Of course, if profound sedation is sometimes a
necessary means to achieve relief from distressing disease
symptoms, and if the resulting unconscious or semi-
conscious status would itself be a repugnant prospect for
the terminally ill patient, there is a powerful impetus for
the patient to decline in advance artificial nutrition or
hydration and thus to ensure a relatively quick death while
under profound sedation. The next section of our paper
addresses that option under the heading of "terminal
sedation."
IV. TERMINAL SEDATION
As used here, "terminal sedation" refers to
administration of sedatives sufficient to render a dying
patient somnolent during the remainder of the dying
process. The object, as in the case of risky analgesics, is to
preclude refractory suffering in the end-stage of a patient's
struggle against a fatal affliction."9
Resort to deep sedation can be triggered by diverse
circumstances. In some instances, deep sedation is used
because analgesic interventions do not succeed in
controlling physical pain while still leaving the patient
alert.19 In other instances, physical discomfort associated
189. Indeed, terminal sedation might be considered a subcategory of risky
analgesics. It is an extreme means of relieving suffering used when customary
analgesics have failed or where the suffering flows from sources other than
physical pain. As we explain in the text, the legal frameworks are essentially
the same for both risky analgesics and terminal sedation. See discussion supra
pp. 134-35.
190. NYSTF Report, supra note 101, at 40; Robert D. Truog et al.,
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with nausea, vomiting, or dyspnea may be intolerable to the
patient and unrelievable by means other than deep
sedation. 9' Other times, a patient may be experiencing
refractory emotional suffering associated with respiratory
distress, agitation, anxiety, incontinence, or fatigue-
emotional suffering relievable only by deep sedation.'92
While relief of suffering is a common thread within
terminal sedation, there are actually three variations of
deep sedation that deserve separate examination.'93 We will
analyze in succession sedation accompanying the
withdrawal of mechanical life support, deep sedation in
response to the above-mentioned intolerable and refractory
symptoms, and deep sedation (in response to intolerable
symptoms) accompanied by withholding of artificial
nutrition and hydration (ANH).
All forms of terminal sedation end in death. Deep
sedation carries some risk of respiratory depression,' and
may sometimes hasten death.'95 However, cause of death is
usually uncertain in the context of terminal sedation.'96
Barbiturates in the Care of the Terminally Ill, 327 N. ENG. J. MED. 1678, 1680
(1992); Cherny & Foley, supra note 126, at 79, 97.
191. See Greene & Davis, supra note 126, at 335; Paul Rousseau, Terminal
Sedation in the Care of Dying Patients, 156 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1785
(1996) [hereinafter Rousseau, Terminal Sedation]; see generally Robert E. Enck,
Drug-induced Terminal Sedation for Symptom Control, AM. J. HOSPICE &
PALLIATIVE CARE 3 (1991).
192. See id.; see also Casswell, supra note 104, at 129-30; Rousseau,
Hospice, supra note 44, at 831; Mount, supra note 180, at 34; Cherny &
Portenoy, supra note 124, at 34.
193. See Truog et al, supra note 190, at 1680.
194. See Russell K. Portenoy, Morphine Infusions at the End of Life: The
Pitfalls in Reasoning from Anecdote, 12 J. PALLIATIVE CARE 44, 45 (1996);
Lawrence Schneiderman & Roger Spragg Ethical Decisions in Discontinuing
Mechanical Ventilation, 318 N. ENG. J. MED. 984, 987 (1988).
195. Cherny & Foley, supra note 126, at 97; Cherny & Portenoy, supra note
124, at 34. The AMA maintains, though, that properly managed sedation will
not precipitate respiratory failure. Brief of AMA, amicus curiae, at 22,
Glucksberg (No. 96-110).
196. See Brody, supra note 135, at 38; Patrick F. Norris, Palliative Care and
Killing: Understanding Ethical Distinctions, 13 BIOETHICS FORUM 25, 27 (1997).
In part because this form of deep sedation is usually confined to the last days or
weeks of a dying patient's existence, and in part because the sedation can be
administered without prompting respiratory depression (NYSTF REPORT, supra
note 101, at 162), attributing death to the sedatives is highly problematic. Not
surprisingly, some examples of deep sedation presented in the literature do not
assign sedation as a cause of death. See Coyle, supra note 168, at 362-63 (cancer
patient died after 4 days of unconsciousness); Truog, et al., supra note 190, at
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Because the practice usually occurs with patients who are
gravely deteriorated and within days of dying, no one
knows whether the patient succumbed to the underlying
disease process or to the effects of sedation.'97 Even where
ANH is withheld incident to the deep sedation, cause of
death might be attributable to the underlying disease, to
the sedation, or to dehydration associated with withholding
ANH.'98 At the least, deep sedation entails some risk of
hastening death and, depending on the dosage of sedatives
used and the length of time ANH is withheld, may in fact
hasten death.9 The various practices therefore warrant
legal examination.
The most common form of terminal sedation is that
accompanying withdrawal of life support mechanisms such
as respirators, dialysis, or ANH. When Chief Justice
Rehnquist referred to terminal sedation, he did so in that
context-as an incident to withdrawal of life sustaining
medical interventions."'0 At the point of withdrawal of life
support, the patient is expected to die. The concern is
alleviation of suffering accompanying and following the
withdrawal process. The potential harms include acute
anxiety, agitation, shortness of breath, and physical pain.
Both analgesics and deep sedation are customarily
administered to prevent these harms.0 ' Again, cause of
1679 (cancer patient died after 2 days in barbiturate coma). Rather, death is
attributed to the underlying disease, such as cancer. See Greene & Davis, supra
note 126, at 335 (death of sedated patients attributed to "end-stage malignant
disease.") Nonetheless, in some instances the deep sedation may hasten a
patient's death and in all instances the sedation maintaining unconsciousness
prevents the patient from changing his or her mind and requesting aggressive
medical intervention.
197. See Greene & Davis, supra note 126, at 335, 337 (attributing death to
"end-stage malignant disease" while admitting "possible shortening of life"); see
also Robert Dozor, Intentionally Hastening Death, 38 J. FAM. PRACTICE 295, 297
(1994); Portenoy, supra note 194, at 45.
198. Some commentators assert that dehydration is "often" the operative
cause of death while conceding that the cause might be the underlying disease
or some "intervening complication." Quill et al., Palliative Options, supra note 6,
at 2100, 2102; see also Orentlicher, supra note 107, at 1237.
199. Anecdotal reports describe use of excessive sedative doses probably
precipitating death. See Billings & Block, supra note 6, at 22; see also Susan M.
Wolf, Pragmatism in the Face of Death: The Role of Facts in the Assisted Suicide
Debate, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1063, 1088 (1998).
200. See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 798 (1997).
201. See William C. Wilson et al., Ordering and Administration of Sedatives
and Analgesics During the Withholding and Withdrawal of Life Support from
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death is uncertain. Upon removal of life support, the
patient is expected to die from the underlying ailment but
administration of large doses of sedatives has some
potential to hasten death."'
The legal rationale for the validity of heavy sedation
accompanying withdrawal of life support is identical to the
rationale for risky analgesics. Once a patient exercises the
prerogative to reject life-sustaining medical intervention,
health care providers have an ethical and legal obligation to
minimize suffering via palliative care.0 3 That obligation
apparently extends to amelioration of mental, as well as
physical, suffering.04  Amelioration of suffering thus
provides the legal justification for the risk that deep
sedation may hasten death. As in the case with risky
analgesics, the deep sedation is supposed to be the least
dangerous means of palliation and the dosage is supposed
to be commensurate with the object of relieving suffering.2 5
Use of a dosage that would be certain or practically certain
to hasten death would be inconsistent with the recklessness
framework, discussed above,20 6 that permits palliative risk
taking only if death is less than a practically certain
consequence. Professional practice seems compatible with
this framework. That is, deep sedation seems to be used on
the assumption that the sedation "may" hasten death,20 7 a
Critically Ill Patients, 267 JAMA 949, 951 (1992); Carol A. Riddick & Lawrence
J. Schneiderman, Distinguishing Between Effect and Benefit, 5 J. CLiNiCAL
ETHICS 41, 42 (1994); see generally Margaret L. Campbell, Case Studies in
Terminal Weaning from Mechanical Ventilation, 2 AM. J. CRITICAL CARE 354
(1993); Barbara J. Daly et al., Withdrawal of Mechanical Ventilation: Ethical
Principles and Guidelines for Terminal Weaning, 2 AM. J. CRITICAL CARE 217
(1993).
202. See Wilson et al., supra note 201, at 952-53 (stating that it is unclear
whether death is actually hastened but acknowledging the "hemodynamic and
respiratory depressant qualities" of the sedatives used); Daly et al., supra note
201, at 222 (admitting that medications used to relieve suffering "may hasten
as well as ease death"); Riddick & Schneiderman, supra note 201, at 42.
203. See Cherny & Portenoy, supra note 124, at 36; Daly et al., supra note
201, at 222; Schneiderman & Spragg, supra note 194, at 987; see also Matter of
Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 419 (N.J. 1987) (Handler, J. concurring).
204. See Cornelius J. van der Poel, Ethical Aspects in Palliative Care, AM. J.
HOSPICE AND PALLIATIVE CARE 49, 53 (1996); Robert D. Truog, Pain Management
and Sedation in the Terminally Ill, 5 AACN 363, 364 (1994).
205. See Quill, Risk Taking, supra note 6, at 707; Campbell, supra note 201,
at 356; Cushing, supra note 104, at 944.
206. See supra notes 122-28, 133-34 and accompanying text.
207. See Cherny & Portenoy, supra note 124, at 34; Portenoy, supra note
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level of risk lower than practically certain.
Specific intent is indeterminate in this context as it was
in the area of risky analgesics. Deep sedation accompanying
withdrawal of life support (at least in non-excessive
palliative dosages) is certainly consistent with an intention
to prevent and relieve suffering. Yet the patient ordering
cessation of life support may well be intending to die and
the cooperating professional may well share that intent to
end life. In one study, 36% of surveyed professionals
reported that hastening death was at least a secondary
object in administering sedatives in tandem with
withdrawal of life support."'
While sedation accompanying withdrawal of life
support seems appropriate and lawful, use of paralytic
agents in that same context is highly suspect.0 9 Paralytic
agents, such as curariform, have no analgesic, sedative, or
therapeutic qualities.210 Their sole function is to prevent the
dying patient from exhibiting signs of struggle or gasping
that might distress surrounding family or caregivers. 2 At
the same time, paralytic agents might prevent a suffering,
dying patient from communicating distress and/or could
incapacitate muscles and cause death by asphyxiation.12
Because of these possible consequences, and because the
agents have no therapeutic value to the patient,
commentators condemn the use of paralytics incident to
withdrawal of life support as "ethically unjustifiable."213 For
these commentators, the benefit to others of avoiding a
distressing spectacle does not justify the possible hastening
194, at 45; Schneiderman & Spragg, supra note 194, at 987.
208. See Wilson et al., supra note 201, at 951. The same study indicated that
most professionals using sedation wanted to decrease pain (88%), decrease
anxiety (85%), or ease air hunger (67%). See id.
209. See Robert D. Truog & Jeffrey P. Burns, To Breathe or Not to Breathe, 5
J. CLINICAL EThICS 39 (1994); see also Rushton & Terry, supra note 168, at 112
(describing a case and examining ethical questions regarding the issue of using
a neuromuscular blocking agent while removing a ventilator); Schneiderman &
Spragg, supra note 194, at 988 (stating the use of paralytic agents is ethically
unjustifiable when shortening a patient's survival only for the benefit of family
or others).
210. Paralytic agents "relieve suffering only to the extent they are effective
in causing the death of the patient." Truog & Burns, supra note 209, at 39.
211. See Rushton & Terry, supra note 168, at 113-14.
212. See Riddick & Schneiderman, supra note 201, at 42.
213. See Schneiderman & Spragg, supra note 194, at 988; Truog & Bums,
supra note 209, at 41.
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of death. It is conceivable that a patient might competently
choose administration of a paralytic agent in order to spare
the sensibilities of loved ones attending withdrawal of life
support. But, common practice does not appear to involve
getting informed consent to such an agent.214 Even if the
patient did consent, administration of a paralytic agent that
hastens death without palliative justification would be
homicide. In short, deep sedation, but not the use of
paralytics, may be a justifiable adjunct to removal of life-
sustaining medical intervention.
A second form of terminal sedation involves sedation to
somnolence at the end-stage of a dying process even though
the patient is not dependent on mechanical life support.'
Again, the object is preclusion of suffering or indignity
associated with diverse intractable symptoms such as pain,
nausea, dyspnea, anxiety, or delirium. Deep sedation is
often cited in the literature as an "end-stage" process, but
the precise definition of end-stage is unclear. Some
commentators consider terminal sedation as occurring
when death is imminent, apparently meaning unavoidable
death is looming within hours or days. 16 Other sources refer
to the practice in the context of the last days "or weeks" of
life.21 7 There is even an occasional reference to deep sedation
for patients unavoidably dying within "weeks or months."218
Clinical reports2 9 usually refer to the last hours or days of
an unavoidable dying process. As predicting death is
notoriously imprecise in terminal patients, even if the
practice is aimed at patients within days of unavoidable
death, some of those patients would presumably have
survived for more than a week.
214. Moreover, such consent would not generally be forthcoming because of
the potential for a paralytic agent to mask distress symptoms and thereby make
a dying process more burdensome.
215. See Cherny & Portenoy, supra note 124, at 31, 34-36; Greene & Davis,
supra note 126, at 335-37; Rousseau, Hospice, supra note 44, at 830-32; Truog,
supra note 204, at 364; NYSTF REPORT, supra note 101, at 40, 164; Rousseau,
Terminal Sedation, supra note 191, at 1785-86.
216. See Rousseau, Hospice, supra note 44, at 832; Rousseau, Terminal
Sedation, supra note 191, at 1785; Brody, supra note 135, at 38-39; Enck, supra
note 191, at 4-5.
217. NYSTF REPORT, supra note 101, at 40; Brief of AMA, amicus curiae, at
23, Vacco (No. 95-1858).
218. J. Andrew Billings & Susan D. Block, Slow Euthanasia, 12 J.
PALLIATIVE CARE 21, 23 (1996).
219. See supra note 215.
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The same framework applicable to risky analgesics22 °
should govern the legality of this form of deep sedation.
That is, relief of intractable and intolerable symptoms may
provide a legal justification for deep sedation even if the
sedation poses a substantial risk of hastening death.22'
First, the patient (or an appropriate surrogate) must
consent to the process. Second, no less risky means of relief
must be available. Finally, sedative effects must be
monitored and dosage carefully titrated in order to achieve
the palliative effect without killing the patient. Clinical
practice largely appears to conform to these parameters.222
While anecdotal reports speak of some physicians
increasing sedative dosage without palliative need in order
to hasten death,223  the frequency of such conduct is
vigorously disputed.2 4 Again, so long as deep sedation
reflects a considered choice by an informed patient or
220. See supra notes 123-30 and accompanying text.
221. As noted, palliative care for the dying patient is an integral part of
professional responsibility. See supra note 203, and accompanying text. Some
sources insist that specific intent of the care providers differentiates terminal
sedation from euthanasia. See generally Mount, supra note 180, at 34-35
(criticizing Billings and Block's analysis); see also Campbell, supra note 201, at
358; Rousseau, supra note 194, at 831 (stating "the explicit intent of sedation is
the alleviation of suffering, whereas the intent of physician assisted
suicide/euthanasia is death."). We dispute that explanation, not just because
specific intent is so elusive in this context but because common sense says that
some providers do seek to hasten death when they administer terminal sedation
knowing that the patient must remain insensate to avoid refractory suffering
and that only death will end that patient's insensate limbo. In other words,
there is strong impetus for the provider to want the patient to die sooner rather
than later once the palliative regime (here deep sedation) reduces the patient to
permanent unconsciousness. One study of sedation accompanying removal of
life support confirms this intuition about providers' mixed reasons in using deep
sedation. See Wilson et al., supra note 201, at 951-53. This intuition about
providers' specific intent is even stronger in the third form of terminal sedation
when ANH is also withheld. See Quill et al., Palliative Options, supra note 6, at
2101.
222. See Cherny & Foley, supra note 126, at 82, 92; Greene & Davis, supra
note 126, at 336-37; Rousseau, Terminal Sedation, supra note 191, at 1785;
Brief of Coalition of Hospice Professionals, amicus curiae, at 14, Glucksberg
(No. 96-110). But see Riddick & Schneiderman, supra note 201, at 41-42
(speaking of using large doses of sedatives causing profound respiratory
depression).
223. See Billings & Block, supra note 218, at 21-22.
224. See Portenoy, supra note 194, at 44; see also Mount, supra note 180, at
31-32 (critically examining the evidence used by Billings and Block); Brody,
supra note 101, at S156 (arguing that increased doses of narcotics does not
necessarily produce a fatal overdose or reduce survival time).
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surrogate, and the sedative dosage is reasonably geared to
preventing intolerable suffering, deep sedation seems
appropriate and justified.
A third form of terminal sedation mirrors the second
form (sedation to somnolence in order to avoid intractable
suffering) with the important addition that ANH is not
provided once the patient becomes unconscious. Absent
ANH, the patient is sure to die; however, it will always be
difficult to fix cause of death among the underlying disease,
the sedation, and dehydration. If the patient were already
dependent on ANH because of a natural affliction, no legal
or ethical problem would arise from withdrawing ANH
pursuant to the patient's instruction. ANH is generally
equated with other forms of life support subject to a
patient's control. Sedation would then be a palliative
adjunct to the withdrawal of life-sustaining medical
intervention (in this instance, ANH) as described earlier in
this section."2 The more troublesome scenario, though,
involves a patient previously capable of eating whose
dependence on ANH accompanies the deep sedation
administered to relieve intractable symptoms during the
patient's dying process.
We can envision several scenarios where cessation of
ANH is associated with deep sedation. For example, a
competent patient requests deep sedation and the physician
administers that sedation and, without consent of the
patient, also withholds ANH once the patient is
unconscious. The deep sedation itself is not problematic at
the request of a patient suffering unbearably. Sedation
posing some risk to an egregiously suffering patient (for
example, a risk of respiratory depression) may be justified
as a necessary concomitant of a palliative regime. However,
that rationale does not apply to withholding of hydration
once deep sedation has fully secured the palliative object of
relieving suffering. Once relief of suffering has been
achieved by deep sedation, the only function of withholding
ANH seems to be to hasten death." Deep sedation
accompanied by a physician's unilateral withholding of
ANH then seems closely akin to non-voluntary euthanasia.
225. See supra notes 202-07 and accompanying text.
226. See Quill et al., Palliative Options, supra note 6, at 2101; see also
Respondents' Brief at 49, Quill (No. 95-1858); Billings & Block, supra note 218,
at 21.
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The patient will inevitably die in the wake of the sedation
and ensuing absence of hydration. At least where it can be
shown that the patient succumbs to dehydration rather
than the underlying disease process whose symptoms
necessitated the sedation, the process might be regarded as"slow euthanasia" precipitated by the sedation
incapacitating the normal processes of ingestion and
digestion.227 Thus, if a physician has merely secured consent
to deep sedation, it would indeed be homicide to go further
and unilaterally withhold ANH.225
We can envision other scenarios in which a competent
patient consents in advance to withholding of ANH in
conjunction with deep sedation. The first such scenario is
simply a variation of the VSED patient we discussed earlier
in this paper. We argued earlier that a suffering, dying
patient has a prerogative to stop eating and drinking
(VSED) and to refuse any ANH proffered at that time by
227. See Billings & Block, supra note 218, at 25; see also Orentlicher, supra
note 107, at 1237-39. One Australian proponent of euthanasia proposed a "coma
machine" as a means of carrying out the then-legal prerogative of assisting
suicide of a competent, terminally ill person. Dr. Philip Nitschke sought to
design a machine that would constantly infuse enough medications (a mix of
morphine and midazolam) to keep a suffering, terminally ill patient
permanently unconscious until death. See Christopher Zinn, Euthanasia Fight
Renewed with 'Coma Machine,' SEATTLE POST-NTELLIGENCER, May 15, 1997, at
A2; This proposed machine illustrates the conceptual analogy between one form
of terminal sedation and physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia.
228. Again, in this scenario we assume that dehydration can be shown as
the cause of death. Cause of death is often a puzzle even where terminal
sedation is accompanied by withholding of ANH. Some sources assign death to
"dehydration or other intervening complications [of dehydration]." Timothy E.
Quill et al., The Rule of Double Effect-A Critique of Its Role in End-of-Life
Decision Making, 337 N. ENG. J. MED. 1768, 1769 (1997) [hereinafter Quill et
al., The Rule of Double Effect]; "Generally, nutrition and hydration are also
discontinued when the patient is under sedation, and the patient then dies of
starvation and/or dehydration." Brief of Coalition of Hospice Professionals,
amicus curiae, at 11, Glucksberg (No. 96-110). Dehydration can indeed have
fatal consequences and will eventually cause death. See Gillian M. Craig, On
Withholding Nutrition and Hydration in the Terminally Ill: Has Palliative
Medicine Gone Too Far? 20 J. MED. ETHIcs 139, 140 (1994). However, as the
dying patient was already in the end-stage of an unavoidable dying process and
as sedation sufficient to cause unconsciousness has been administered,
assigning cause of death to dehydration is difficult. Death might as well be
attributable to the underlying disease process (or possibly to the sedation) as to
dehydration. See Orentlicher, supra note 107, at 1237; see also Craig, supra
note 228, at 141. We assume, though, that dehydration can sometimes be shown
to be at least a contributing cause of death, so that the legality of profound
sedation coupled with withholding of ANH must be examined.
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medical staff."9 Ordinarily, this would mean that a
competent patient can decide to refuse all nutrition and
hydration (including ANH) and then request sedation
(presumably light sedation) to relieve anxiety or agitation
during the ensuing dying process. In some instances,
though, a patient initiating VSED might be suffering so
egregiously, either from the preexisting medical conditions
and their intractable symptoms or from emotional distress
accompanying VSED, that the patient subsequent to
initiation of VSED might choose deep sedation. Deep
sedation at that juncture would be legally justified if
necessary to relieve the patient's suffering. Non-lethal
amounts of sedatives could then be regarded as a palliative
measure relieving anxiety, agitation, or any discomfort
associated with the underlying disease or with dehydration.
From that perspective, this form of terminal sedation (deep
sedation accompanied by withholding of ANH) could be
sustained as a variation on a patient's prerogative to
initiate VSED. Of course, this must be an actual rather
than a fictitious rationale. The patient must make an
informed, considered choice regarding all three elements:
refusal to eat, deep sedation, and withholding of ANH.
Further, the deep sedation must be necessary in order to
relieve severe distress or suffering that materializes during
the VSED process. Under those conditions, profound
sedation (and concomitant withholding of ANH) may be
justified."0 In such instances, the patient is likely to die
from VSED rather than profound sedation.
A possible legal obstacle might arise regarding the role
of this form of deep sedation in maintaining
unconsciousness and thus preventing the patient from
changing his or her mind about the fatal VSED course. An
action that obstructs a person's natural life-sustaining
process, such as placing one's hand over a person's mouth in
a fashion asphyxiating the person, is homicide.2"' An action
that prevents a person from extricating himself or herself
229. See supra notes 67-76 and accompanying text.
230. To be justified, the sedation must be "necessary" because some risk of
hastening death accompanies the use of sedation. By "necessary," we mean that
the benefit of relieving distressing symptoms outweighs the risk of hastening
death by depressing respiratory function.
231. Cf. Dena S. Davis, Legal Trends in Bioethics, 5 J. CLINICAL ETHICs 62
(1994) (noting indictment of a neonatologist for placing a hand over an infant's
mouth as the infant struggled for air).
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from a life-threatening situation is also homicide. For
example, tying the hands of a person who is attempting
suicide via hanging, in a manner that does not allow the
person to loosen the rope, has been deemed a homicide.232
Arguably, rendering the VSED patient insensate materially
advances the terminal enterprise by precluding discomfort
or other thoughts and sensations that might prompt the
patient's change of mind. 3 However, that objection would
also be present in the first two forms of terminal sedation.
That is, deep sedation always renders a formerly competent
individual incapable of changing his/her mind. If the
sedation is indeed a "necessary" palliative measure, its
incidental impact of preventing a change of mind should not
disqualify its use. Even a patient who engages in VSED
without deep sedation will eventually lapse into a coma and
thus be unable in this last stage to change her mind. Again,
we suggest that cessation of ANH incidental to deep
sedation is licit where a competent patient has first made a
considered determination to stop eating and drinking, and
has then chosen deep sedation in the face of severe
suffering or distress that has materialized.
A final scenario involves a suffering patient who has
not previously opted for VSED, but who confronts the ANH
issue when unbearable symptoms prompt the patient's
request for deep sedation. In this case, when the physician
concurs that deep sedation is justified, the patient also
requests withholding of ANH. Timothy Quill argues that
this form of terminal sedation is probably legal."4 From his
perspective, the deep sedation is warranted as a palliative
measure in the face of patient suffering. As to the
withholding of ANH, Quill, apparently assuming that the
patient is giving informed consent to that medical course,
sees it as a legitimate exercise of self-determination and
bodily integrity by the patient.235
232. See United States v. Varraso, 21 M.J. 129, 133 (C.M.A. 1985); see also
People v. Cleaves, 280 Cal. Rptr. 146, 150-51 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)
(describing the circumstances of the case where the defendant tied the suicide
into a position from which the suicide could not escape).
233. Cf. Somerville, supra note 125, at 309 (calling sedation to prevent a
gravely impaired infant from waking and demanding nourishment a form of
"death-inflicting pain relief.")
234. See Quill et al., Palliative Options, supra note 6, at 2100, 2103, 2106;
Quill et al., The Rule of Double Effect, supra note 228, at 1768-70.
235. See Quill et al., Palliative Options, supra note 6, 2100; Quill et al., The
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We have already endorsed the legality of withholding
ANH following deep sedation where the competent patient
had previously initiated a VSED course and deep sedation
then became necessary and was subsequently chosen by the
patient. Does it matter legally that in the current scenario
the choice to reject ANH is being made simultaneously with
the request for deep sedation? Our answer must be very
tentative, because there is no precedent on point.
We can perceive three arguable distinctions based on
the change in sequence-rejection of hydration
simultaneous with, instead of prior to, choice of terminal
sedation. The first distinction relates to the amount of time
available to test a patient's firmness of purpose in forgoing
food and drink. In the typical VSED case, a person who
initiates VSED without recourse to deep sedation will have
several days to reflect upon the decision and perhaps
change her mind. By contrast, a person who decides to forgo
nutrition and hydration simultaneously with a request for
deep sedation may lose that period for lucid reflection-at
least if deep sedation is initiated shortly after the person
requests it. At the very least, the diminished time span for
reflection requires the health care provider to be especially
careful when eliciting informed consent.
A second possible distinction relates to the justification
that underlies our endorsement of VSED. A dying patient
who initially opts for VSED is escaping intolerable
suffering; that patient has determined that death would be
preferable to the dismal existence the patient is
experiencing. Sympathy with that experiential plight of the
dying patient helps account for willingness to accept the
VSED course. But a patient who simultaneously achieves
deep sedation is relieved from the experiential suffering
that helped prompt recognition of the patient's prerogative
to forgo nutrition and hydration."6 Thus, one of the
Rule of Double Effect, supra note 228, at 1237 ("death results from omitting
medical interventions refused by patients who are exercising their rights to self-
determination and protection of their physical integrity"); see also Respondents'
Brief at 16, Vacco (No. 95-1858) (arguing that terminal sedation involves a
lawful exercise by a patient of a right to resist ANH).
236. It is worth noting that the concurring Justices in Glucksberg-those
most sympathetic with dying patients' interests-were particularly concerned
to ensure the relief of suffering as an adjunct of the dying process. See
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 791 (1997) (Ginsburg, J., Breyer, J.
concurring). Hence their ostensible endorsement of terminal sedation.
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elements that helped reinforce respect for VSED might be
lacking where nutrition is forgone simultaneous with
initiation of deep sedation.
A third possible distinction has to do with the
consequences of disrupting a patient's choice of forgoing
nutrition and hydration. Our projection of legal acceptance
of VSED was grounded in part on the revulsion that would
accompany administration of forced nutrition to a
competent, resisting patient." The distasteful specter of
forcing ANH on a conscious, struggling patient is absent
when the patient is undergoing deep sedation.
For all these reasons, it is difficult to assess the legal
status of this form of terminal sedation-deep sedation
accompanied by simultaneous choice to forgo ANH. Given
that the dying patient would likely be permitted to forgo
nutrition if that choice had preceded deep sedation, and
given that the sedated patient retains autonomy and bodily
integrity interests in avoiding ANH, judges might rule that
sequence does not matter. On the other hand, if a suffering
patient can lawfully precipitate death by getting deep
sedation together with withholding of ANH, then the
distinction between risky palliative intervention and
euthanasia indeed blurs.ms
Interestingly, although proponents of assisted suicide
and euthanasia tend to view terminal sedation as a form of
euthanasia, they disparage resort to terminal sedation. 39
For them, the terminal sedation process is undignified,
gruesome, and distorts the recollections that loved ones will
have of the dying patient. This is so, they say, because the
profoundly sedated patient must linger in an insensate
state until death ensues from dehydration, from the
underlying affliction, or from effects of the sedation. The
brief in Vacco v. Quill on behalf of physicians favoring
assisted suicide deemed it "monstrous to have... [patients']
237. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text (discussing the
distasteful restraints that would be necessary to force-feed a competent, yet
resisting patient).
238. David Orentlicher has commented on the strong similarity between
this form of terminal sedation and euthanasia. He argues that once a patient is
deeply sedated the only function of withholding ANH is to precipitate death. See
Orentlicher, supra note 107, 337 N. ENG. J. MED. 1237-39.
239. See Orentlicher, supra note 107, at 1238; Respondents' Brief at 17, 49-
50, Vacco (No. 95-1858); see also Ronald Dworkin, Euthanasia, Morality, and
Law, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1147 (1998).
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minds chemically shut down and to be imprisoned in their
decaying bodies and deliberately starved to death, while
loved ones keep a gruesome vigil. [Terminal sedation is] an
assault on [the patients'] humanity and the very essence of
degradation." " While permanent unconsciousness is indeed
an undignified status, it is not clear that terminal sedation
is an intrinsically inhumane or "monstrous" process.
Certainly, physicians employing terminal sedation see it as
a vehicle to help maintain the dignity of a dying patient in
the face of refractory suffering. Refractory suffering is
regarded as even more degrading than unconsciousness.
Moreover, immersion in the insensate state of profound
sedation is relatively brief-no more than hours when
critical life support is being withdrawn and no more than
days when a patient invoking VSED dies of dehydration."
Some people nonetheless insist that physician-assisted
suicide and euthanasia offer more expeditious relief than
terminal sedation and therefore should be lawful. And they
assert that the end-of-life techniques thus far discussed are
morally and legally indistinguishable from euthanasia. We
turn to those assertions.
V. PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA
Recall Herman Michelle's basic circumstances-
stricken with an unavoidably fatal cancer condition and
suffering unbearably from discomfort, distress, and anxiety
to the point where he prefers to die rather than persevere.
We have identified several licit ways in which medical
professionals might facilitate Herman's wish to hasten his
240. Respondents' Brief at 17, Vacco (No. 95-1858).
241. See Greene & Davis, supra note 126, at 337; Cherny & Portenoy, supra
note 124, at 34, 36.
242. We do suggest that a terminal sedation prerogative need not be
confined to the end-stage of a dying process. Terminal sedation, i.e. sedation to
somnolence until the patient's demise, has customarily been confined to the end
stages (last days or weeks) of an inexorable dying process. Yet close proximity of
death does not seem like a necessary element of the practice. The severe
discomfort or distress that justifies profound sedation might occur when death
is still months away. If ANH is not withheld in such instances, the patient
might subsist in an unconscious or semi-conscious state for a protracted period.
As we noted above, some patients might opt first for VSED, then for refusal of
ANH, and thus shorten the dying period to days. When a choice of VSED is
accompanied by profound sedation, death ensues within days. See supra notes
229-30 and accompanying text.
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demise. If Herman decides to stop taking nutrition and
hydration (including by artificial means), medical staff may
provide comfort care until Herman dies from dehydration
(or perhaps from the underlying natural affliction). If
Herman seeks pharmacological relief from his suffering,
medical staff may administer analgesics that should ease
suffering but might (depending on the dosage needed to
achieve relief) hasten Herman's death. If Herman's is the
rare case in which the analgesics fail to ease suffering
without intolerable side effects, or if Herman's emotional
suffering remains intractable, medical staff may, upon
Herman's request, administer sedatives that will render
Herman somnolent and insensate until he dies (probably
from the underlying lung cancer, but possibly from the
impact of the sedatives). Finally, if Herman's condition
deteriorates to the point where he is ventilator dependent,
medical staff must respect his decision to forgo such
mechanical ventilation even though death will promptly
follow disconnection of the machine. By contrast, if Herman
at any stage requests provision of a lethal poison to ingest,
or seeks administration of a poisonous substance into his
veins, health care personnel must decline to participate.
Assisted suicide and euthanasia (hereinafter PAS)24 are
patently illegal in the vast majority of American
jurisdictions.
Are these sensible lines that American law has drawn?
In all the previously discussed scenarios, Herman Michelle
was essentially in the same fatally afflicted state with the
same state of mind (desirous of death). And all these modes
of hastening death have the same underlying object-
promotion of patient control in order to minimize suffering
243. In the ensuing discussion in this section, we use PAS primarily as a
shorthand for both physician-assisted suicide and voluntary active euthanasia.
This is for ease of expression and not because the two forms of ending life are
identical. Some sources deem assisted suicide to be more tolerable than
euthanasia, primarily because the patient's performance of the final lethal step
gives some reassurance of voluntariness and desire to die. See John Deigh,
Physician Assisted Suicide and Voluntary Euthanasia: Some Relevant
Differences, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1155, 1157-59 (1998); Timothy E.
Quill et al., Care of the Hopelessly Ill: Proposed Clinical Criteria for Physician
Assisted Suicide, 327 N. ENG. J. MED. 1380, 1381 (1992) [hereinafter Quill et
al., Proposed Clinical Criteria]. Other sources contest whether the two practices
can be meaningfully distinguished. See, e.g., Nicholas Dixon, On the Difference
between Physician-Assisted Suicide and Active Euthanasia, 28 HASTINGS CTR.
REP. 25 (1998).
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and preserve dignity in the dying process. Is PAS, then,
such a distinctive mode of bringing about death as to
warrant its distinctive legal treatment?
Some ostensible differences do exist between PAS and
each of the established lawful means of hastening death.
PAS involves introduction into the body, at the patient's
initiative, of a lethal substance that the patient knows will
cause death. By contrast, withdrawal of life support, as
noted, involves conduct that allows a natural disease
process to run its course and involves respect for a patient's
prerogative to resist bodily invasions. VSED does not
exactly facilitate a natural dying process as the patient has
initiated the dying process by rejecting nutrition and
hydration,' but it does involve maintenance of bodily
integrity against unwanted invasions. While administration
of risky analgesics and terminal sedation entail active
introduction of substances into the body, they generally
involve only a justifiable risk of death made necessary by
absence of alternative means to relieve unbearable
suffering.. as opposed to conduct that knowingly causes
death. These two active modes of hastening death (risky
analgesics and terminal sedation) arguably constitute less
of a "taking' of life than PAS.
While differences thus exist between the lawful and
unlawful end-of-life practices, are they meaningful
differences for purposes of fixing public policy? Or do the
existing lines shaping end-of-life practices present only "a
patina of rationality and fairness"2 6 lines possessing
244. It is a common phenomenon for dying patients to experience loss of
appetite and disinterest in nutrition. See, e.g., McCann, supra note 42, at 1266.
To that extent, VSED can be viewed as a "natural" adjunct to the dying process.
However, our description of permissible VSED includes patients whose
determination to cease eating and drinking is not prompted by natural appetite
loss.
245. Most forms of terminal sedation involve only some risk of hastening
death-a risk justified by the need to relieve unbearable suffering. Deep
sedation accompanied by withholding of ANH may make ultimate death
certain, but attributing death to dehydration is often not easy. In any event, we
have suggested that deep sedation accompanied by withholding of ANH is only
lawful where the sedation is justified by intractable suffering and where the
withholding of ANH is preceded by a considered patient decision to engage in
VSED. In other instances, for example where the patient consents to deep
sedation but has not deliberated about cessation of nutrition, withholding of
ANH seems to qualify as homicide. See supra notes 226-28 and accompanying
text.
246. Robert A. Burt, Disorder in the Court: Physician-Assisted Suicide and
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sufficient rationality to withstand constitutional challenge
yet artificially obstructing humane dying practices.
We do not purport to resolve whether PAS should be
legalized. The literature addressing that issue is vast and
resolution of the issue is beyond the scope of this paper. Our
object instead is to highlight some anomalies or tensions on
both sides of the debate-anomalies that stand out in the
wake of our scrutiny of currently lawful end-of-life
practices.
The tension is perhaps most glaring between the
differential treatment of withdrawal of mechanical life
support (lawful) and PAS (unlawful). The rote
explanation-one accepted by the Supreme Court as
sufficiently rational to satisfy equal protection
requirements-is that withdrawal of life support involves
letting nature (a fatal affliction) take its course. A poison is
an entirely independent and unnatural cause of death,
easier to deem a killing or taking of life. This is the letting
die versus killing distinction long debated by moral
philosophers. 7  The Supreme Court never explained,
though, why it is rational to distinguish between pulling the
plug (letting die) and providing a poison (assisting a killing)
in the context of a competent dying patient who seeks relief
from an intolerably painful or undignified dying process.248
Should public policy continue to make this distinction in
modes of hastening death?
The best explanation for differential treatment is
grounded on the important symbolic message embodied in
society's strict prohibition of killing. Government reinforces
the sanctity of human life principle by banning all killings,
the Constitution, 82 MINN. L. REV. 965, 981 (1998).
247. See KILLING AND LETTING DIE (Bonnie Steinbock ed., 1997). For
arguments that no moral distinction exists between killing and letting die see
ELKE-HENNER W. KLUGE, THE ETHICs OF DELIBERATE DEATH (1981); JAMES
RACHELS, THE END OF LIFE (1986); Dan Brock, Voluntary Active Euthanasia, 22
HASTINGS CTR. REP., Mar.-Apr. 1992), at 10. Numerous commentators insist
that the line between killing and letting nature take its course is artificial. They
maintain that the predominant interest is patient autonomy in shaping a
dignified and painless dying process in the face of a fatal affliction. And they
favor PAS as a useful means of promoting that patient interest. See Meisel,
supra note 15, at 849-50; Quill, et al., Palliative Options, supra note 6, at 2099;
Quill et al., The Rule of Double Effect, supra note 228, at 1768.
248. See Ezekiel J. Emanuel, The Future of Euthanasia and Physician-
Assisted Suicide: Beyond Rights Talk to Informed Public Policy, 82 MINN. L.
REv. 983, 997(1998).
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including self-killings, except in extremely limited
circumstances. The common exceptions for capital
punishment, self-defense, and war have extraordinary
justifications as responses to mortal injury or threat of
mortal injury-a response to a murderer (capital
punishment), an attacker (self-defense), or a hostile force
(war).29 Relief of suffering has not traditionally been
deemed a justification for killing, as the almost universal
ban on euthanasia shows. This intuition about the symbolic
rationale for banning PAS is supported by the commentary
to the MPC. In explaining why aiding suicide is criminal
even though suicide and attempting suicide are not, the
commentary asserts that society's sanctity of life interest is
"threatened by one who expresses a willingness to
participate in taking the life of another....""'
This rationale-aversion to killings as a symbolic
justification for banning PAS while tolerating other forms
of hastening death-is debatable at best. Yes, a broad
prohibition on killings reflects society's respect for sanctity
of life. Still, from the perspective of the lay public, a doctor's
pulling the plug and precipitating death may seem as much
a killing as provision of a prescription for a poison.25' If that
is so, and we think it is, the symbolic message embodied in
the distinction between killing and letting die becomes
confused and hollow.
A limited incursion upon the sanctity of life principle is
already widely accepted when a dying patient seeks to
reject life support and thereby avoid a painful and/or
undignified dying process. Acceptance of PAS might not
249. See DANIEL CALLAHAN, WHAT KIND OF LIFE 230 (1990).
250. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5 commentary at 100 (1980); see also Philip
G. Peters, Jr., The State's Interest in the Preservation of Life: From Quinlan to
Cruzan, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 891, 969 (1989) (supporting the symbolic importance of
maintaining a stringent limit on active killing).
251. Indeed, as many commentators have noted, pulling a plug without
authorization from the patient or a patient's agent would in fact be treated as a
homicide. A recent experience in Israel illustrates the public tendency to
associate withdrawal of life support with killing. In October 1998, a Tel Aviv
district court authorized withdrawal of a respirator from a competent patient
suffering at the end stage of Lou Gehrig's disease (ALS). The machine was
detached and the patient died. The press report in Haaretz (Israel's most
intellectual newspaper) proclaimed the event as the first official mercy killing
in Israel. See Ron Resnick, At 10 O'clock Itai Arad Was Detached From the
Respirator, HAARETZ, Dec. 3, 1998. The point is the perception that detachment
of a respirator was a form of mercy killing.
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further erode the symbolic moral message involved. A
patient ordering the withdrawal of life support is often
conveying a distasteful message--"my prospective existence
as a gravely debilitated, dying person is so dismal that I
prefer death." However, the message is morally acceptable,
despite its suicidal content, because patients, families,
judges, and society as a whole understand that a patient
seeking final refuge from an unendurable fatal affliction is
not denigrating life or its value. That patient is simply
seeking to die with dignity in the face of an unavoidable
natural affliction.252
This point applies as well to the patient seeking PAS.
The abstract societal interest in sanctity of life does not
seem threatened by offering relief to persons suffering
unbearably in the face of an unavoidable fatal affliction.
Again, respect for the individual dignity interests at
stake-including freedom from physical or emotional
suffering and preservation of survivors' wholesome
recollections of the patient-accounts for the deviation from
a strict sanctity of life approach.
Reliance on a symbolic distinction between withdrawal
of life support and PAS is reminiscent of the futile effort to
invoke symbolism to constrain the bounds of withdrawal of
life support itself. In that context, some commentators
contended that patient self-determination should not
include a prerogative to refuse ANH, for provision of ANH
expresses a sacrosanct symbolic message of human caring
and nurturing.23 Courts have almost universally rejected
that asserted symbolic rationale and have instead treated
ANH like other forms of medical intervention-subject to
patient control.254
The legal status of VSED and use of risky analgesics
further compromise the force of the symbolism argument.
VSED is a form of self-destruction impelled by the patient's
current suffering and distaste for the dismal existence
facing the patient during the remainder of the dying
252. See Norman L. Cantor, Two Opinions in Search of a Justice: The
Constitution and Physician-Assisted Suicide, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 435, 441 (1997).
253. See Dan Callahan, On Feeding the Dying, 13 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 22
(1983); Mark Siegler & Alan Weisbard, Against the Emerging Stream: Should
Fluids and Nutritional Support Be Discontinued?, 145 ARCIVES INT. MED. 129
(1985).
254. See In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1236 (N.J. 1985); In re Longeway, 549
N.E.2d 292,296 (IM. 1989).
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process. If symbolic harm to sanctity of life is the gravamen
of the objection to PAS, then the same concern is applicable
to medical cooperation with a patient deliberately resisting
hydration because of distaste for his or her current and
prospective existence. That is, if self-killing by self-
starvation is morally wrong based on its violation of
sanctity of life,255 then by analogy, medical cooperation in
VSED is also wrong. Indeed, the symbolic harm from VSED
is arguably greater than the harm from PAS, as the
certainty of death from dehydration and any accompanying
affront to sanctity of life is greater. A physician writing a
prescription for poisonous barbiturates may at least think
that the patient only needs reassurance that relief will be
available if suffering ultimately becomes unbearable; the
physician's expectation might still be that the lethal
substance will never be used.256 A patient steadfastly
rejecting nutrition and hydration will inevitably die. And
yet it is almost unthinkable that law would compel medical
personnel to cease cooperation with a competent, dying
patient's determination to stop eating and drinking and to
resist ANH.257 The tension here with the illegality of PAS
seems plain.
Any distinction between use of risky analgesics and
PAS grounded on society's symbolic aversion to killing or
taking of life is eroded as well by the recent expressions in
some concurring Supreme Court opinions in Glucksberg258
and in some bioethics commentary259 suggesting that
analgesics and sedation may lawfully be used even in
dosages certain or practically certain to cause death. As we
explained,"' the only tenable distinction between risky pain
relief and euthanasia is the distinction between risky
conduct and conduct known to be lethal. That distinction
255. For one opinion that self-starvation is indeed a moral wrong, see
Keown, supra note 2.
256. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 750-51 & n.14 (1997)
(Stevens, J., concurring); WEBB, supra note 86, at 387; ANNAS, supra note 87, at
220, 231-32.
257. We previously noted the empathy with the dying patient's plight and
the revulsion toward forced feeding of a resisting, dying patient that help
explain law's reluctance to intervene against VSED. See supra notes 70-73 and
accompanying text.
258. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 751 (O'Connor, J., Breyer, J.); see also supra
notes 138-42 and accompanying text.
259. See supra note 154.
260. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
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helped explain the lawful status of both risky analgesics
and terminal sedation. If the medical prerogative to provide
palliative care in fact includes analgesic dosages known to
be lethal, then the main theoretical basis for distinguishing
PAS from lawful practices disappears."' Even if the
Supreme Court expressions are wrong, as we contend, some
tension remains between the illegality of PAS and the
legality of risky analgesics. The line seems tenuous between
active administration of analgesics that will probably kill
the patient in the face of unbearable suffering (the legal
limit we perceive) and active administration of poisons that
will certainly kill the patient in the face of unbearable
suffering. Continued illegality of PAS then seems shaky
unless there are other supports for distinctive treatment of
PAS.
One such possible support is maintenance of the
integrity of the medical profession. According to the AMA,
and according to the Supreme Court brief submitted in
1997 by the AMA and the major professional organizations
representing nurses, psychologists, and hospitals, PAS is
"fundamentally incompatible with the physician's role as
healer... Their contention is that public trust and
confidence in physicians will be negatively affected if
physicians are known to function as killers-providers or
administrators of lethal poisons-rather than healers. Our
response is that the medical role has already irrevocably
shifted. As medical science became capable of sustaining
life well beyond a point that many patients deem desirable,
physicians inevitably became managers of the dying
process. 63 While this medical management normally
includes strenuous efforts to heal and to extend life, it
sometimes includes resignation that comfort care is all that
medicine can provide. And this palliative focus, particularly
the strong impetus to relieve suffering, sometimes involves
using risky analgesics or risky sedation or cooperating in a
patient-dictated course (VSED or removal of life support)
that hastens death. There is no reason to think that
261. We repudiate the conventional distinction between risky analgesics
and PAS grounded on the specific intent to relieve suffering reflected in use of
risky analgesics. See supra notes 109-21 and accompanying text.
262. AMA CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 2.21 (1992); Brief, Amici Curiae,
Glucksberg (Nos. 1295-1858, 96-110).
263. Norman L. Cantor, The Real Ethic of Death and Dying, 94 MICH. L.
REV. 1718, 1718 (1996).
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physician involvement in these modes of hastening death
has eroded patient confidence. Relief of suffering is such an
integral part of palliative behavior that many medical
professionals view cooperation in hastening death as a
legitimate step.2  So many professionals view PAS as
ethical that it is difficult to see its prohibition as a pillar of
medical integrity. As to patient confidence, dying patients
might well view PAS as a humane, desirable tool in the
medical armamentarium rather than a basis for
apprehension.265
Of course, the principal impediment to legalization of
PAS may be pragmatic rather than theoretical. That is,
even some observers who concede that assisting a suicide
can be a humane, moral step in certain circumstances still
oppose legalization because of a variety of perceived
hazards.266 One basic notion is that legalization would
inevitably produce "undue killing"267 in measure that would
outweigh whatever palliative benefits might flow from
making PAS an available option to dying patients. A
principal fear is that physicians-having considerable
impact on patient choice26 by controlling information,
264. See Julia Pugliese, Note, Don't Ask, Don't Tell, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1290,
1297-99 (1993); Dan Brock, Voluntary Active Euthanasia, 22 HASTINGS CTR.
REP. 10, 22 (1992); Wanzer et al., supra note 160, 847-48; David A. Asch, The
Role of Critical Care Nurses in Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide, 334 N. ENG. J.
MED. 1374 (1996). For results of a nationwide survey indicating that 6% of
doctors had participated in assisted suicide or euthanasia and that
approximately 24% would do so if the practices were legal, see Diane E. Meier
et al., A National Survey of Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the
United States, 338 N. ENG. J. MED. 1193 (1998); Nationwide Survey finds 6% of
MD's Admit Helping Patients Die, NEWARK STAR LEDGER, Apr. 23, 1998, at 10.
For results of other studies showing considerable physician involvement in and
acceptance of assisted suicide, see Robert M. Hardaway et al., The Right to Die
and the Ninth Amendment: Compassion and Dying after Glucksberg and Vacco,
7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 313, 321-22 (1999).
265. The notion that a physician who believes in PAS will necessarily be
seen as a potential threat is like saying that pregnant women will see a
physician who believes in abortion as a potential threat.
266. See, e.g., John Arras, Physician Assisted Suicide, 13 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POLY 361, 365 (1997); James F. Childress, Dying Patients: Who's
in Control?, 17 L., IED. & HEALTH CARE 227, 230 (1989); Emanuel, supra note
9, at 1003; Joan Teno & Joanne Lynn, Voluntary Active Euthanasia: The
Individual Case and Public Policy, 39 J. AM. GERIATRICS Soc'y 827 (1991).
267. Giles Scofield, Natural Causes, Unnatural Results, and the Least
Restrictive Alternative, 19 WEST. N. ENG. L. REv. 317, 351 (1997); WESLEY J.
SMITH, FORCED EXIT 143-49, 180-92 (1997).
268. See David Orentlicher, The Illusion of Patient Choice in End-of-Life
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persuasion, and imperiousness-would subtly coerce or
manipulate patient choice of PAS."9 The danger of coerced
or ill-considered selection of PAS is perceived as
particularly acute because dying patients tend to be
depressed and health care providers often have difficulty
discerning and treating clinical depression."'
Commentators also fear patients' premature selection of
PAS resulting from widespread undertreatment of pain.27'
Patients in unrelieved agony are obvious candidates to
utilize any PAS option. Concerns about undue pressure on
patients also arise from the expensive nature of terminal
care and cost containment practices prevalent in an era of
managed care.272 Certain vulnerable populations-including
the elderly, ethnic minorities, the poor, and the disabled-
are cited as the most likely victims of the various social and
economic pressures toward opting for suicide. 273 This
vulnerability could stem from the patient's poverty or
hostility or prejudice of health care providers.
The litany of potential abuses of PAS indeed warrants
pause and reflection. However, no one knows whether such
abuses would ensue in the wake of legalization; speculation211
is at the core of almost all the projections. The anomaly,
to our minds, is that similar potential for pressured or
Decisions, 267 JAMA 2101 (1992).
269. See John Finnis, Euthanasia, Morality, and Law, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1123, 1139-40 (1998); Sandra H. Johnson, End-of-Life Decision Making: What
We Don't Know, We Make Up; What We Do Know, We Ignore, 31 IND. L. REV. 13,
34-35 (1998); Yale Kamisar, Physician-Assisted Suicide: The Problems
Presented by the Compelling, Heartwrenching Case, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1121, 1134-35 (1998) (noting that apprehensions also exist about
family coercion).
270. James J. Bopp, Just the Medical Facts: An Argument in Support of the
Continued Ban on Physician-Assisted Suicide, 12 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT.
610, 615-18 (1997); Emanuel, supra note 9, at 984; Johnson, supra note 269, at
34-35.
271. See M. Conolly, Alternative to Euthanasia: Pain Management, 4 ISSUES
L. & MED. 497 (1989); Kathleen Foley, Competent Care of the Dying Instead of
Physician-Assisted Suicide, 336 N. ENG. J. MED. 54, 55 (1997); Kamisar, supra
note 269, at 1132; Steven H. Miles, Physicians and their Patients' Suicides, 271
JAMA 1786 (1994).
272. M. Cathleen Kaveny, Managed Care, Assisted Suicide, and Vulnerable
Populations, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1275 (1998); WEBB, supra note 86 at 393;
Kamisar, supra note 269, at 1131 (commenting that the financial aspects of
death and dying "loom large" in the PAS context).
273. See Johnson, supra note 269, at 33; Smith, supra note 267.
274. See Deigh, supra note 243, at 1164; Buchanan, supra note 19, at 32.
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premature or ill-considered end-of-life decisions underlies
all the currently legal modes of hastening death previously
discussed, and yet apprehended abuses have not
materialized in those contexts in any measure that would
jeopardize their validity.27
An artificial impetus to choose death-whether from
financial pressures, depression, undertreatment of pain,
physician prejudice, or physician domination of decision
making-could affect patients contemplating VSED,
withdrawal of life support, risky analgesics, or terminal
sedation.276 "[T]he patient who asks to be allowed to die by
removal from a ventilator is at least as likely as a patient
who requests a prescription for lethal drugs to be making
the request because of undue influence, financial pressure,
clinical depression, or inadequately treated pain."277 And
these extraneous pressures would also potentially impact in
a disproportionate manner on vulnerable populations such
as the elderly, the poor, and the disabled. In fact, the kind
of in-terrorem arguments now leveled at PAS were once
leveled at the notion that life support might legally be
withdrawn from some patients . 8  Despite initial
apprehensions of abuse and manipulation of patient end-of-
life decisions, the prerogatives of competent patients to
reject life-sustaining medical intervention and to demand
adequate analgesic relief are now well entrenched in both
American medicine and jurisprudence-all without
significant showing of patient abuse. To the extent that
abuse surfaces in contemporary end-of-life medical
practices, it still tends toward unwanted prolongation of the
275. See Deigh, supra note 243, at 1160 (observing that "any act by which a
person deliberately hastens his or her death raises concerns about
voluntariness"); Orentlicher, supra note 107, at 1237-38 (noting that terminal
sedation poses risks similar to PAS); Orentlicher, supra note 41, at 963.
276. See Dworkin, supra note 239, at 1157-58.
277. STELL, supra note 6, at 247. Any argument that can be made against
actively hastening death can be leveled with equal vigor against passively
hastening death. See Meisel, supra note 15, at 856.
278. See Jeffrey Blustein, The Family in Medical Decisionmaking, 23
HASTINGS CENT. REP. 7-9 (1993) (arguing that patients are readily subject to
manipulation and coercion); Daly, supra note 201, at 223 (arguing that
withdrawal of life support might become "so easy" that it would result in
unnecessary deaths). The arguments grounded on potential abuse in the context
of withdrawal of life support were especially strident as to surrogate decision
making on behalf of incompetent patients.
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dying process rather than premature termination of life.25
Moreover, this record of non-abusive administration of end-
of-life practices transpired without the elaborate safeguards
proposed for PAS.2" Finally, the initial report on Oregon's
incipient experiment in legalized assisted suicide shows no
indication of exploitation of vulnerable populations.28'
Opponents of PAS-in stressing various dangers
supposedly accompanying legalization of PAS-have paid
scant attention to the fact that similar feared abuses have
not materialized in the context of presently accepted modes
of hastening death. One exception is the New York State
Task Force on Life and the Law. In an addendum to its
report opposing legalization of PAS, the Task Force
contends that PAS would be more dangerous than current
practices because current practices usually occur within
health care institutions-thus ensuring some visibility and
collective responsibility.22 The apparent assumption is that
PAS would be implemented in a relatively insulated home
setting; that is, PAS would be a matter for individual
patients, physicians, and pharmacists without the scrutiny
provided by an institutional setting.
The visibility argument is not particularly convincing.
Not all current end-of-life practices have broad exposure to
279. See A Controlled Trial to Improve Care for Seriously Ill Hospitalized
Patients: The Study to Understand Prognoses and Preferences for Outcomes and
Risks of Treatments, 274 JAMA 1591 (1995). In New Jersey, judges endorsing a
competent patient's prerogative to dictate withdrawal of life support initially
insisted on special safeguards-specifically, certification of the patient's
competence and prognosis by two independent physicians beside the attending
physician. See In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404 (N.J. 1987). That precaution proved
burdensome and excessive in light of the fact that no abusive practices surfaced
in New Jersey. The New Jersey State Board of Medical Examiners has
therefore eliminated the requirement of additional physician certification.
280. See, e.g., Charles H. Baron et al., A Model State Act to Authorize and
Regulate Physician-Assisted Suicide, 33 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (1996) (discussing
the proposed statute to regulate PAS); Timothy Quill et al., Care of the
Hopelessly Ill: Proposed Criteria for Physician-Assisted Suicide, 327 N. ENG. J.
MED. 1380, 1381-82 (1992) (detailing the proposed safeguards for PAS)
[hereinafter Quill et al., Care of the Hopelessly Ill].
281. See Sam Howe Verhovek, Oregon Reporting 15 Deaths in 1998 Under
Suicide Law, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1999, at A7; Patients Choosing Assisted
Suicide Defied Predictions, MEDICAL ETHICS ADVISOR, (May 1999), pp. 51-52;
Arthur E. Chin et al., Legalized Physician-Assisted Suicide in Oregon-The
First Year's Experience, 340 N. ENG. J. MED. 577 (1999).
282. See NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, WHEN DEATH IS SOUGHT: ASSISTED
SuICmE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT 15 (Supp. 1997).
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institutional personnel. Hundreds of thousands of deaths
occur outside of institutions in the presence of few
observers, if any, beyond an attending physician or nurse or
home health care aide. Of the 2.3 million annual deaths in
the United States, at least 20% (460,000) occur in private
residences.283 Another approximately 20% of deaths (and
that percentage is constantly increasing) occur in nursing
homes in which scrutiny and monitoring of patient and staff
interactions are markedly less stringent than in hospitals.
These statistics also gloss over the many older patients who
were exposed to long periods of home care and were
transferred to hospitals only on the day they died. 4 Even
within an institution like an acute care hospital, not all
terminal practices involving competent patients are widely
scrutinized. This is especially so regarding use of risky
analgesics and terminal sedation. All this effectively
means that current end of life practices-including
withdrawal of life support, use of risky analgesics, and
terminal sedation-result in hundreds of thousands of
deaths without rigid scrutiny. Yet no source has
demonstrated or even suggested systematic or widespread
abuse.
On the PAS side of the coin, it would be possible to
make PAS a carefully monitored process. Because of the
novelty of PAS, proponents are willing to prescribe
procedural safeguards, including verification of patient
competence, prognosis, and deliberateness of decision
making.286 Not only does Oregon's statute call for such
protections,287 but initial reports of the statute's application
indicate no sign of abuse."8 It would even be possible to
283. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, APPROACHING DEATH: IMPROVING CARE AT
THE END OF LIFE 39 (Marilyn J. Field & Christine Y. Cassel eds., 1997).
284. See id. at 40. The National Hospice Organization estimates that, in
1997, 77% (381,000) of the 495,000 hospice-connected deaths were at home and
that the percentage of hospice-connected patients is increasing by about 16%
annually. Hospice Fact Sheet, NAT'L HOSPICE ORG. (Arlington, Va.), Nov. 18,
1988 (on file with the Buffalo Law Review).
285. See Finnis, supra note 269, at 1133 (noting how easy it is for physicians
to kill via analgesic doses). See generally Orentlicher supra note 107 (arguing
that terminal sedation is more susceptible to abuse than PAS).
286. See Baron, supra note 280, at 18.
287. See Oregon Death with Dignity Act, ORE. REV. STAT. § 127.800,
§§1.01(7)(a-e) (1997).
288. See Verhovek, supra note 281, at Al.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
confine PAS to institutional settings."9 In short, opponents
of legalizing PAS do not adequately explain why, PAS is
more dangerous than accepted end-of-life practices. 9
A few opponents of PAS draw a perverse inference from
the apparently abuse-free history, even absent procedural
safeguards, surrounding a competent patient's prerogative
to reject life support when compared to the abuses projected
to accompany PAS. They suggest that in order to preclude
uneven treatment of end-of-life practices, procedural
restrictions on withdrawal of life support might be
instituted, despite the abuse-free history, together with any
procedural safeguards regulating PAS.2 ' This would indeed
be a perverse result-increasing constraints on current
practices despite their proven safety-just to ensure parity
of treatment with PAS. Nor is identical procedural handling
of PAS and other end-of-life practices logically compelled.
Special procedural protections accompanying legalization of
PAS would be rational and justifiable just from the relative
novelty of the practice. 92
We promised to underline anomalies or tensions on
both sides of the PAS debate. The proponents of legalizing
PAS are by no means immune from criticism. The principal
flaw or tension in the pro-PAS position concerns the
ultimate scope of any prerogative to hasten death either by
assistance to suicide or by active euthanasia.
Most proposals for legalization of physician-assisted
289. See Buchanan, supra note 19, at 41 n.24.
290. Ezekiel Emanuel speaks to the comparative magnitude of danger from
a quantitative perspective. That is, he argues that many more people would be
"at risk" from PAS because every dying patient would be a potential candidate
for PAS and many more people are dying than are institutionalized and
connected to life support. Emanuel, supra note 9, at 1012. This perspective
tends to minimize both the abuse-free history of removal of life support and the
possibility of procedural safeguards accompanying legalization of PAS. It also
tends to overlook the potential for abuse in existing practices such as use of
risky analgesics and terminal sedation.
291. For arguments that commentators who (like us) see the moral
equivalence of letting die and killing will end up precipitating increased
constraints on current end-of-life practices such as withdrawal of life support,
see Johnson, supra note 269, at 37; George J. Annas, The Promised End -
Constitutional Aspects of Physician-Assisted Suicide, 335 N. ENG. J. MED. 683,
686 (1996).
292. Another anomaly of the anti-PAS position is its reliance on feared
abuses even while evidence grows that underground euthanasia occurs at a
significant rate without any indications of exploitation of vulnerable
populations.
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suicide confine the beneficiaries to competent, terminally ill
individuals.293  Oregon's authorization of physician
assistance to suicide is limited to patients who will,
according to medical judgment, unavoidably die within six
months. The litigants urging the Supreme Court to find a
constitutional right to assistance to suicide restricted that
putative right to competent, terminally ill people at the end
stage of the dying process.295 These efforts to restrain PAS
are disingenuous and unpersuasive both from a legal and
public policy perspective.
On a legal plane, the Ninth Circuit (in its decision
ultimately reversed by the Supreme Court) half-heartedly
justified limiting the patient prerogative in issue to the end
stages of terminal illness by claiming a "substantially
diminished" state interest in preserving life in the final
stages of an unpreventable dying process."' That rationale
is unconvincing. As we pointed out earlier,297 a state's
abstract interest in preserving life endures unwaveringly
up to the moment of death.298 If an individual prerogative to
hasten death prevails, as in the case of rejecting life-
sustaining medical intervention, it is because the individual
interests outweigh the state interests in issue-not because
of the short duration of a remaining existence. 9 Those
individual interests (in self-determination and bodily
integrity) prevail in the balance even where the patient is
293. See, e.g., Baron, supra note 280, at 11; Dworkin, supra note 239, at
1158.
294. See Oregon Death With Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800,
§1.01(12) (1997).
295. See Respondent's Brief, at 10, Glucksberg (No. 96-110).
296. Compassion in Dying v. State of Wash., 79 F.3d 790, 820-21 (9th Cir.
1996).
297. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
298. See also Yale Kamisar, The 'Right to Die: On Drawing (and Erasing)
Lines, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 481, 509-10 (1996) (ridiculing the notion of a diminished
state interest in life at its boundaries) [hereinafter Kamisar, The Right to Die];
Yale Kamisar, Against Assisted Suicide-Even a Very Limited Form, 72 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. 735, 742-43 (1995) [hereinafter Kamisar, Against Assisted
Suicide].
299. "The state's indirect and abstract interest in preserving the life of the
competent patient generally gives way to the patient's much stronger personal
interest in directing the course of his own life." In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209,
1223 (N.J. 1985). Even when the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the
constitutional challenge to state laws banning assistance to suicide, several
justices expressed strong sympathy with a competent patient's prerogative to
avoid suffering.
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forgoing a long preservable existence.0 0
On a policy plane, any effort to limit a PAS prerogative
to the end stage of existence is also likely to fail. The whole
movement toward greater patient autonomy is grounded in
avoidance of prolonged suffering and/or indignity during a
dying process. Yet the greater the span of a projected dying
process, the more suffering and/or indignity to be faced. To
quote Justice Scalia: "[T]he patient who has 10 years of
agony to look forward to has a more appealing case than the
patient who is at the threshold of death.""1 Excluding dying
persons who face protracted dying processes would be both
cruel and imperfectly connected to the legitimate
government interests in play. 3° In short, PAS cannot
realistically be confined to patients at the end stage of an
unavoidable dying process.
Nor can a dying patient's prerogative to actively hasten
death be practicably confined to assisted suicide to the
exclusion of active euthanasia. Some proponents of PAS
contend that assistance to suicide is less susceptible to
abuse and constitutes a less radical alteration of the
medical role than active euthanasia because the patient
rather than a physician performs the final lethal act.3 The
patient's performance of the final act supposedly
emphasizes the voluntariness and steadfastness involved,
as self-killing is ostensibly harder than submitting to
300. Cases upholding a competent individual's right to reject life sustaining
medical intervention do not limit the patient prerogative to the end-stage of a
disease process. See Thor v. Superior Ct., 855 P.2d 375 (Calif. 1993); In re Peter,
529 A.2d 419 (N.J. 1987). In fact, numerous cases uphold a patient's prerogative
to reject treatment-usually but not always inspired by religious scruples-
even when the patient is salvageable to a long existence and death is
indefinitely avoidable. See, e.g., Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 551 N.E.2d 77, 85 (N.Y.
1990); Public Health Trust v. Wons, 541 So.2d 96, 98 (Fla. 1989); McKay v.
Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 623 (Nev. 1990).
301. Oral Argument at 28, Glucksberg v. Washington, 517 U.S. 1241 (1997)
(No. 96-110).
302. See Kamisar, The Right to Die, supra note 298, at 504-09; Kamisar,
Against Assisted Suicide, supra note 298, at 739-41; Brody, supra note 101, at
157-58, (noting the appeal of people suffering from degenerative neurologic
disease); Quill et al., Care of the Hopelessly Ill, supra note 280, at 1381 (arguing
that it would be arbitrary to exclude people suffering from progressive illness
although not imminently dying).
303. See Baron, supra note 280 at 10; Quill et al., Care of the Hopelessly Ill,
supra note 280, at 1381. For a contrary position, see Nicholas Dixon, On the
Differences between Physician-Assisted Suicide and Active Euthanasia, 28
HASTINGS CTR. REP. 25, 25-29 (1998).
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administration of death (for example, injecting oneself with
a poison may be harder than accepting a lethal injection)."'4
Also, the physician's more indirect involvement in death by
assisted suicide might ease the conscience of individual
physicians and constitute less of an offense to traditional
medical ethics than injection of a poison.3 5 Whatever the
validity of these distinctions, the line between assistance to
suicide and active administration of euthanasia cannot in
practice be maintained. Yale Kamisar convincingly argues
that circumstances would inevitably impel resort to
euthanasia, not just assistance to suicide." The impetus
would come in part from patients who are competent to
request aid in dying but are either physically or emotionally
unable to perform the final step necessary for suicide. °7 A
quadriplegic's case, or the case of someone physically
weakened by diseases, provide examples.0 8  Another
impetus would surface in the context of botched suicide
attempts. Under a regime of lawful assistance to suicide,
some percentage of suicide attempts would fail (from
vomiting or from miscalculation of poison dosage) and the
humane course would then be to allow someone to intervene
and complete the fatal event (euthanasia). 9 We agree with
Ezekiel Emanuel's conclusion:
Practically speaking, then, there will be no distinction between
PAS and euthanasia.... While... [the two] are conceptually
304. See John Deigh, Physician-Assisted Suicide and Voluntary Euthanasia:
Some Relevant Differences, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1155, 1159 (1998).
305. But see Dixon, supra note 303, at 25 (arguing that physician
involvement in suicide is just as blameworthy as performance of euthanasia).
306. See Patrick M. Curran, Jr., Regulating Death: Oregon's Death with
Dignity Act and the Legalization of Physician-Assisted Suicide, 86 GEO. L.J.
725, 743 (1998); Kamisar, The Right to Die, supra note 298, at 515-16; Kamisar,
Against Assisted Suicide, supra note 298, at 745-47; see also Emanuel, supra
note 9, at 984, 1001-03 (attacking "The Myth of Separation" between assisted
suicide and euthanasia).
307. "Fairness requires that if we legalize [PAS], then we also make active
euthanasia legally available to patients who are physically unable to commit
[PAS] or who prefer to die by lethal injections that cannot easily be self-
administered." Dixon, supra note 303, at 29.
308. See '60 Minutes' Will Air Death by Kevorkian, NEWARK STAR-LEDGER,
Nov. 20, 1998, at 28 (reporting Dr. Kevorkian's admission that he euthanized
an ALS patient incapable of ingesting a poison).
309. See Curran, supra note 306, at 743; Emanuel, supra note 9, at 1002.
The perfect poison cocktail is not yet known. As long as there are failed
attempts, euthanasia will be needed as a backup. See id.
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distinct, from a social policy perspective this distinction cannot be
sustained. The real choice is to legalize both physician-assisted
suicide and euthanasia, or to legalize neither. 
31
A strong impetus would also exist to extend any
prerogative to assist suicide not only to active euthanasia,
but also to non-voluntary active euthanasia. Both American
experience regarding withdrawal of life support and Dutch
experience regarding euthanasia confirm the likelihood of
this course. Once competent patients are accorded a
particular prerogative to hasten death in order to avoid
intolerable suffering and indignity, as in rejection of
mechanical life support, the overwhelming impulse is to
accord the same benefit to incompetent patients. The
easiest cases will be those where now incompetent patients
have, by advance directive or other prior competent
expression, requested euthanasia. But even in the absence
of prior expressions, an impetus will surface to extend
euthanasia to now incompetent patients-at least where
surrogate decision-makers are confident that the patient, if
competent, would have wanted that course. To some extent,
this consequence derives from judicial unwillingness to say
that people lose their "rights" upon becoming incompetent
or that the developmentally disabled do not have
comparable "rights" to the abled. State judiciaries
considering withdrawal of life support from incompetent
patients often strive to extend "the same panoply of rights
and choices" to incompetent as competent patients.31' While
recognition of the dignity and worth of incompetent beings
does entail according them a variety of rights, a choice of
medical treatment involves an autonomous weighing of
options that is simply beyond the capability of an
incompetent person. The dignity and worth of
310. Emanuel, supra note 9, at 1003.
311. In re Grant, 747 P.2d 445, 449 (Wash. 1987); Brophy v. New England
Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 634 (Mass. 1986); Superintendent of
Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 428 (Mass. 1977). "Nor
does the fact that Nancy Cruzan is now incompetent deprive her of her
fundamental rights." Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't Health, 497 U.S. 261,
308 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Scofield, supra note 267, at 328.
312. "Whatever rights an incompetent person may be said to possess, how
can autonomous choice be one of them when incompetency means precisely the
inability to exercise choice?" Sanford Kadish, Letting Patients Die: Legal and
Moral Reflections, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 857, 870 (1992); Neal F. Splaine, Note, The
Incompetent Individual's Right to Refuse Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment:
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incompetent persons are promoted, though, by allowing
surrogates to make decisions that advance the interests of
their now incompetent charges. And that is what American
courts have largely done in the context of dying
incompetent patients. This effectively means that when a
competent patient would choose death because of
intolerable suffering and/or indignity, surrogates will seek
to afford the same beneficent relief to incompetent patients.
That tendency will exist in the active euthanasia context
just as it has in the passive euthanasia (withdrawal of life
support) context. The motivating force is not so much
extension of "rights" as solicitude for the suffering and/or
indignity of an incompetent patient. "Compassion for those
who suffer may obscure the distinction between those who
ask for death and those who may be unable to request it."0
14
The tendency to extend a euthanasia prerogative to the
context of dying incompetent patients has clearly appeared
in the Netherlands experience. All empirical studies of the
Dutch experience show that some percentage of euthanasia
acts are performed on incompetent patients despite the
ostensible impermissibility of such acts under Dutch law.315
This slide into some non-voluntary euthanasia appears not
to be symptomatic of abuse, for there is no showing that
such acts are impelled by cupidity, prejudice, or pressure, or
that they are performed contrary to patients' wishes.
Rather, a measure of non-voluntary euthanasia seems to be
a product of humane impulses to relieve extreme suffering
of some never-competent patients (primarily infants with
Legislating, Not Litigating, A Profoundly Private Decision, 27 SUFFOLK L. REV.
905, 932 (1993).
313. See Drabick v. Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 855 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); In
re Guardianship of L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60, 68 (Wis. 1992); JAMEs M. HOEFLER,
MANAGING DEATH 105-12 (1997). This substituted judgment approach is not
universally accepted. See Lawrence Nelson & Ronald Cranford, Michael Martin
and Robert Wendland: Beyond the Vegetative State, 15 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L.
& POLY 427 (1999) (detailing some judicial reluctance to authorize terminal
decisions by surrogates where the now incompetent patient retains
consciousness).
314. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 783 (1997) (Souter J.,
concurring).
315. See, e.g., Paul J. van der Mass et al., supra 176, at 672 (indicating 0.8%
of Dutch deaths involved administration of lethal drugs without patient
request); CARLOS F. GOMEZ, REGULATING DEATH: EUTHANASIA AND THE CASE OF
THE NETHERLANDS 135-37 (1991); Herbert Hendin, The Slipping Slope: The
Dutch Example, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 427, 433-34 (1996).
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multiple deficits) or to provide relief for severely
deteriorated patients on the verge of unavoidable death.3
Similar humane impulses can be expected to impel
extension of euthanasia from competent to incompetent
patients in this country.
All this is not to say that the specter of non-voluntary
euthanasia warrants preclusion of PAS. Non-voluntary
euthanasia is often cited as the ultimate horror on a
slippery slope flowing from legalization of assisted suicide.
Yet, as the Dutch experience tends to show, non-voluntary
euthanasia is not necessarily abusive of vulnerable persons.
Assessment of the handling of incompetent dying patients
to date-especially in the contexts of withdrawal of life
support and use of risky analgesics-might convince public
policy makers that incompetent patients can be protected
against abuse in the euthanasia context as well.
Appropriate decision-making standards to guide surrogates
might be available whether the ultimate issue is
withdrawal of life support or euthanasia.31 Our point is
that proponents of PAS are disingenuous when they assert
that legal end-of-life practices can be extended to physician-
assisted suicide without entailing some voluntary active
euthanasia and, ultimately, some active euthanasia on
incompetent patients.
Perhaps the hardest question about PAS is whether the
practice can be confined to people suffering from natural
afflictions as opposed to people suffering from unbearable
existential distress provoked by life's general
circumstances. If unbearable suffering is the keystone of a
prerogative to control time of dying, why should not the
rejected lover or humiliated criminal or bankrupted
entrepreneur have that prerogative, at least where the
dismal life circumstance is accompanied by unbearable
316. See van der Maas, supra note 176, at 672 (indicating that half the non-
voluntary deaths in the Netherlands involved patients who were "near to death
and clearly suffering grievously" yet verbal contact had become impossible).
Also, some percentage of these Dutch patients had made prior competent
requests to die, but slipped into incompetency before the request could be
implemented. See id.
317. Regarding decision-making standards for incompetent patients, see
generally Norman L. Cantor, Discarding Substituted Judgment and Best
Interests: Toward a Constructive Preference Standard for Dying, Previously
Competent Patients Without Advance Instructions, 48 RuTGERS L. REV. 1193,
1248-50 (1996).
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suffering? Indeed, one case in the Netherlands did
authorize euthanasia for a competent, despondent
individual suffering from existential distress rather than a
disease. 18
Our response is that a moral line separates the disease-
afflicted from the simply despondent. A person's response to
a natural pathology is regarded, at least in our culture, as a
matter of private choice. While avoidance of suffering can
be an element affecting choice, autonomy in end-of-life
decision making is not primarily grounded in avoidance of
suffering. The moving force is more likely avoidance of
indignity."' Many reported cases upholding decisions to
withdraw life support involve permanently vegetative
patients where suffering is simply not an issue; avoidance
of indignity then becomes the primary justification for
allowing such patients to die." And where conscious but
gravely debilitated patients are allowed to die, the impetus
may well be avoidance of indignity rather than avoidance of
suffering.321 This focus on dignity in an inexorable dying
process helps substantiate a moral line differentiating
assistance in dying given to a fatally stricken patient from
assistance to the existentially distressed person. 2 Dismal
life circumstances, such as the loss of loved ones, loss of job,
and bankruptcy, can indeed impel deep suffering and
despondency, but such despondency does not generate the
same kind of sympathy and moral understanding of despair
as for an afflicted person facing unavoidable death. Life
circumstances are transitory; physical afflictions often are
not. Indeed, rational suicide over transitory life
circumstances is an oxymoron because of its implicit
318. See Gene Kaufman, State v. Chabot- Euthanasia Case from the
Netherlands, 20. OaHO N.U. L. REV. 815, 816-19 (1993).
319. See Norman L. Cantor, The Real Ethic of Death and Dying, 94 MICH. L.
REV. 1718, 1730-31, 1735-36 (1996); cf van der Maas, supra note 315, at 672
(noting that 57% of Dutch requests for euthanasia inspired at least in part by
avoidance of indignity versus 46% pain-inspired). HOEFLER, supra note 313, at
156-57. See generally Alan Handler, Individual Worth, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 493
(1989).
320. See Cantor, supra note 317, at 1249-50.
321. See In re Grant, 747 P.2d 445, 451, 457 (Wash. 1987); In re Conroy, 486
A.2d 1209, 1246 (N.J. 1986) (Handler, J., concurring).
322. For a description of the immorality of despair as a rationale for
condemning suicide, see David A.J. Richards, Constitutional Privacy, The Right
to Die, and the Meaning of Life: A Moral Analysis, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 327,
377 (1981).
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repudiation of possibilities for change. The same moral
objection is not generally leveled against a fatally afflicted
patient who may opt to die sooner rather than later. Hence,
the boundary line of permissible assisted suicide can
probably be drawn at people facing an unavoidable dying
process."
VI. CONCLUSION
We have surveyed various ways in which medical
personnel might respond to a terminally ill patient who is
suffering unbearably and wishes to die. Each of these
medical courses either hastens, or creates a risk of
hastening, death and thus potentially implicates criminal
law.
Several modes of hastening death seem consistent with
medical ethics and criminal law. In some instances, a dying
patient's autonomy interest in timing death-deciding if
and how to struggle against an inexorable and debilitating
fatal affliction-is reinforced by a bodily integrity interest
producing a legal prerogative to avoid bodily intrusions
even when death will ensue. These elements explain why
medical personnel may withdraw life support systems;
when the afflicted patient rejects medical invasions, the
disease is deemed to kill the patient rather than the acts of
the medical personnel. Similarly, we suggest that medical
personnel may provide comfort care to a patient who has
decided to forgo eating and drinking. This form of care also
respects the dying patient's invocation of bodily integrity
and would not be viewed as assisting the patient's suicide.
Moving to situations in which the palliative act of a
physician may kill the patient, we conclude that the line
between legal and illegal conduct depends on application of
principles of criminal recklessness. The primary issue
becomes: when is risk of death justifiable? That is, when
does the benefit to the patient (relief of suffering) warrant
the increased risk of death posed by the palliative acts of
medical personnel. We suggest that the use of risky
323. See, e.g., People v. Kevorkian, 1993 WL 603212, *18 (Mich. Cir. Ct.,
Dec. 13, 1993) (drawing the boundary at presence of "an objective medical
condition"), reversed by Hobbins v. Attorney General, 518 N.W.2d 487 (1994).
The remaining question would be whether patients suffering grievously from
chronic pain should have a PAS prerogative even though they are not
terminally ill, that is, their natural affliction is not fatal.
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analgesics is lawful as long as the dosage is necessary to
relieve pain and does not create a practical certainty of
hastening death. When the patient's symptoms and
suffering are best addressed by deep sedation, we suggest
that this too is legally permissible as long as this palliative
course does not create a practical certainty that death will
result from the sedation. This conclusion insulates certain
forms of terminal sedation but leaves unclear the legal
status of deep sedation simultaneous with withholding of
artificial nutrition and hydration.
Current law draws the line at physician-assisted
suicide and euthanasia. The main distinction between this
kind of conduct (PAS) and other palliative intervention is
that death is certain or practically certain so that the
physician knows that the patient will die. This line between
conduct that poses a substantial risk of death and conduct
that is practically certain to cause death reflects a profound
distinction in the criminal law. Actors who are engendering
risk (who are potentially reckless) can always seek to assert
a general justification for the risk they create-in this
context, a justification that the act confers a net benefit
(relief of suffering) on the person who ultimately dies.
Actors who know that their conduct is practically certain to
cause death cannot assert that kind of justification. 4 One
simply cannot argue that a knowing or purposeful killing is
justifiable because the victim is better off dead. Thus, to
place physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia on the
criminal side of homicide is consistent with centuries of
criminal law.
Whether this is the best policy for the future is a
difficult question. We sketched certain difficulties with both
sides of the argument for legalization of PAS, highlighting
tensions and anomalies between the currently lawful and
unlawful modes of hastening death. However public policy
toward PAS comes out, the other forms of medical
assistance that we discussed in this paper (VSED, risky
analgesics, and certain modes of terminal sedation) are in
our view lawful and should be made widely available to
dying patients who make informed choices to take the risks
entailed by these medical courses.
324. For a brief discussion of the kinds of justification that can be offered
when one acts purposely or knowingly to cause death, see supra note 136.

